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Changes in the political, social, and media environments and their impact on the coverage of conflict: The case of the Arab citizens of Israel

Kurzfassung: Die vorliegende Studie untersucht, in welcher Weise die arabischen Bürger Israels in den hebräischen Medien porträtiert werden. Insbesondere geht es dabei um die Berichterstattung der nationalen Presse über zwei gewaltsame Zwischenfälle: über die Ereignisse rund um den ersten „Land Day“ (30.03.76) und über die Ereignisse während der ersten beiden Wochen der Al-Aksa Intifada im Oktober 2000. Damit verfolgen wir zwei Ziele. Erstens wollen wir die Art und Weise explorieren, wie die israelischen Araber während gewaltsamer Konflikte dargestellt werden, so dass die jüdische Bevölkerung sie als eine Bedrohung erlebt; und zweitens soll durch die Betrachtung dieser Darstellungsmittel in ihrem zeitlichen Rahmen die Annahme überprüft werden, dass der Darstellungsprozess dynamischer Natur ist und in sozialer wie auch in symbolischer Hinsicht von der sich ändernden „Realität“ beeinflusst wird. Als Untersuchungsmethode kamen sowohl quantitative als auch qualitative Verfahren der (Medien-)Inhaltsanalyse zum Einsatz.

Zwei Hauptfragen stehen im Mittelpunkt unserer Arbeit: 1. Wie wird „der andere“ während des Ausbruches eines nationalen/ethnischen Konflikts in den nationalen Medien dargestellt? Mit anderen Worten, wie werden arabische Israelis in der israelischen Presse geschildert? 2. Verändert sich diese Darstellung in den verschiedenen Zeitungen im Laufe der Jahre, und wie lässt sich ein solcher Unterschied erklären?

Zwei hebräischsprachige Zeitungen – ein Boulevardblatt und eine Qualitätszeitung - wurden analysiert und hinsichtlich der Art ihrer Berichterstattung über die Ereignisse miteinander verglichen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen Ähnlichkeiten in der Berichterstattung über beide Ereignisse in beiden Zeitungen, darunter die Darstellung der Ereignisse auf der Folie von Aufruhr und Terror, die Identifikation der israelischen Araber als Feind und die Nicht-Thematisierung der Ereignisse als Bürgerprotest. Beide Zeitungen übernahmen die Sichtweise des Establishments und der Sicherheitskräfte und ignorierten die arabische Stimme. Die Berichterstattung bediente sich einer „Wir-gegen-sie“-Terminologie, und die arabischen Führer wie auch die Hintergründe der Ereignisse wurden delegitimiert. Dennoch gab es gewisse Unterschiede in der Berichterstattung der beiden Zeitungen. Diese Unterschiede beruhen auf den im Laufe der Jahre eingetretenen Veränderungen im sozio-politischen Umfeld, im Umfeld der Medien und in der arabisch-israelischen Bevölkerung.

Abstract: The present paper examines the ways in which the Arab citizens of Israel are portrayed in the Hebrew media, with particular attention to the coverage of two violent incidents in national newspapers: the events surrounding the first Land Day (3/30/76) and the events of October 2000, which took place during the first two weeks of the Al-Aksa Intifadeh. Our purpose is twofold: 1) to examine the ways in which Israeli Arabs are portrayed in times of violent conflict that lead Jewish citizens to perceive them as threatening, and 2) to examine the means of presentation in terms of a time frame, in accordance with the view that the presentation process is dynamic, affected both socially and symbolically by a changing “reality.” The research was conducted using both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of media content.

Two central questions are at the heart of this research: 1. How is the “other” portrayed in the national media during the outbreak of national-ethnic conflict? In other words, how are Arab Israelis depicted in the Israeli press? 2. Has there been a difference in this representation in various newspapers throughout the years, and how can such differences be explained?

We analyzed two Hebrew national newspapers – one a popular daily and the other a quality paper – and compared their coverage of the events. Our findings showed similarities in the coverage of both events in the two papers, including the use of disorder and terror frames, the identification of Israeli Arabs as the enemy and not presenting the events as civilian protest. Both papers used the voice of the establishment and the security forces as the defining voices of the coverage, while ignoring the Arab voice. The coverage was presented with the use of “us vs. them” terminology, and the Arab leaders and the reasons behind the events were de-legitimized. Nevertheless, there were some differences between the coverage of the two newspapers and the two events. These differences stem from changes in the socio-political environment, the media environment and the Arab Israeli population in the course of the years.

1. Introduction

In this article we will examine the ways in which the Arab population of Israel¹ is portrayed in the Hebrew media, with particular attention to the coverage of two violent incidents by national newspapers. The events selected are those surrounding the first Land Day, which occurred on March 30, 1976, and those which took place in October 2000 during the first two weeks of the Al Aksa Intifada. In both cases Israeli Arab civilians were killed, and both are considered milestones in Israeli history and in the fractured Arab-Jewish relationship in particular. In our opinion, investigation of the media reporting of these events is of great importance because during times of conflict people rely on media even more heavily than usual, and they shape their views of reality (Cohen et al., 1990). Consequently, the purpose of this research is twofold: 1) to explore how the way in which the Arab citizens of Israel are portrayed in times of violent conflict encourages Jewish citizens to perceive them as a threat, and 2) to examine the means of presentation in terms of a time frame, in accordance with the view that the presentation process is a dynamic one affected both socially and symbolically by a changing "reality." This will be done via a quantitative and qualitative analysis of media content.

Presentation and stereotypes in the coverage of the "other"

The way minorities are covered in the media has become a major topic in media research. The reason for this interest lies in the fact that presentation is a central component of cultural life in all societies (Hall, 1997). Researchers who have dealt with the coverage of minority groups in the media have found that in most cases there has been a tendency to either ignore them or to portray them negatively. Such coverage implies that the "other" represents a threat to the social order. In addition, implicit in this coverage is the notion that because they are different from "us," minorities are to blame for our economic and social difficulties. The description, coverage, and portrayal of the "other" in the media, whether based upon religious, national, ethnic or other differences, is accompanied in many countries by the widespread use of generalizations, stereotypes, and prejudices, and ignores the background, causes, and political-social context that has given rise to difficulties and crises involving minorities in many areas (Avraham, 2001; First, 2001; Weimann, 2000; Wolfsfeld, 1997).

As we know, the mass media help us consolidate our interpretation of political, social, and economic conflicts. The media play a similar role in describing the "others" of our world. The term "construction" is used with regard to news stories, because news reports are stories created in the framework of a specific narrative which organize and define everyday events in a wider context (Wolfsfeld, 1997). In this process, the news continually presents impressions through pictures and words of different social groups and identities. In this manner, the media constructs for viewers the affiliations of certain groups and defines "us" and "them" and our national awareness, which is itself also an artificial social product, pertaining to an imagined community (Kellner, 1995).

