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War Journalism and 'Objectivity'


Drei der wichtigsten Konventionen bevorzugen offizielle Quellen; eine dualistische Konstruktion von Geschichten und Ereignissen über den Ablauf hinweg. Wenn man sie für die Darstellung von Konflikten verwendet, bringt jede von ihnen Leser und Publikum dazu – oder auch nicht –, gewaltsame, reaktive Antworten zu überbewerten und nicht-gewaltsame, entwicklungsartige Reaktionen zu unterbewerten.


In einigen Aspekten kann gezeigt werden, dass es Kriegsjournalismus für Nachrichtensendungen schwieriger macht, ihre öffentlichen Pflichten zu erfüllen. Derzeit wächst ein Bewusstsein für die Spannung zwischen diesen beiden Begrenzungen für Journalismus und den Einfluss auf die Art, wie öffentliche Debatten geführt und mediiert werden. Mehr Friedensjournalismus würde dazu beitragen, die staatlichen Nachrichten wieder mit den berechtigten öffentlichen Erwartungen in Einklang zu bringen.

Abstract: This article opens by considering an apparent paradox. Many professional journalists, working on many media in many countries, consider themselves 'objective'. They do not, at least, set out to skew their coverage of important issues in favour of one side or the other. And yet much of their coverage of conflicts shows a discernible dominant pattern of War Journalism - biased in favour of war. This is not because of a lack of objectivity, the article suggests, but a surfeit. The set of conventions many editors and reporters regard as defining 'objective' journalism arose in response to economic and political conditions which rewarded news that could commend itself as unobjectionable to the maximum number of potential customers.

Three of the most important conventions privilege official sources; a dualistic construction of stories and event, over process. Each of these, when applied to the representation of conflicts, leads readers and audiences – or leaves them – to over-value violent, reactive responses and under-value non-violent, developmental responses.

Industry conventions sit uneasily alongside equally time-honoured expectations of journalism. These are encoded in rules and regulations governing the content of broadcast news, in many jurisdictions which have a public service concept for radio and television.

In some respects, War Journalism can be shown to make it more difficult for broadcast news services to fulfil their public service obligations. Awareness is now growing, of the tension between these two pressures on journalism and its influence on the way pressing public debates are shaped and mediated. More Peace Journalism would help to bring public service news back into line with legitimate public expectations.
Introduction

This article explores some of the connections between the prevalent conventions of journalistic objectivity, and its predisposition towards patterns of reporting conflicts which deserve the name, War Journalism – biased in favour of war. This was first defined by Johan Galtung (in Lynch 1998) as journalism about conflict that is:

- violence orientated
- propaganda orientated
- elite orientated
- victory orientated.

In this kind of journalism, violence seems to 'make sense' and often appears to be the only solution. But why would this be the case when journalists strive so hard to be 'neutral' and objective? Well therein lies the problem. What journalists think of as 'objective' reporting actually consists of a set of conventions which predispose news about conflict in favour of War Journalism.

Journalistic Objectivity

Objectivity developed at the time of urbanisation, industrialisation and the advent of consumerism. Greater literacy and more efficient transport links enabled newspapers to grow larger in circulation. Between them, these developments led to an increasing dependency on selling advertising. So now they had to avoid putting off potential customers, of all political views and none:

"The popular commercial dailies developed the first version of journalistic objectivity; an independent, universalizing stance that looked at the world and the body politic from the viewpoint of the ideal citizen: a prudent, rational, fair-minded individual, committed to individual rights, political democracy, a market economy, and progress through science and education" (Hackett and Zhao 1998, p. 18).

Some latter-day definitions:

"It is the value of fairness, which is extremely important. It's the ethic of restraining your own biases, which is also important... It's the idea that journalism can't be the voice of any particular party or sect" (Rosen 1994).

"An effort to report the facts without developing – or at least without revealing – an opinion about them" (Kinsey 2001).

Journalism matching these criteria lent itself to being marketed in a consumer society (Bagdikian 2000), because it avoided putting off potential consumers among the educated classes.

But what to do about the subjective aspects of the job? The choices facing reporters and editors are endless. Why this story, and not another? Then, once you have decided that, why interview this person, or use that organisation as a source of information and not another? This issue was defused, as the methods of Objective Journalism hardened into industry conventions, by the habit of indexing – projecting such basic decisions onto an external frame of reference that was not, apparently, of the journalist’s own making.

