

Susan Dente Ross

(De)Constructing Conflict: A Focused Review of War and Peace Journalism

Kurzfassung: Diese Übersicht über Medien, Konfliktliteratur sowie Fallstudien zur Medienberichterstattung über Frieden bietet eine Orientierung für Friedensjournalisten.

Viele Studien zeigen, dass die Medien selten neutral über Konflikte berichten. Humanpsychologie, journalistische Normen und strukturelle Einschränkungen halten die Medien von einer komplexen historischen Berichterstattung über Gewalt ab. Die begrenzte systematische Forschung zur Medienberichterstattung über Frieden reicht nicht aus, um auf den vorherrschenden Kriegsjournalismus reagieren zu können. Eine Fallstudie der Berichterstattung von *The Washington Report* über Friedensinitiativen des Mittleren Ostens weist auf Probleme in der Medienberichterstattung über Frieden hin. Sie lässt fünf Trends der Presseorientierungen erkennen. Demnach sind Friedensinitiativen: 1. politische Manöver und strategische Stellungnahme, 2. rhetorische Spiele, um hartnäckige Unterschiede zu verschleiern, 3. eine Charade unter Spielern mit geringem Glauben an ihren Erfolg, 4. fragil und unbeständig und 5. eine Übung in Doppelzüngigkeit und Verzerrung. Friedensjournalisten nutzen die Medien entweder in einer aktivistischen Funktion oder betreiben Friedensjournalismus als objektiven Qualitätsjournalismus, der unterrepräsentierte Perspektiven mit berücksichtigt, um tiefere und breitere Informationen zu liefern. Diese Zuordnung reflektiert seit langer Zeit bestehende ideologische Ziele im Gebiet der Konfliktstudien, Friedensstudien und Konfliktlösung. In diesem Sinn diskutieren ökonomische Wissenschaftler auch die Beeinflussung der Medien durch Industriestrukturen und Profitdenken, wodurch die Mächtigen bevorzugt und das Potential für Veränderung eingeschränkt werden. Das Propagandamodell der Medien zeigt, dass friedensjournalistische Initiativen wirkungslos sind, da die Medien ein Sprachrohr der Regierung darstellen. Es wird behauptet, dass die Situation der Welt nach dem Kalten Krieg Qualitätsjournalismus unterdrückt und lokale Medien ineffiziente begrenzte Plattformen zu Verbreitung alternativer Ideen darstellen. Kritische Wissenschaftler betrachten Friedensjournalismus als fehlerhaft, unwirksam oder von vornherein zum Scheitern verurteilt. Medientexte können jedoch vielfältig interpretiert werden; Risse im Monolith bieten Gelegenheiten für Reformen.

Friedensjournalismus muss tief verwurzelte professionelle Muster, strukturellen und finanziellen Druck und psychologische Reaktionen, die eine reaktive, nationalistische Berichterstattung fördern, verändern. Friedensjournalisten müssen gut zuhören, "den anderen" mehr Gehör schenken und dieses neue Verständnis begreifen und verinnerlichen, um die Verbindungen zwischen Identität und Feindschaft zu überwinden. Effektiver Friedensjournalismus muss ein Journalismus symbolischer Annäherung sein. Er muss Journalisten als menschliche Wesen erkennen, die dem gleichen sozialen, politischen, religiösen und nationalistischen Druck ausgesetzt sind wie alle Menschen. Restrukturierung und Umschulung als Mittel zur Befreiung unabhängiger Medien und Journalisten von ökonomischem und politischem Druck sind bedenklich. Der Schlüssel liegt in einer pluralistischen Verteilung von Besitz, Strukturen und Einkünften. Training muss Journalisten gegen automatische Reaktionen auf Angst und Gewalt impfen. Friedensjournalismus muss das Bewusstsein für die verschiedenen Identitäten und Realitäten der Konfliktparteien, die Subjektivität und Kontextabhängigkeit der Ursachen und die Falle des Dualismus beinhalten.

Abstract: This overview of the media and conflict literature and case study of media coverage of peace offers a framework and guidance for peace journalism.

Many studies show media rarely report conflict neutrally. Human psychology, journalistic norms, and structural constraints draw media away from complex historical reporting of violence. Limited systematic research on media coverage of peace is insufficient to direct response to prevalent war journalism. A case study of *The Washington Report* coverage of Middle East peace initiatives suggests problems in media coverage of peace. It demonstrates five trends in press orientations. Peace initiatives are: 1. political maneuvering and strategic posturing, 2. rhetorical games to mask intractable differences, 3. a charade among players with little belief in their success, 4. fragile and impermanent, and 5. an exercise in doublespeak and distortion.