The presentation process is affected by both the "political-social reality" and the "symbolic reality" in which it occurs. The influence of "political-social reality" functions on two levels. First, the effects of processes and events occur in a given time and environment. For example, the outbreak of a conflict increases the distinction and polarization between "us" and "them" (First, 2001). In addition, there is the framework of relations between the political institution and the media institution (Caspi & Limor, 1992). As mentioned above, the symbolic reality in which the presentation process occurs is comprised of various means of expression, including literature, art forms, and the media. The last of these formats includes the news, which is the central source that constructs our political, social, and economic agenda. The influence of this reality itself acts on two levels. First, the proliferation of channels presents an ever-increasing number of images. Second, the process of constructing the media product includes the routines of media organizations, the process of encoding information, for example, who was it who covered the "other," interpreted his actions, etc.

The presentation process includes stereotypes created during the sorting out and cataloging of the various fields, for aspects of society are subject to interpretation based on the physical environment or the symbolic environment in which they appear. This results in a distortion of the "social reality" of social groups, which inevitably become media subjects. The discussion of the means of presentation includes at least three indexes which assist in examining the location of the group within a given society: 1) How does the group appear in the context of the media – is it "extinct," portrayed stereotypically or "normally"? 2) What are the status systems with which group members are affiliated, in other words, the nature of the visibility of the "other," which is generally measured in terms of professional social position and status characteristics? 3) What are the modes of interaction between members of the dominant group and members of the minority group? These relationships indicate the extent of proximity between the groups. The existence of daily social interaction on an equal footing indicates that the hierarchy of power is diminishing (Gross, 1991; Greenberg & Brand, 1994).

1 Throughout our research we used the terms: "Israeli Arabs," "the Arab citizens of Israel," "the Arab population," etc. These terms are used most often in research on this topic.

Media frames

The discussion of media frames constitutes the connecting link with research on the question of representation, in other words between processes and products, since a dialectical relationship exists between the two. An analysis of the theories dealing with media frames demonstrates that different definitions exist. Here we are discussing the frame from the point of view of the media, regarding which there are a number of competing and complementary definitions (Gamson, 1989; Gitlin, 1980). A summary of the various definitions demonstrates that the framing process includes the placing of "facts" or components perceived as "reality" in frames that provide them with coherency, meaning the presentation of a causal explanation, moral evaluation, and/or recommendations for a solution. A media frame can be identified through a newspaper's use of metaphors, key sentences and symbolic means, including words and pictures. It should be noted that there is a constant competition among the various factions and interest groups which want to employ the media frames most suited to them. Additionally, in periods of conflict, the emphasis is placed primarily on the impact of the conflict, and less on its nature and possible solutions (First, 1998). Framing, according to Liebes (1997), includes the following mechanisms: excising, sanitizing, equalizing, personalizing, demonizing, and contextualizing. The framing mechanisms as such are in accordance with the methods we presented regarding the presentation of the "other." In general, it is widely noted that the viewpoint of news framing includes mechanisms of frame representation – of the exclusion and alienation of the "other" – which occur in a certain symbolic and cultural context.

Effects of socio-political environments on media content

Media serve as ideological instruments by delineating and distributing the parameters of discourse. News writers use framing mechanisms, as well as known socio-cultural codes, to transform the news from unusual and unexpected events into understandable media contents (Gitlin, 1982; Hartely, 1982). The presenter, namely the media organization, has reciprocal relations with the changing social and political environment and is also part of it. Accordingly, the presentation process is a dynamic one. In this environment there are a variety of cultural assumptions regarding a society's central values, which in turn affect the behavior of media personnel and the manner in which the news is presented, as well as the product itself (Avraham, 2002; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980).

The constructivist approach holds that news reporters prefer news stories that are recognized as effective and culturally acceptable, and tend to lend them professional approval. Editors' decisions are influenced by their opinions regarding the target audience and the belief that dominant groups have little interest in the status of minorities, unless such information might upset their day-to-day lives (Jakubowicz et al., 1994; van-Dijk, 1996). There is a greater tendency to place a minority group in more marginal media frames the less the values and goals of that group are consistent with those of the political and media elite. Ottosen (1995) holds that changes in the images of minorities stem from changes in the political elite's minority conceptualization. According to Ottosen, it is important to deal with minority images because stereotypes of and generalizations about marginal groups tend to legitimize the use of violence against them by the establishment/government (Avraham, 2001).

From 1976 to 2000: Changes in Israeli society

As previously mentioned, the media is a product of a particular country and culture, and as a consequence media images are dynamic. This cultural context is affected by two different sources, "socio-political reality" and the "symbolic reality" which is part of it and in which it creates and is created. All realities make their distinctive contribution, but we must not forget that there are permanent relations of reciprocity among them.

Changes in the social-political reality of Jewish Israeli society

Israeli society underwent profound changes in the period covered by the research (1976-2000). We will not delineate these changes here, but will rather briefly summarize a number of processes related to our discussion. The framework of relations between Israel and the Arab countries, as well as with the Palestinians, has undergone significant changes as a result of a number of events, including the peace agreement signed with Egypt in 1979, the Lebanese War in 1982, the first Intifada, which began in December 1987, the Gulf War of 1991, the mutual recognition agreements that were signed in 1993 between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (the Oslo Accords), the peace treaty signed with Jordan in 1994, and the beginning of negotiations with the Palestinians, Syrians, and Lebanese aimed at ending the continuous state of conflict. Primarily as a result of the Oslo Accords, peace was recognized as a political option whose recognition sharpened the political debate, culminating in the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. The peace process ultimately became deadlocked, and the Al Aksa Intifada broke out in October 2000.

The political system has also undergone significant changes. These changes include the end of Labor Movement hegemony in 1977 and the formation of a government by the Right (the Likud Party) for the first time. In addition, the

larger parties became weaker, and the political system went from one with a dominant center to one with a divided center (Arian, 1997). In this period over a million immigrants arrived in Israel, and the process of globalization and the communications revolution brought changes to politics as well as to societal values. Ethnic groups began to fight for their identities, individualism as an ideology grew in strength, universal values became acceptable, and a civil society began to develop (Timm, 2001). Politically and culturally speaking, the hegemony of the pseudo-Western secular "Israeli" was broken, and a number of almost autonomous societies and cultures began to appear separately from one another, even if they were dependent upon one another, one of them being the Arab-Israeli society.

Changes in Arab Israeli society

Most researchers who have dealt with the question of the identity of the Arab population in Israel agree that it is comprised of two central components. There is a civil element, resulting from the very status of Arabs as citizens of the State, and a national component, resulting from the national affinity of Arabs in Israel for the Arab world and the Palestinian people in the territories (Al-Haj, 2000). The formation of the identities of Arabs and their relationship with the State of Israel have been affected since the establishment of the State by four central focuses. These include: the local focus, namely, the internal structure of the Arab population; the national focus, pertaining to formal and informal status within the State of Israel; the regional focus, relating to the cultural and national affiliation with the Arab world, and in particular with the Palestinians in the territories; and the religious focus, involving the ethnic identities of the Moslems, Christians, and Druze. Ghanem and Osatski-Lazar (2001) maintain that an analysis of the events of October 2000 within the framework of the Al Aksa Intifada must include an additional focus, the global focus. They claim that the end of the Cold War was accompanied by an emphasis upon local and regional politics. It should be noted that there is a constant interaction among all of the above factors, though we shall primarily emphasize the first two. In the period covered by our research, from the 1970s to 2000, changes occurred in all four focuses. In the local realm, Israeli Arabs have undergone a process of modernization in economy and education (Al-Haj, 2000; Kimmerling & Migdal, 2001). Arab society has experienced a widespread politicization reflected in changes in voting habits, nationwide organizational developments and the development of political parties. Indeed, during the elections for Prime Minister in 1999, MK Beshara, an Israeli Arab, declared his intention to run as a candidate (Ghanem & Ositski-Lazar, 2001).