Indexing Official Sources

In practice, that often meant tracking the agenda set by official sources – governments, the police and courts, financial authorities and so on. Leading, say, the television evening news, or the front page of the New York Times, with a report of a speech by President Bush on Iraq, need not be taken to mean that the programme or the paper agrees with him. His comments can be presented as newsworthy – whatever he actually says – because he’s the President, and the most powerful man in the land. Still a subjective interpretation, of what constitutes the most meaningful fact of that particular day – but one chosen on a seemingly ‘neutral’ basis, and one which is deeply embedded in the structures and practices of news:

"Journalism’s criteria of newsworthiness and factuality, and its routines of gathering anchored in bureaucratic institutions with designated spokespersons and predeveloped routines, are mutually constitutive. Taken together, they tend to ensure routine and privileged access for bureaucrats and agency officials, who provide the ‘hard facts’, credible claims and background information for Objective reporting" (Hackett and Zhao 1998, p. 78).

For these reasons, a bias in favour of official sources is probably still the single most widespread convention in global news. Go to any capital city in the world, pick up a copy of the main newspaper, and there’s a good chance that the deeds and pronouncements of that country’s political leaders will be on or near the front page.
Objectivity and War Journalism

Lynch and McGoldrick argue that there are three ways in which news said to be Objective fuels further violence.

“Three conventions of Objective reporting, in particular, are predisposed towards War Journalism. Their ‘natural drift’, as it were, is to lead us – or leave us – to over-value violent, reactive responses to conflict, and under-value non-violent, developmental ones:

• A bias in favour of official sources
• A bias in favour of event over process
• A bias in favour of ‘dualism’ in reporting conflicts” (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, p. 209).

The problem is that news is, by its very nature, preoccupied with change, yet it has a very fixed and one-dimensional understanding of how change comes about. Built into it is an orientation in favour of realism and ignores the insights of Peace and Conflict Studies, which argue that there are many ways to bring about change in a conflict, many ‘levers’ to pull. Later I will suggest that anyone working to intervene in the Cycle of Violence, for example, can be regarded as a ‘change agent’.

But the Objectivity conventions mean we hear relatively little about them, compared with official sources – a category topped by leaders of national states. Max Weber provided a well-known definition: the state is “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1946, p.78). Weber’s argument was that a state could only be defined in terms of means rather than ends. States could not be said to be for anything, necessarily; they were better conceived in terms of their observable characteristics than assumptions about their purpose.

Weber’s formulation has been seen as neutral, even normative – the word, ‘legitimate’ has seemed, to some, to suggest a benign hand, guaranteeing security for all citizens. But these are concepts later interrogated and revised by researchers in Peace and Conflict Studies. What if the effect of state action favours the interests of some citizens, and not others? In the words of veteran Australian peace researcher, John W Burton, the very notion of ‘conflict resolution’ is only admissible if conflict is understood as attributable not to ‘inherent human aggressiveness’ but to “the emergence of inappropriate social institutions and norms that reasonably would seem to be well within human capacities to alter, to which the person has problems in adjustment” (Burton 1998).

Perhaps Burton’s cardinal insight is that there is more to human relations than power – there are also human needs, including the basics of food, drinking water and shelter from the elements, certainly, but also intangibles such as identity, recognition and respect. If the institutions and norms of a state entrench power relations of a kind that deny these human needs to any or all of its citizens, ‘the person’ will inevitably resist them. In those circumstances, what Burton calls the ‘deterrent strategies’ of the state take on an altogether more sinister aspect.

Once deterrent strategies – such as the $560bn Pentagon budget – are put in place, they inevitably alter the nature of power relations. Missiles have to be fired and replaced in order to maintain ‘defence capacities’ – rich and powerful interests are not served by allowing military hardware to gather dust. Prisons have to be filled to generate orders for correctional corporations to build more. So norms and institutions come to be influenced in favour of wars overseas and punitive criminal justice policies at home – variants on what President Dwight D Eisenhower called the “military-industrial complex” (Eisenhower, 1960).

Then the number of levers under the control of the leaders of national states has diminished in recent times. Industry has globalised, public services have been marketised and/or privatised and economic policy-making has become increasingly contingent on events elsewhere. Hence there may be more emphasis on the levers they do control, including the ability to set the news agenda and also the deployment of armed forces.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair has pitched the UK into more armed conflicts than any other – Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq, Afghanistan – and is said to admire the armed forces for their “professionalism” (Brogan 2003). Their stock-in-trade being, of course, to follow orders, in marked contrast to Blair’s experience with other areas of the public sector where change has to be negotiated and efforts at reform had left him with “scars on his back” (Watt 1999).

It all means that a reliance on official sources may, of necessity, predispose the coverage of conflict towards War Journalism. Military deployment always seems to move, as if by osmosis, on to the news agenda. Calls for collaborative effort to enforce international law, or building solidarity at the level of civil society – even, latterly, accepting as final the will of the UN – always seem to have to be justified afresh from first principles.