Peace journalists are divided between an activist, advocacy role for media and a definition of peace journalism as quality, objective journalism that includes under-represented perspectives to provide deeper and broader information. The divide reflects long-standing imprecision and ideological objectives in the fields of conflict studies, peace studies, conflict resolution, and more. Thus, economic theorists contend that industry structure and profit-motives drive media to privilege the powerful, limiting the potential for change. The propaganda model of media suggests peace journalism initiatives are impotent because media are a mouthpiece for government. Some say the realities of the post-Cold War world undermine quality journalism, and local media are an inefficient and limited mechanism to disseminate dissident ideas. Critical scholars view peace journalism as flawed, ineffectual, or certain to be co-opted. However, media texts are subject to multiple interpretations; cracks in the monolith offer opportunities for reform.

Peace journalism must transform deeply trained professional patterns, structural and financial pressures, and psychological responses that encourage reactive, nationalist reporting. Peace journalists must listen well, hear "the other" better, and understand and incorporate that new understanding to transcend the bonds of identity and enmity. Effective peace journalism must be a journalism of symbolic rapprochement. It must recognize journalists as human beings subject to the same social, political, religious and nationalist pressures as all people. Restructuring and retraining to insulate independent media and journalists from economic and political pressures are critical. Increased pluralism in ownership, structures, and revenue streams is key. Training must inoculate journalists against knee-jerk responses to fear and violence. Peace journalism must embrace awareness of the varied identities and realities of parties to a conflict, the subjective and contextual nature of root causes, and the trap of dualisms.

It would be simple to join the chorus of media critics who castigate contemporary journalism for overt bias, systematic pandering, and flagrant participation in various conspiracies. However, such simple answers are rarely correct, as the following will demonstrate. Rather, if there is a singular truth about contemporary journalism, it appears that it is both better than ever and less than it could be. There is much contemporary journalism that is not broken, that does not need to be fixed, and that is worthy of praise and emulation. There is also unequivocal evidence that systematic pressures (economic, structural, social, professional) on journalists exacerbate the human tendency to see only part of the truth and to transmit that truth in ways that reinforce previous perceptions and beliefs (Altheide, 1987; Donsbach, 2004; Gamson et. al, 1992; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1979; Hackett & Zhao, 2005; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Tichenor et. al, 1980). The predictable rituals of journalists and their heavy dependence on official sources produce persistent patterns of inclusion and exclusion by the mainstream Westernized media (McLeod & Hertog, 1998; Paletz & Entman, 1981; Sigal, 1973; Tuchman, 1978).

The "narrative conventions of American journalism" also orient the media toward clashes rather than discussion of abstract political ideas (Hallin & Mancini, 1984, p. 845; Schudson, 1982). Among these, and of critical importance to the development of what many call the global civil society, is the pervasive pattern for media to exacerbate conflict and perpetuate wars through ethnocentric, nationalistic, and simplistic dualistic portrayals (Coe et al, 2004; Entman, 2004; Goldfarb, 2001; Hutcheson et al, 2004; Lazar & Lazar, 2004; Liebes, 1992; Nohrstedt et al, 2000; Ottosen, 1995; Ross, 2003; Wolfsfeld, 2001, 2001b, 2004). Thus, for example, Dominikowski (2004) traced the historical symbiosis of war and media back to antiquity, while Price and Thompson (2002) identified the close link between media and violence during the last 15 years. Case studies by Metzl (1997a, 1997b), Thompson (1999), Naveh (1999), (2001), Hoijer, Nohrstedt & Ottosen (2002), Kondopoulou (2002), Stanley, Eriyanto, Sudibyo, Muhammad, (cited in Hanitzsch, 2004) and others demonstrate the deep and ongoing interconnections between media coverage and military aggression in various conflicts around the globe.

This paper offers a summary overview of the literature on media and conflict to establish a context, theoretical framework, and source of cautious guidance for the growing field and study of peace journalism.

The War Media

The media play a central role in international affairs and violence because citizens are dependent on media to provide timely, credible information of distant events. Lake and Rothchild (1996) cited "information failures" as a primary contributor to rising fear that increases the potential for violent conflict. Scholars (Beit Hallahmi, 1972; Ben-Dak, 1972; Hofman, 1972; Ibrahim, 1972) examining the significant role of communication flows in conflict resolution frequently focus on nation-states and highlight the role of media in the construction and reinforcement of simplistic and extremely negative images of the "other". Thus, for example, Steuter (1990) and others found that national media exhibit a strong tendency to cover terrorism, war, and international relations from an ethnocentric position in which news "bear[s] a remarkable resemblance to many sentiments common in [the government's] foreign policy and, indeed, [the nation's] political culture" (p. 274).