In the regional realm the "Israeliness" of the Arab citizens of Israel has been discussed again and again. Their "Israeliness" is expressed first and foremost in terms of their formal status, as they are citizens of the State of Israel, constituting 18% of the population. Nevertheless, the "Israeliness" of Arabs is incomplete, and they are marginalized in Israeli society. In other words, they have little influence on any level of daily life. Additionally, their interpretation of their citizenship is inconsistent with the acceptable Jewish interpretation of "loyalty to the State," empathy with its nature, and identifying with Jewish symbols. Although it seems that Israeli society is undergoing processes of democratization and is more amenable to the entry of marginal groups into the center, this process does not include Arabs (Ghanem & Ositski-Lazar, 2001). The Yom Kippur War (1973), the Lebanese War (1982), the first Intifada (1987), and increasing ties with the populations living in the territories have led to a growing "process of Palestinianization," a growing sense of Palestinian national identity amongst Israeli Arabs (Al-Haj, 2000).

The two major events chosen for this research and the period it covers emphasize the consolidation of national identity as opposed to civil identity. Both involve incidents of protest by Arab Israelis against actions of the Israeli government that culminated in the deaths of demonstrators – six in the first and 13 in the second. In the first, a series of violent confrontations took place on March 29-30, 1976 over the expropriation of lands owned by Arab Israelis by the State and was later dubbed *the First Land Day*. The second, the *events of October 2000*, which began with demonstrations on Thursday, September 28, 2000 against Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, was an important stage of the Al Aksa Intifada in the occupied territories. On October 1, the Arab citizens of Israel began to stage protests which developed into violent clashes with security forces throughout the country and continued for ten days.

The Arabs are the "other" in Israeli society because they are situated outside of the Israeli-Jewish collective and are portrayed as such in the media. However, their presentation is neither homogeneous nor static and is influenced by the framework of political relations that the different Arab groups apply to the State of Israel in a given period (First, 1998). Previous studies dealing with this subject concluded that the Hebrew media generally ignore the Arab population, and the little coverage there is deals primarily with disorder and perennial subjects such as crime, involvement in terrorism, violence and civil disorder (Asia, 2000; Avraham, et al., 2000; First, 1998).

Changes in the symbolic reality

There are conflicting views regarding the role of the press in Israeli society. This debate is particularly acute when examined in the context of liberal democracy. Usually, the Israeli press tends to behave no differently from state presses in un-democratic countries, e.g., with various self-imposed prohibitions (Pappe, 1997). The central explanation for such behavior was the Arab-Israeli conflict that has beset the State of Israel since it came into being. In times of war the

press has supported national aims and portrayed the conflict from the national perspective (Liebes, 1997). As such, the Israeli media (both print and broadcast) adopted the task of promoting the national cause in a variety of ways (see for example: Dor, 2001; First, 2001; Niger et al., 2001). There is no doubt that during the years covered by our research (1976-2000) a revolution took place in the national press (Caspi & Limor, 1992). Ideological party-oriented newspapers died out (aside from the ultra-Orthodox press), their place being taken by privately-owned newspapers. The battle for the hearts of readers altered the format of major newspapers such as *Ma'ariv* and *Yedioth Aharonoth*, popular newspapers which together account for approximately 90% of the market. Newspapers began to devote greater space to personal stories and focused upon "difficult news" in the humane format of the "soft" story (Roeh, 1994). Likewise, dramatic changes took place from the 1970s to the year 2000 in television stations. In this period the monopoly of public television came to an end, and commercial stations as well as cable television started up. Such developments increased the competition in all Israeli media forms.

2. Research methods

Research questions

Two central questions are at the heart of this research:

1. How is the "other" portrayed in the national media during the outbreak of national-ethnic conflict? In other words, how are Arab Israelis depicted in the Israeli press?
2. Has there been a change in this representation in various newspapers over the course of the years, and how can such changes be explained?

In this study we have used two research methods to examine the questions posed: an analysis of quantitative content and an analysis of the qualitative content of 388 articles and media texts.

Quantitative content analysis

In order to answer the questions posed by the research, a coding system was constructed to assist in the measurement of the dependent variables. The validity and reliability of this coding system was arrived at by means of three judges, who agreed amongst themselves an average of 93% of the time regarding the different variables on the coding page. In order to reach this percentage, the judges went through a training course, and a number of "pre-research" tests were made (pre-test). The coding page for newspaper analysis included the following variables: type of newspaper, date, location, length of news piece, type of event, writer's name and ethnic background, subjects reported on, existence of quoted sources, references to injured Arabs and their description, the Arab participant and his description, connection between the article and civil protest, terrorism, the Arab world and the Palestinians, the use of historical arguments, or group demands and issues mentioned in the article.

The sample population

Media: The two newspapers studied were *Yedioth Aharonoth* and *Ha'aretz*. These two papers were chosen for the following reasons: *Yedioth Aharonoth* is an independent commercial newspaper that is popular with the mainstream. It targets the public at large, its news items have emotional appeal and concentrate on personal stories, and it is the most widely-read newspaper in the country. *Ha'aretz* is an independent newspaper that is considered both high quality and elitist. It speaks primarily to the well-educated public and the elites, emphasizes institutional critique and adopts a liberal perspective.

Sample Period: We analyzed all the articles appearing in the two weeks following the events detailed in all the sections of the newspaper (aside from the sports section). Our analysis focused on two periods of time: the first two weeks following the events of Land Day in March 1976 (in our qualitative analysis we studied the two weeks preceding these events as well) and the first two weeks of the Al Aksa Intifada of October 2000.

Qualitative content analysis

In the current research, after viewing and reading all the articles pertaining to the events of our investigation, we extrapolated key components that in our opinion characterized the coverage of Israeli Arabs and were consistent with the characteristics described in the theoretical portion of this paper. These include types of framing, generalizations, limitations, objectivity and subjectivity, context, group voice or voice hegemony, sources of information and the writer's ethnic background.

3. Findings and interpretation

The data is presented through comparisons of the newspapers and the periods. The analysis of the press includes the analysis of 388 items (articles, opinion editorials, caricatures, photographs) from two newspapers. A total of 147 items were analyzed in 1976 and 241 items in 2000.