A bias in favour of event over process

A news story is supposed to answer six basic questions:

• Who?
• What?
Most stories only deal superficially – if at all – with the ‘why’. Many journalists argue that that it would make the story too long. But people can only begin to think themselves out of a conflict if they understand the underlying issues. The important thing to note here is that without some exploration of underlying causes, violence can be left to appear, by default, as the only response that ‘makes sense’. Wars remain opaque, in the sense that we are given no means to see through the violence to problems that lie beneath. It therefore makes no sense to hear from anyone wanting those problems to be addressed and set right, as a contribution to ending or avoiding violence.

A bias in favour of dualism

One safe way to insulate oneself against allegations of bias is to ‘hear both sides’. It means the journalist cannot be seen as ‘the voice of any particular party or sect’. By tradition, classic BBC reporting, for instance, is said to adopt the formula: “On the one hand … on the other … in the end, only time will tell” (Kampfner 2003).

But this inscribes a paradigm of dualism that frames out multiparty initiatives, complex causes and win-win situations. Dualism is a key part of Objectivity but also, for these reasons, a major contributory factor in the way in which it escalates a conflict, by turning it into a tug of war in which each party faces only two alternatives – victory or defeat. Their words and deeds must be unequivocally ‘winning’ if they are not to risk being reported as ‘losing’, ‘backsliding’ or ‘going soft’.

Findings from researchers in Peace and Conflict Studies provide abundant evidence that this dualistic model of conflict is seldom, if ever, the whole picture; there are always third (or more) parties whose involvement may be hidden; and within the parties, there are fault lines and differentiations which open up the scope for more creative conceptualisations of the issues at stake (Francis, 2002).

The liberal theory of press freedom

Kempf puts his finger on a dilemma facing every journalist covering conflicts – “either to take sides and to incite one party against the other, or to play the role of a moderating third party in order to improve the communication between them and contribute to constructive conflict transformation” (Kempf 2003 p. 83). Failure to adopt a deliberate policy of constructive conflict coverage, he argues, is tantamount to escalating them, because of “the lack of differentiation between traditional conflict coverage and propaganda” (Kempf 2003 p. 83).

Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) give the following definitions:

“Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters make choices – of what stories to report, and how to report them – which create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent responses to conflict.

Peace Journalism:
• Uses the insights of conflict analysis and transformation to update the concepts of balance, fairness and accuracy in reporting
• Provides a new route map tracing the connections between journalists, their sources, the stories they cover and the consequences of their journalism – the ethics of journalistic intervention
• Builds an awareness of non-violence and creativity into the practical job of everyday editing and reporting” (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005 p. 5).

This contains a little more ‘wiggle room’ than Kempf’s formula. Some journalists, in some places, will find themselves comfortable with the idea that they should decide, at the outset, to harness their journalism to the furtherance of socially desirable goals. In post-colonial societies, the traditions and assumptions journalists imbibe draw heavily on values of social solidarity, and the sense of obligation – on those fortunate enough to enter professional life – to use their education and position to improve the outlook for their society and the prospects for their fellow citizens. This certainly applies to responses to conflict. An exhaustive consultation with senior journalists from 11 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in 1999, found:

“Whether employed by state-controlled broadcasting corporations or editing weekly or daily newspapers surviving on street-corner sales, most of the journalists involved said that they believe they have a vital role to play in the prevention (sic) and resolution of conflict. For many, the question was not whether they should be fulfilling that role, but rather how they could do so” (Onadipe and Lord 1999, p. 2).

Journalists in western countries sup from different sources, notably the liberal theory of press freedom, that media should be seen as a civic tool in democracy, flagging up problems and presenting ‘the facts’, without fear or favour. A UK study interviewed senior British editors, producers and reporters engaged in covering conflict, and recorded, as typical, this statement from an experienced frontline correspondent, Kim Willsher of the Mail on Sunday.
"I don’t wish to sound pompous or arrogant about it, but you hope that by opening people’s eyes to what is happening, that maybe something will be done to stop it from happening. If enough journalists are telling the story, the politicians will see what’s happening and will actually do something to stop it continuing" (Tumber and Webster 2006, p. 67).

It’s only a nuance away from the formulae for Peace Journalism and for constructive conflict coverage, quoted here, but, in this context, a nuance makes all the difference. Willsher cut his teeth covering the wars of succession in former Yugoslavia, Tumber and Webster record, and here, ‘doing something’, in the eyes of many UK-employed journalists, came to mean taking sides against the Serbs, up to and including military intervention.

"Journalists embarked on crusades and became partial. They empathised with the Bosnian government because of personal outrage at Serb aggression. Prima facie, this partiality distorted the reporting" (Gowing 1997, p. 12).