Nearly three decades ago, Schlesinger (1978) observed that the media's persistent and myopic focus on politics – as defined by the narrow range of publicly visible events in which self-defined politicians operate – systematically reinforced political power, obscured other influences upon political decisions – such as decisions to wage war – and de-legitimized attempts by non-government organizations to influence international policy decisions. Similarly, Angus and Cook (1984) concluded that the media allied with the nation-state to constrain the boundaries of public understanding and debate to "the very terms that [any oppositional] movement attempts to criticize" (p. 6).

Numerous scholars have documented more direct government pressures on journalists in conflict zones (Bennett, 2003; Carruthers, 2000; Knightley, 1975; Lynch, 2003; Reese & Buckalew, 1995). In 1986, Hallin concluded that media coverage systematically excludes significant issues and distorts conflicts to conform to "the constraints of ideology and journalistic routines" closely aligned with the domestic government's power and perspectives (p. 214). In more concrete terms, Liebes (1992) observed that journalists tend to minimize the costs and accentuate the benefits of government-sanctioned violence when the domestic military is engaged in a conflict that is geographically distant from the domestic nation. Avraham (2003) found that media covering conflict zones report "different kinds of pain and different kinds of blood." Indeed, when the press looks on from a distance, it is more likely to ignore the pain and the blood to portray violent conflict as a natural and necessary part of political processes and social change. Such coverage often distinguishes worthy from unworthy victims (Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Karnik, 1998; Kempf, 1994; Minear, Scott & Weiss, 1996).

Wolfsfeld (1997b) suggested that structural constraints – e.g., the need to condense and simplify voluminous material and the strong orientation toward crisis coverage – draw the press away from complex historical context or abstract frames of international violence (p. 153). Dependency on government sources gives government voice and privilege to construct key issues and events (Gans, 1979; Paletz & Entman, 1981; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Wolfsfeld, 1997b). Thus, both the quantity and the nature of news reporting vary with expressed government attitudes and actions (Daugherty & Warden, 1979).

Herman and Chomsky (1988) argued that instead of an independent and critical press, media function as a propaganda tool for governmental elites, using binaries – such as us/them reporting – to echo and extend: 1. nationalistic political ideology, 2. media dependency on official government sources, and the influence of 3. corporate ownership, 4. advertising pressure, and 5. government and business spin. An analysis of U.S. and Canadian television coverage of Central American peace building by Adam (1991) found empirical support for the propaganda model, despite national differences and variations based on the language of coverage.

Others, particularly those closely examining variations in press coverage across nations or through time, have suggested that media are not an uncritical vehicle for government propaganda but rather an inefficient and limited mechanism for the distribution of minority and dissident ideas and information. Vincent (2000) found that coverage of war and peace is truncated so that “only the techniques of war may be debated, not the question of motives,” the morality of bombings, or the opportunity for non-violent alternatives (p. 336). Ackerman’s (1999) study of *The New York Times* concluded that the U.S. media virtually ignored any real possibility for peace and compromise in Rambouillet, France. He also found that, congruent with U.S. and NATO postures, the paper radicalized Milosevic’s stance in Rambouillet at a time when “the Yugoslav position had not changed at all.” Similarly, Vincent’s (2000) study of coverage of the NATO military intervention in Kosovo noted that occasional mentions of the Rambouillet peace talks were presented “almost exclusively from a US/NATO point of view” (p. 333, 331) and failed to use the talks as an opportunity “to go back and revisit events and to further examine them in historical context” (p. 333). Vincent argued that a primary cause of the media’s continuing role “as an organ of political propaganda” is its continued fervor and “myopic belief that objectivity is possible” (p. 341).

Some scholars point to the new realities of the post-Cold War world, in which global conflict is dominated by volatile, interethnic clashes designed to assert identity and protect security, as the source for imperfect media coverage (Terzis & Melone, 2001). Young and Jesser’s (1997) study of the media and war postulated a series of linkages in this new global reality: Because multiple states had the power of mutual annihilation, conflicts in the post-Cold War era would be limited in scope; The limited scope of conflict relieved citizens of their historical duty to support wars as an essential element of their civic obligation; The release of citizens from their patriotic obligation to serve in war 1) increased the discretion of citizens to oppose wars, which placed 2) new emphasis on the importance of public opinion, and promoted 3) sophisticated and pervasive government manipulation of media coverage of war (p. 272).