Coverage salience

1976: In the printed press there were 147 articles dealing with events surrounding Land Day; 80 articles appeared in *Yedioth Aharonoth* and 67 appeared in *Ha'aretz*. An analysis of these articles demonstrates that the event was prominently portrayed in the national newspapers. Information regarding the event appeared 14 times in the headlines on the first page of *Yedioth Aharonoth*, amounting to about 18% of the covered material. However, in *Ha'aretz* 10 references appeared in the front page headlines, amounting to approximately 15% of the covered material in the group. The events were accompanied by a large number of editorials. Comparison with studies on the coverage of Arab citizens during non-crisis periods (Aburaiya, et al., 1998; Avraham, 2001) demonstrates that this event received very extensive coverage. The average size of each article was 226 square centimeters.

2000: Regarding the events of October, there were 241 articles dealing with the topic, and they can be divided almost equally between *Yedioth Aharonoth* (113 articles) and *Ha'aretz* (128 articles). The matter was deemed of high importance, for most of the reports appeared on the front pages or the news pages. It should be noted that the subject appeared in 18% of the cases in the headlines or on the front page of *Yedioth Aharonoth*, as compared to 6% on the front page of *Ha'aretz*. The importance of the events studied is apparent from the number of editorials devoted to them in the newspapers (14% in *Yedioth Aharonoth* as compared to 18% in *Ha'aretz*). The average size of each article was 433 square centimeters.

Clashes accompanying the event – Disorder

1976: The event was typically categorized as a civil disorder. The total coverage of Land Day in *Yedioth Aharonoth* dealt with 30 events in terms of demonstrations, marches, property damage and loss of life. This represents about 38% of the total events. The report in *Ha'aretz* was quite similar. Twenty-six articles, amounting to about 39% of the articles printed, dealt with events in which there were civil disturbances such as demonstrations involving property damage and loss of life. In other words, the newspaper preference was more for events involving damage and personal injury, as opposed to discussions of the issues, their implications, alternative solutions, etc. As a result, the Arab Israeli community was identified more than anything else with violence and civil disorder, as well as with the protest it expressed.

2000: The event was classified in less than half of the articles as a civil disorder, in 41% of the examples in *Yedioth Aharonoth*, as opposed to 52% in *Ha'aretz*. The events were portrayed in various manifestations, including demonstrations, marches, property damage and loss of life.

Who is the spokesman – Is this the hegemonic voice?

1976: An analysis of the sources of quoted information reveals that in about 60% of the articles there was use of an information source in both newspapers. Security sources were provided with an opportunity to respond or reply in about 25% of all articles. In 40% of the articles there were responses from Jewish leaders to the events, whereas the responses of Arab leaders appeared in only 19% of the articles. At first glance, one might assume that Arab politicians were given sufficient representation, although an analysis of those quoted reveals that they were primarily Arab politicians who opposed the strike (Koren, 1994).

2000: Generally speaking, it can be said that the Jewish political institutional voice was far less apparent in both newspapers as compared to 1976, primarily in *Ha'aretz*. In this newspaper, the responses of Jewish leaders dropped to 26% in 2000. Concurrently, the defense establishment gained in strength as a news source. The most quoted source in both newspapers continued to be that of the security forces. In *Yedioth Aharonoth*, the security forces were cited in 32% of all articles, as compared to about 38% of all articles in *Ha'aretz*. A survey of the subject matter list shows that in *Yedioth Aharonoth* there was a similar level of presentation over time for Jewish leaders, which ranged between 29% and 31%. In comparison, while in *Ha'aretz* there was an increase in the level of presentation for Arab leaders (from 12% in 1976 to 22% in 2000), *Yedioth Aharonoth* showed a decrease from 21% to 12%. Additionally, the Arab participants mentioned in articles were still politicians (21% in *Yedioth Aharonoth* and 28% in *Ha'aretz*), though the demonstrators' voices can also be heard (5% in *Yedioth Aharonoth* and 16% in *Ha'aretz*), along with those of the people in the street (5% in *Yedioth Aharonoth* and 9% in *Ha'aretz*). It seems that *Ha'aretz* tends to portray a greater variety of opinions than *Yedioth Aharonoth*.

Similarity in subject matter in the two newspapers

1976: An analysis of the subjects most often covered demonstrates a small difference between the newspapers. In *Yedioth Aharonoth* the seven most covered subjects were, in descending order: the connection of the events with coexistence and the status of Arab Israelis in the State, activities of the security forces, the protests themselves, the response of Jewish leaders, attempts at further incitement, internal struggles between group leaders and the responses of Arab leaders.

2000: An analysis of the most frequently covered subjects reveals that in *Yedioth Aharonoth* the seven most often covered subjects, in descending order, were as follows: connection with coexistence and the status of Israeli Arabs in the State (49%), the protests themselves (47%), actions of the security forces (45%), the responses of Jewish leaders (29%), reports of Arab casualties (25%), attempts at further incitement (18%) and reports of Jewish casualties (18%). In *Ha'aretz* the seven most often covered subjects, in descending order, were as follows: the protests themselves (73%), actions of the security forces (45%), links to coexistence and the status of Israeli Arabs in the State (48%), reports of Arab casualties (22%), complaints of discrimination (26%), responses of Jewish leaders (26%) and the responses of Arab leaders (22%).

Despite the similarity in the subject priority and the amount of coverage between the two newspapers in 1976, the differences between them were more pronounced in 2000 in two areas: group discrimination and the responses of Arab leaders. In *Ha'aretz* there was a preference for covering complaints of discrimination (26% of all articles in *Ha'aretz* as opposed to 15% in *Yedioth Aharonoth*). A similar level of coverage was maintained regarding the responses of Arab leaders (22% in *Ha'aretz* versus 12% in *Yedioth Aharonoth*). It seems that the focus of reporting in *Yedioth Aharonoth* was the Jewish collective. It appears over time that *Yedioth Aharonoth* still preferred to cover matters relating to coexistence and the status of Israeli Arabs in the State. In these articles the events were examined in the light of the group's status in the State and in connection with its activities regarding coexistence. The subject of Arab leaders' responses received less coverage in 2000. It should be noted that in *Ha'aretz* there was a sharp increase in the coverage of complaints of discrimination, yet a decline in reporting on attempted incitement and Jewish casualties. This contrasts with the increase in reporting of Arab casualties (from 18% in 1976 to 37% in 2000).

The reporter and the Jewish perspective

1976: In *Yedioth Aharonoth* no articles were found regarding the "other," the Arab. Likewise, the newspaper did not contain any reports or editorials written by Arab citizens. In *Ha'aretz* only 6% of the relevant articles were written by Arab reporters or analysts. Coverage of the events presented the Jewish perspective, in terms that implicitly or explicitly invoked notions of "us" versus "them." This type of presentation is important for two reasons. First, the group is separated from "us," the Jewish citizens, and secondly, by their very classification as "others" Arabs are perceived as different from the majority group, and therefore their legitimacy is questioned:

"... *We dismantled 'El Arad' (an Arab Party) ... and we exiled from the country some of the inciters ... we closed Arab newspapers, we dispersed demonstrations, we closed Arab stores and schools ...*" (*Yedioth Aharonoth* 23.3.76).