Inscribed in Lynch and McGoldrick’s formula for Peace Journalism is a concept of redressing an imbalance. If War Journalism predominates, then the media contribution to democratic debate is skewed, in favour of violent outcomes – reproducing war propaganda, as Kempf rightly points out. Instead, according to the liberal theory, they should project into the public sphere as many views, perspectives and versions of events as possible.

"The peculiar evil of silencing an expression of opinion is that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error” (John Stuart Mill 1861).

A similar concept provides the underpinning for public service agreements common to many broadcast news organisations, both public and commercial. The BBC Producer Guidelines (2004), for example, stipulate that a “full range of significant views and perspectives” are heard and “There are usually more than two sides to any issue”.

In Canada:
• “To achieve balance and fairness, the widest possible range of views should be expressed”
• “There must also be depth, the capturing of dimensions and nuances. Without these elements, the programming becomes too simplistic to permit adequate comprehension” (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2004).

In Australia:
• “Balance” should be achieved by presenting “a wide range of perspectives”
• “In serving the public’s right to know, editorial staff will be enterprising in perceiving, pursuing and presenting issues which affect society and the individual”.
• “Pursuing impartiality should not mean endorsing the status quo. The Corporation is also required to be innovative... The ABC seeks to be a pace-setter in community discussion” (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2004).

Television in America is less overtly regulated, but the First Amendment to the US Constitution protects freedom of expression. A famous court ruling said that should mean:

“an uninhibited marketplace of ideas ... It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, and other ideas which is crucial” (Supreme Court 1969).

These are all useful arguments for Peace Journalism. If there are generally more than two sides to any issue, then BBC reports, at least, should generally frame conflicts as consisting of more than two parties; but most do not. The common denominator of these provisions – a responsibility to ensure public access to a “full range” of views – is generally trumped by the reporting conventions which award the agenda-setting role to official sources.

That means issues officialdom prefers to ignore tend to drop off the edge of the news agenda, even when it is in the public interest, as defined by these formulations, to discuss them. The conventions of Objectivity, in other words, are at odds with public service notions of balance and fairness; notions based, in turn, on the liberal theory of press freedom.

Sixty percent of journalists who responded to a global survey (Lynch and McGoldrick 2004b) believed that the media in their own country industry today is not performing this essential public service. Most blamed “journalistic conventions”, with “market conditions” a close second.

For journalists in the West, most of whom will likely feel uncomfortable at any suggestion of geared their reporting towards contributing to particular outcomes, this is a slightly different rationale for Peace Journalism – as a remedial strategy, necessary to redress the current, built-in, easily observable imbalance in favour of War Journalism, to ‘give peace a chance’ in public debates about conflicts and how best to respond to them. In that, they are increasingly likely to have to find ways to take issue with, and look around the edges of, war propaganda.
The CNN Effect

Inscribed in Willsher’s comment about his role as a journalist is an assumption about media influence which has also come to be known as ‘the CNN effect’ – so called after the first Gulf War when the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said: “We say we have 16 members in the Security Council: the 15 members plus CNN.” (Boutros-Ghali 1995). The proposition is that today’s global media have grown so mighty as to be able to raise issues to the political agenda by their own efforts; issues which would otherwise hold little or no interest for the powers-that-be. But researchers who have examined the causality find the reality differs from the hype. To take two ‘cause celebres’ of this argument:

• ‘Operation Provide Comfort’ – protecting Iraqi Kurds fleeing the vengeance of a defeated Saddam Hussein in the winter of 1991

In Somalia, well before images of starving children started appearing on television, there were already moves afoot in Washington to build a case for military deployment. Ultimately the decision was “based more on diplomatic and bureaucratic operations than press coverage” (Livingston and Eachus 1995).

Operation Provide Comfort has been called “TV news’ finest hour” (Shaw 1996) – an argument that nightly coverage of Kurdish refugees, fleeing Iraqi helicopter gunships over the mountains into southern Turkey, prompted governments to decisive action they would never otherwise have considered.

This, too, gives way under closer scrutiny, however. Another account quotes Andrew Natsios, then Director of the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, which is part of the US Government’s Agency for International Development:

“Major geopolitical considerations drove policy at the time ... The first was concern for Turkey, one of Washington’s closest Muslim allies ... Turkey, with its own Kurdish ‘problem’, had no desire to take in hundreds of thousands of destitute Kurdish refugees ... Even if the cameras had not been there, the Bush administration would have made the same decision” (Robinson 2002).

It underlines Kempf’s observation, about the ease with which official propaganda frames can enter the news agenda – especially given the predisposition built in to the conventions of ‘objective’ reporting. Without Peace Journalism, the aspirations of the liberal theory of press freedom, and public service agreements for broadcasters, are likely to remain largely unfulfilled.

References


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