2000: In this period, the first glimmerings of the voices of Arab Israelis appeared. There were 16 articles written by Arab writers in *Yedioth Aharonoth*, and these articles accounted for 14% of all articles dealing with the subject. In *Ha'aretz* there were only five articles by Arab writers, making up only 4% of the total coverage of the subject. It appears that the number of Arab writers had increased, with the most dramatic increase appearing in *Yedioth Aharonoth*. This increase was due to the hiring of an Arab writer, as well as a new willingness to permit Arab Knesset members and Arab newspaper editors to respond to events. The percentage of articles mentioning the number of Arabs who had been shot doubled in relation to Land Day (11% in *Yedioth Aharonoth*, 16% in *Ha'aretz*).

Group leadership: Hostile and non-representative

1976: In addition to the alienation of the Arab population of Israel, in two major areas a similar process of delegitimization occurred in the media regarding the group's leaders. First, for a variety of political reasons, news organizations declared the group leaders to be 'off limits', thereby implying that they had joined Israel's enemies by trying to prevent the land expropriation and by speaking out against discrimination. Secondly, the leadership was portrayed as non-representative of the group. Characterizing the leaders as "nationalistic extremist forces" (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, 30.3.76), "Rakah (the Arab Communist Party) propagandists" (*Ha'aretz*, 29.3.76), "subversive elements" (*Yedioth Aharonoth*) belittles their public activities. Moreover, it was claimed that supporters of the strike were not representative of the population, and the disparagement of the legality of the strike created a platform for those opposed to the strike. The strikers were disparaged in two ways. First, their ability to think autonomously was belittled through caricatures and portrayals of Israeli Arabs standing in front of a *Rakah* pharmacy in which a nefarious pharmacist was urging them to purchase a magic potion (*Ha'aretz*, 31.3.76). Second, the leaders were characterized as

PLO members, and in another caricature stones thrown by demonstrators form the letters "PLO" (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, 2.4.76). Along with providing a stage for those opposing the strike, the leaders of the strike were distanced from the discourse, while their statements and claims were disparaged.

2000: Both newspapers found that the ultimate reason for the actions of Israeli Arabs stemmed from incitement by Arab MKs. This is how events were described in *Ha'aretz*: "The Arab MKs are partners in the bitter consequences ..." (page A1, A3, 2.10.00). In other words, these MKs were initiating some of the events. According to an article in *Yedioth Aharonoth*, "Incitement by MKs craving ratings" (page 1, 18, 2.10.00) was behind many of the events. It was in fact implied that these leaders had incited the incidents in order to increase their popularity. Despite the article's warning, one can also find in it the understanding that "the Arab MKs are the principal representatives for the organization of dialogue between the majority and minority. We can ask them not to be swept along by the fickle masses, but rather to steer its behavior." An interesting explanation was provided (*Ha'aretz*, 6.10.00) for the behavior of the Arab Israeli leadership: "Minority leaders are either weak or agitators."

Interpretation of events: Discriminated against or in league with the enemy?

1976: An analysis of the reasons for the strike will help us understand how the media construction of events controls the depiction of reality. In other words, were these demonstrations against discrimination, deprivation, and land expropriation – as the demonstration organizers claimed – or provocation by a marginal, unrepresentative group with ties to the enemy? It seems that most of the news commentators chose the second media frame, portraying the developments with an emphasis upon the ties between the organizers of the demonstrations and the Arab world or the Palestinians, as part of the unceasing struggle to destroy Israel. " 'The Arabs are stabbing us in the back', said a Jewish businessman '... the Arabs are raising their heads. *It is undoubtedly another link in the demonstrations in Judea and Samaria designed to make the State smell bad ...*' (*Ha'aretz*, 23.3.76). The manner in which events were reported dismisses the demonstrators' stated reasons for the demonstrations. Instead, "correct" reasons were given for the demonstrations: "... at first glance the Land Day demonstrations were 'against discrimination, against land expropriation'; although the truth is well known to us. Well-known sources demonstrate that there is no discrimination involved in the matter" (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, 1.4.76). An additional connotation of "us" and "them" relates to the relations with the superpowers at the time – "we," the West, versus "them," the East bloc. Along with the adoption of a media frame and the interpretation provided by the establishment, we discerned an attempt to view the land expropriations as not only harmless to the residents, but as actually improving their situation.

Two competing explanations were given for the strike, which are reciprocally related. First, the Arab population of Israel is an enemy and allied with the Arab world and the Palestinians. Second, this was an attempt by *Rakah* to dominate the Israeli Arabs and incite them against the State. *Rakah*, according to the descriptions of the news reporters, is a political enemy whose legitimate existence must be terminated. At the same time, spokespersons of the establishment (for example, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Shmuel Toledano, the Prime Minister's Advisor on Arab Affairs) were given the stage, which they utilized to sharply criticize the activities of *Rakah*:

"... the Prime Minister – Yitzhak Rabin, who sat in the Knesset during a no-confidence vote advocated by the *Rakah* faction, will speak wonders of the self-restraint of the security forces, faced with *the violent and provocative deeds inspired by subversive elements ...*" (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, 31.3.76).

2000: "The Fire has Spread to Israeli Arabs" was the headline that dominated the front page of *Yedioth Aharonoth* (2.10.00), and in such a manner that the conflict in the territories was linked to the clashes with the Arab citizens of Israel. A supplementary headline on the same day reported about the significance of the events: "Rioting in Arab villages in Galilee and the 'Triangle' severed the connection with the North of the country." The notion that a real threat was growing was underscored by a picture printed on the same page. The caption accompanying this picture informs readers that, "Arabs threw stones and border policemen *were forced* to fire rubber bullets." The association between the general Arab-Israeli conflict and the Al Aksa Intifada was made through the use of various media techniques. These include: *language* – "Intifada in Galilee and Jaffa" (page 4, 23); *visual documentation* – the pictures; via *newspaper graphic design* – in proximity to a picture of the clashes in Galilee was another picture of identical size of a boy, Mohammed A-Dura, who had been shot in clashes in the Gaza Strip; *use of symbols* – the use of the same logo during the coverage of the events in the territories and in Arab villages in Israel.

This association blurred the lines between the two conflicts in such a way that it implied the unity of the Palestinian forces going to war in Israel. From the events reported that day in *Yedioth Aharonoth*, one could reach the conclusion that it was an all-out war, one vast battlefield, with "three days of battles in the territories and in Israel, accompanied by live fire" ("War of Independence?" page 2). To enhance the portrayal of the country as under siege from "all the centers of opposition," one could still see the green line (the 1967 border) on the map, but it was quite blurry and vague. This associative process in *Yedioth Aharonoth* continued. On October 3, 2000 the paper printed two pictures of

equal size. One was taken in Israel and showed young Israeli Arabs burning tires, and alongside it was a picture of incidents in the territories in which a young Palestinian can be seen desecrating an Israeli flag. In contrast to the reports in *Yedioth Aharonoth*, *Ha'aretz* (2.10.00) reported about the rioting in the territories in its front page headline. The newspaper's reports did not include the same implied rhetorical threats, although they could be inferred from the reporting of the overall situation, which was restrained as a result of editing by security sources:

"Security sources expressed deep concern regarding the dimensions of the protests amongst the Israeli Arab public. In their opinion, the obstruction of roads for long periods of time is a very disturbing sign of what may come next. They expressed concern that the strikes and protests had been coordinated from the start with the Palestinian Authority."

The tendency of *Ha'aretz* not to link events in the territories with those occurring inside Israel was evident in the supplementary headline on the front page (3.10.00):

"Rioting increasing: five Israeli Arabs were killed yesterday, two more succumbed to their wounds. In the territories: two Israelis and about 15 Palestinians were killed in shooting incidents."

The major headline of the newspaper focused upon the events in Israel and delved into the significance of the events for the government with statements such as "Barak and Arab Israeli leaders will meet in an attempt to bring calm."

Historical contexts of events and patterns of identity

1976: We sought to determine whether the articles provided historical explanations of the events, and whether the reader could ascertain the demands of the group involved in the incident. In the above case, there is a long history of the nationalization of land, and the strike had a defined purpose – to bring an end to the confiscation of Arab land. In both newspapers, the historical reasons for the events were delineated in just 13% of the articles. The group's demands ranged in both newspapers from 11% to 16%; and both claims together amounted to about 10%. Additionally, we sought to determine if the articles made any reference to civilian protest, specifically, to its civilian context in the State of Israel or primarily to the Palestinians in the territories and the Arab world. Although the strike is the ultimate civilian protest activity, the connection to civilian protest appeared in fewer than 50% of the articles (43% in *Yedioth Aharonoth* and 51% in *Ha'aretz*). The relevance of the context of Arab identity was made via references to both the Palestinians and the Arab world. The first reference to the Palestinians was made in *Yedioth Aharonoth* in 64% of the articles, and in *Ha'aretz* in 49% of the articles. Reference to the Arab world was made in *Yedioth Aharonoth* in 44% of the articles and in 37% of those in *Ha'aretz*. Furthermore, an interesting finding is the high percentage of links found between the strike and terrorism, despite the inherently civilian nature of the strike (19% of the articles in *Yedioth Aharonoth*).

2000: At the onset of the disturbances, the group was presented as having just one goal – identification with the Palestinians in the territories. Only after Arab civilians were shot were references made to the discrimination suffered by the group, with primary emphasis on the civilian status of the Arab residents. It is interesting that there was a decline in the percentage of these two components in comparison to 1976. Reference to the historical reasons for the events was made in about 20% of the articles. Group demands are more prominent in *Ha'aretz* than in *Yedioth Aharonoth* (22% as compared to 12%). In both newspapers, the two claims made together in the same article appear in no more than 11% of the items.

As mentioned above, an additional aspect of context entails the contours of the surveyed group's identity. The group's connection with the Palestinian people was initially portrayed in articles in both newspapers – 71% in *Yedioth Aharonoth* and 63% in *Ha'aretz*, thereby emphasizing the element of Palestinian identity. After three days had passed, however, the public discussion shifted to the group's civilian identity, a topic discussed in about 48% of the articles in *Yedioth Aharonoth* and 43% of those in *Ha'aretz*. Reference to the Arab world occurred in between 15% (*Yedioth Aharonoth*) and 9% (*Ha'aretz*) of the articles. In light of the fact that at first group coverage was more limited regarding Palestinian activities, the reference to terrorism was limited in both newspapers (8% in *Yedioth Aharonoth* and 6% in *Ha'aretz*).

Blaming the group for members' deaths and supporting security forces

1976: News reporters had a tendency not to accept the group's claims regarding the question of who was to blame for the violence that broke out, resulting in many dead and injured amongst the Israeli Arabs. In most of the articles it was claimed that the group's policies were responsible for the response of the security forces, who had had no choice but to use live ammunition in self-defense. In other words, group violence was the catalyst for the violence of the security forces. Likewise, the security forces were lavished with praise for their actions:

"The violent breach of the curfew necessitated the use of weapons" (*Ha'aretz*, 31.3.76).

"... in no other country could a situation arise in which a group, for all intents and purposes a fifth column, would dare to attend Parliament the day after orchestrating and implementing violent confrontations, and *accuse the State of committing crimes*" (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, 1.4.76).

News reporter 'enlistment' in the State's defense was so widespread that in some cases identification with the security forces went beyond support for their claims (in other words, the security forces were compelled to use live fire):

"... *Congratulations ... it is our duty to send commendation to our police, who so faithfully carried out their duties in these difficult times ...* (an editorial extolling the security forces) (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, 4.4.76).

The law-and-order syndrome became clear in discussions of the security forces. The legitimacy of maintaining public order, first and foremost, stemmed from the view of the news reporters that the law was not the appropriate response for dealing with a violent strike:

"This decision can be appealed in accordance with law – *and anyone who attempts to use the means of incitement and violence will be met with the appropriate response*" (editorial article in *Ha'aretz*, 28.3.76).

2000. In most articles the security forces were given starring roles, primarily the police and senior officers. Discourses on "law and order" predominated. Police actions and the deaths of Israeli civilians did not merit any serious criticism and were portrayed as regrettable but unavoidable. News commentators did not challenge the principle of "law and order." For example, when an automobile driven by an Arab pediatrician was fired upon on October 3, *Yedioth Aharonoth* described the incident (4.10.00) as follows: "Nazareth Police involved in another serious incident." The newspaper concluded the article with the response of one of the police chiefs, who placed the blame on the doctor: "Just as the doctor drove down the road, a Molotov cocktail was thrown at the police. The startled doctor drove towards the police. The police suspected that he had thrown the Molotov cocktail – and opened fire in response. The incident is being investigated." Despite the problematic answer, the news personnel did not ask additional probing questions. It seems, once again, that the group was held responsible for a member's death. It was not until October 4 that for the first time an editorial criticized police behavior. In a piece on page 2 of *Yedioth Aharonoth* the editor criticized the actions of the security forces, declaring that "a black flag of illegality hovered over the command to use live ammunition against the demonstrators."

We have thus seen the similarities in the manner in which events have been presented over the years. Nevertheless, the question remains: in what way was the coverage of the events of October 2000 different from that of the events of 1976?

Despite the similarity, one could find in the pages of the newspapers in 2000 a call for coexistence and an understanding of the pain that burst forth from the "other." That is, in addition to the criticism of Arab Knesset members, criticism could also be found of the Israeli Right, along with sympathy for the anger of Arab citizens of Israel. Criticism was leveled primarily in editorial articles in which one could find empathy for the pain of the "other," a desire to continue living together, and criticism of "us" as well. In *Ha'aretz* there were editorial articles and criticisms by a growing number of journalists. In an article entitled "On the Temple Mount and Speaking Out Against Discrimination" a journalist described "emotional youths speaking with a sense of distress about 'Jewish occupation', discrimination, humiliation, unemployment and despair" (3.10.00). Despite the problematic framing of the events in *Yedioth Aharonoth* (as described above), by the second day of the news reporting (the third day of the incidents) other voices could also be heard. One writer, in an article entitled "Save My City" (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, 3.10.00, page 4), blamed both the Jews and the Arabs, saying, "It's a great day for Jewish and Moslem fanatics, who see peace as anathema. It's a devastating failure for the advocates of peace, who did not understand how to translate their dream into an understandable language." The writer also expressed understanding of and empathy for the others' situation: "The Islamic and Jewish nationalist racists leave no alternative for this population, having been caught for decades between the Israeli hammer and the anvil of nationalist fundamentalism."

Another senior reporter, in an article entitled "The Pain Bursts Out" (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, 3.10.00, page 13), described the battlefield (his section was called "In the Line of Fire") in an Arab village, Um El Fahm. Although he felt himself to be in danger during his stay in Nazareth, he quotes the words of Arab leaders and their claims against the government, the police, the media, and the attitudes of these groups towards the Arab population. In addition to criticism, the writer attempts to understand the sources of the uprising and to delineate them with the assistance of his doctor friend, who felt he had been turned into a second-class citizen. "These things are well known, but it hurts so much when said by your good friend, among the best students in the class, a person who did everything, everything to be an Israeli." He also reaches the conclusion that Arab-Jewish relations have not been completely shattered by these events. "Regarding my compatriots, the crisis is an outburst of accumulated pain."

Another difference can be found in the cessation of the process of objectification of Israeli-Arab citizens. On the fourth day of clashes the news pages (page 2) of *Yedioth Aharonoth* already featured photos of six Arabs killed. In addition,

pictures of two Nazareth residents who had been killed appeared on October 10. The caption under the main picture in the article, which was taken from television, was "Bidding the Children Farewell."

The victims from Nazareth were personalized in both *Yedioth Aharonoth* and *Ha'aretz*. However, in *Yedioth Aharonoth* more emphasis was placed upon the feelings of the victims' families, whereas *Ha'aretz* presented the opinions of the family members about the behavior of the security forces.

As we have stated, the media ecology underwent a change, and the press could not ignore the images on the small screen. In fact, in *Yedioth Aharonoth* we found the story of an Arab woman doctor and her sister from Nazareth who were beaten by police forces. They were assaulted while on their way home as they stopped with a small group of people on Fountain Square in Nazareth. The article covered the story of the woman doctor, and alongside it was a picture of the policeman who had struck the woman – a picture taken from television. Additionally, voices of the "other" could be heard as well. In *Yedioth Aharonoth*, next to the opinions of a Jewish leader were those of an Arab reporter ("Dangerous Turning-Point," page 1, 21), both of which appeared under similar frames on the front page of the newspaper. One could read the positions of these adjacent articles in two contrasting ways. There are those who would claim that the article by the Arab writer pales in light of the newspaper's general tone, according to which Arab Israelis were part of a general threat, the aim being to enhance the feeling of conflict. Conversely, others might claim that despite the troubled atmosphere, the newspaper chose to give the "other" an opportunity to express his position.

4. Discussion and conclusion

A comparison of the types of media coverage of the events surrounding Land Day and the early events of the Al Aksa Intifada of 2000 amongst the Arab population in Israel reveals that there were both similarities and differences between the newspapers, as well as across the years. The similarities and differences both revolve around the central means of presentation in minority group presentation, and the myriad ways of portraying political-social conflicts in the framework of symbolic reality. Coverage of the events surrounding Land Day in the press during 1976 provides a classic example of symbolic extinction, objectification, and stereotyping, and the unequal balance of power in the reciprocal relations between majority and minority groups. Newspaper framing included different means of presentation that helped to belittle the existence of the group, its demands, its explanations for the demonstrations and its proposals for resolving the conflict. Quantitative symbolic extinction could be found in the number of articles, small in both number and size, devoted to the topic. Qualitative extinction of the Israeli-Arab citizens was expressed by means of descriptors applied to the strikers, such as: "traitors," "rabble," "agitators," and "fifth column." Such an approach provided legitimacy for blaming the group for its death. The Israeli-Arab citizens suffered from objectification – transparency both as strikers and as victims. The number of spokesmen who organized or participated in the strike and appeared in the media were few indeed. The victims remained anonymous – without homes, ages, professions or life stories.

The balance of power between the groups was clear. Reciprocal relations arising from the coverage reveals a paternalistic relationship in which the larger group – the Jews – did not assume responsibility for the deaths of members of the other group, the Israeli-Arab citizens. The press provided a platform for the Jewish politicians and security forces, and in order to completely de-legitimize the events surrounding the strike, it provided a platform for those amongst the Arab citizens of the State who opposed the strike. Reciprocal relations were expressed primarily on an institutional level concerning both the political institution and the media institution. In terms of the political institution, we found that the views expressed were primarily those of the Jewish establishment, emphasis being given to those who organized the strike, *Rakah*. In terms of the media institution, the voice of the "other" was not heard. In other words, no Israeli-Arab news reporters were quoted at all, a fact that additionally contributed to the alienation of the Arabs from their citizenship as Israelis. The news stories' declared support for the security forces and the labeling of the leadership of the strike as enemies of all citizens of the State contributed further to this alienation. The focus upon official sources and the adoption of their language and the terminology they employed to interpret the events created closed perspectives that left no place for alternative viewpoints. The reporting in both newspapers portrayed the strike as involving the disruption of public order, and the frame of coverage was accompanied by the de-legitimization of the group's activities, its leaders and its demands, while all Arab citizens were generalized to belong to the enemy. There was agreement amongst writers that *Rakah* was to blame. Although it was possible to interpret the events in different ways, the writers chose to interpret them in the context of an attempt to harm Israel, instead of depicting a group that had been treated unjustly and therefore demanded change and justice.

All of the points mentioned above regarding the coverage in 1976 can be made regarding the coverage of the events of October 2000 as well. The most prominent characteristic of the news reporting was the portrayal of the actions of the Arab citizens primarily as disrupting civil order. However, this time the framing of the stories was more threatening. The events were portrayed as a war against the very existence of Jewish citizens in their homeland, the initial central comparison being made to a "war for independence." The alienation and disenfranchisement of Arab citizens were also

increased by these incidents. A connection was found between the protests and events in the territories and other incidents such as rioting and violent demonstrations perceived as posing an existential threat to the Jewish population (as appears in other research, such as Niger and others, 2001). The process included the use of language, visual documentation, graphic editing, and the use of various symbols. A villain was found once again, just as in the previous conflict. This time it was Israeli-Arab Knesset members, primarily members of the Arab Parties. Reporters themselves supported the actions of the security forces, criticism of the security forces was extremely limited, and the security discourse was once again predominant. Arab citizens were once again blamed for their own suffering, and the coverage and the interpretation of the events through graphic editing, pictures, and maps made their activities synonymous with the larger Arab-Israeli conflict.

Comparison between the two newspapers showed that in 1976 there was a difference in the coverage of events, but the difference was rather slight. The topics covered were similar, and the frequency of their appearance was similar as well. The reason for this can be summed up with the phrase "crisis drives Jewish writers back home," that is, there is a tendency amongst journalists to rally around the official version of incidents. Likewise, in October 2000 the phenomenon of "coming back home" occurred amongst news-people who once again rallied around the official stance, although this time there was increased latitude that permitted the voicing of other opinions. Despite the similarity between the two periods, there were some significant differences as well. The first prominent difference between the two periods was the volume of reporting. The number of articles in both newspapers together almost doubled from 147 articles in both newspapers about events surrounding Land Day in 1976 to 241 articles during the outbreak of the Al Aksa Intifada. Additionally, the size of the articles themselves almost doubled between the two periods. This finding demonstrates the increased importance of the topic in the national, political, and social day-to-day events of the State of Israel, which, in turn, permitted a greater variety of voices to be heard.

Another change could be found in the voices that occupied the journalists' stage. First of all, the voice of the Jewish political establishment was muted, while the voice of the defense establishment grew in strength. The Arab citizens' voice also underwent a change. There was a difference in the number of Arabs who appeared as writers of articles and editorials, as well as of those interviewed in the newspapers, and the content of their messages changed as well. Whereas in 1976 the Arab-speakers played second fiddle to Jewish opinions, and those quoted largely opposed the strike, by 2000 the opinions of Arab citizens were presented as a contrast to those of the Jews in an attempt to portray events from the Arab perspective. Change also occurred in the framework of the reporting itself. The most significant turning-point took place in *Yedioth Aharonoth*, where for the first time there were Arab journalists, and leaders and representatives of the group were allowed to offer alternative points of view about the incidents. Whereas the voice of Jewish reporters and Jews interviewed in 1976 was unified, by 2000 a variety of voices could be heard, both on the Jewish side and on the Israeli-Arab side, thereby to some extent fragmenting the unity. In both newspapers one could find articles and editorials about Jews who expressed sorrow, empathy, and a desire to mend the tapestry of relations between Jewish and Israeli-Arab citizens. Such articles appeared by the second day of the incidents. Likewise, Arab writers and intellectuals were allowed to express their opinions, and their articles and editorials could be found, for example, on the first page of *Yedioth Aharonoth*.

In 2000 the differences between the newspapers had increased. *Ha'aretz* and *Yedioth Aharonoth* each focus upon different target audiences, and the editorial decision-makers of the newspapers believe that their audience differs in its points of view and outlook regarding the Arab population in Israel (Avraham, 2001). As a matter of fact, interviews with journalists demonstrate different outlooks regarding the target audience. The *Yedioth Aharonoth* writers who were interviewed claimed that there is a connection between the editors' behavior and the views of the target audience. In their opinion, editors prefer not to publish positive articles about Arabs because such articles would not interest their audience. In contrast, for *Ha'aretz*, the outlook of the target audience, its preferences and what it needs to know are totally different from those of *Yedioth Aharonoth*. A reporter covering the group alleged that the newspaper staff expects him to air the problems of Arabs in the newspaper, since it is deemed important that the target audience know about them. On one hand there is the viewpoint of *Yedioth Aharonoth*, which believes that the reader is not interested in objective coverage of matters affecting the Arab population of Israel. This contrasts with *Ha'aretz*, which seeks to advance the group and its affairs by means of fair and comprehensive coverage. The differences in outlook inevitably express themselves in different coverage and attitudes between the newspapers and the group. This extinction was evident primarily in the difference between them in topics covered. For example, *Ha'aretz*, far more than *Yedioth Aharonoth*, preferred topics such as charges of discrimination by the group, reports of Arab casualties, and the opinions of Arab leaders. The latter preferred items such as attempts by Arab leaders to incite unrest, reports of Jewish casualties, and the opinions of Jewish leaders about the incidents.

During the coverage of both events, the press exhibited a tendency to adopt the interpretations and definitions provided by the security forces in order to explain, and to a certain extent to justify, the response of the security forces. When these definitions become the dominant tools of the media, the media itself becomes part of the security process. Through the newspapers' coverage, the use of "security definitions" and the linkage of the protests to other events and

events in the occupied territories, readers were in effect "prepared" to think of the events in the context of an immediate and existential threat to their lives, which in turn provided legitimacy and justification for the use of all the means at the disposal of the security forces (Koren, 1994).

Although both newspapers framed the "other" in a similar fashion, the reporting of the two newspapers definitely changed over time. In *Ha'aretz* the difference was paramount between 1976 and 2000. *Yedioth Aharonoth* portrayed a greater feeling of threat than that described in *Ha'aretz*, and the latter presented a more balanced and consistent picture. Both newspapers utilized permanent logos accompanying the coverage of the events in the initial days following the outbreak of the events – a permanent headline that went with the pages dealing with the different aspects of the events and a secondary headline that varied depending upon the subject covered on that page. A feeling of moderation was created by the relationship between the text and the pictures, between the different texts, excessive and contrasting expressions, and the graphic editing of the newspaper. The impression of moderation in *Ha'aretz* stemmed largely from the style, the lack of both pictures and emotional terms. Nevertheless, it is our opinion that the style of the articles, which focused more upon reports and was more security-establishment oriented, created the sense that an appeal to the collective seemed more rational. It should be noted that both newspapers made scant criticism of the defense establishment. *Yedioth Aharonoth* tried to portray events in the Jewish collective life of Israeli society. Moreover, the reporting in *Yedioth Aharonoth* underwent a change during the period surveyed, and the initially enflamed tone was moderated over time, reaching its peak in a lengthy research article in the weekend edition on the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Arabs.

The events of 2000 transpired in a socio-political reality marked by reciprocal relations that signified a different symbolic reality. Jewish citizens and Arab citizens alike had undergone significant changes since 1976. The Zionist armor now had cracks, ideological differences between different Jewish groups had grown, and the old rule of the elite (Kimerling & Migdal, 2001) was no longer secure. In addition, substantial changes had occurred amongst the Arab population in Israel, primarily during the last decade. A new, stable generation had arisen with a firm national identity, as well as consolidated political views. The grandchildren of the generation of 1948 and the children of those who had led the Day events in 1976 stood at the center of the political arena during the events of 2000 (Rabinowitz & Abu Bakar, 2002). Likewise, there was radical change in the media ecology accounting for the basis of the symbolic reality in which the process of representation and framing transpires. Despite the differences both between the two newspapers and the periods of the events, the distinction in press coverage between "us" and "them" still exists and is the result of a vicious cycle that has yet to be resolved. The problem is that the Jewish writer reports and broadcasts to the Jewish audience from the Jewish viewpoint. However, it is apparent that this distinction is less clear-cut than previously. Changes can be found in the prominence of Arab opinions aired, the names applied to the group, the nationality of the writers reporting and analyzing the events, the references to the names of victims, an increase in the diversity of Arab voices reflected in the articles, and so forth.

In conclusion, both similarities and differences stem from the fact that both the socio-political reality and the symbolic reality have undergone vast changes. At the same time, reciprocal relations between them have changed the process of representation and framing. A comparison between the media's behavior in the two periods provides a better understanding of the coverage of the events of 2000 than if the events were analyzed in isolation. This comparison provides us with a better perspective regarding the path taken by the media in Israel since the 1970s. Accordingly, despite the criticism we have made of the manner in which the media covered the "other," there has been a change for the better.

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