Wolfsfeld (1997) argued that media coverage could be understood primarily as part of a cycle of waxing and waning political influence that itself reflects varying external realities that mitigate the ability of political leaders to control relevant events. In a simplified vision of Wolfsfeld’s (1997, 2004) complex analysis that identifies several influential factors (e.g., media autonomy, political culture, etc.), peace coverage is in large part a factor of political power which, in turn, is driven by events. Lang and Lang (2004) also challenge the neat precision of the propaganda model for news and suggest that the process is more complex and disorderly. Other scholars assert national identity and political ideology, not governmental dictates, are the most significant and intractable factors directing media coverage. Lee and Maslog (2005) discredited government/media conspiracy theories and ideological reporting and concluded that “media outlets within the same cultural and political context do not frame the same event in the same way” (p. 323).

For decades, scholars have generally accepted Gitlin’s (1979) finding that media serve as sites of strategic political contests in which struggles contain only two sides. Earlier, Allport (1954) identified the fundamental role of categorization in human cognition and posited that contact between members from opposing groups can reduce conflict under controlled and optimal conditions. Coe et al (2004) underscored the fundamental, inherently oppositional nature of Western thinking that constructs reality in terms of binaries that unify and direct public beliefs and attitudes.

Coles (2002) indicated the power of U.S. government elites to diminish this potential by deploying media disseminated binaries to generate patriotic unity and fervor and stifle dissent. He also asserted that rational government actors may use and multiply the instances of violent conflict because they recognize that “war and its words can be a means by which a society, including those who don’t do the actual fighting, defines its national character and legitimates its existence” (p. 588). Coles argued that war is beneficial to national leaders for whom it provides “a teachable moment [in which to] socialize the nation’s members ..., defining who they are ..., and what their collective role is in the community of nations” (2002, p. 589).

One aspect of the political expediency of war is demonstrated by studies of business cycles and media coverage. Bloomberg and Hess (2002) found that domestic economic problems “create incentives for increased external and internal conflict” because war—and its jingoistic coverage by the “patriotic” media—serves as “a diversionary political instrument to signal [leaders’] competence to voters during recessions.” War not only stimulates the economy but also provides ready scapegoats to the nation’s ills. In a related study, Hess and Orphanides (2001) found the United States was twice as likely to engage in external conflict when the president was running for reelection and the economy had been in a recession.

Abundant public opinion polls and political commentary document that a sizeable majority of the U.S. public rallies behind

the president at the onset of military conflict (see Lindsay, 2003). Powlick and Katz (1998) suggested that major media coverage of foreign policy events prompts public attention and activates opinion formation. Some scholars argue that increased public and media dependency on the president to set the national course during national crises and military conflict (Brody, 1994; Brody & Shapiro, 1989; Mueller, 1971) helps explain why media suggest, prompt, or magnify the impulse of the public to participate in a patriotic, pro-administration "rally" at such times (Edwards & Swenson, 1997; Hutcheson, 2003; Lee, 1997; Mackuen, 1983; Mueller, 1994). Indeed, Hutcheson (2003) found such rallies endure only during elite consensus, when the president effectively speaks for a unified nation. Pan and Kosicki (1994) found that increased homogeneity between government and media discourse generated greater rallying effects.

Arguing against a strong direct effects model, Connell (1982) observed that media texts are subject to multiple interpretations and do not simply exclude alternative voices but rather undermine their credibility with negative discursive cues that alert readers to the lack of authority of such perspectives. Embedded in communication disorders, such as two-sided messages and double-bind communication, these cues finally immunize the dominant interpretation of reality against criticism (Reimann, 2002). Bratic (2006) reasons that the increasingly homogeneous media content and increasing media consumption, impact, dependence and susceptibility in communities experiencing violence heighten media effects. Bratic, like Hantzsch (2004), starts from a weak effects model of media influence but concludes that within the context of violent conflict "the role of media in building peace is simultaneously both substantial and limited ... by the uncertainty that [its] positive impact [on awareness and beliefs] will be translated into behavior" (p. 9).

Decades of study of the role of the media in ongoing conflict suggests that media rarely report conflict neutrally (Gamson et al, 1992; Noakes & Wilkins, 2002; Ross, 2003; Wolfsfeld, 1997b, 2001, 2001b). Taleb's (2004) overarching work on media coverage of conflicts asserted that media frame conflicts in one of five ways: as win/lose conflicts, as human interest stories, as economic forces, as morality tales, and as indicators of blame. Some scholars have argued that press and researchers' excessive focus on media coverage of conflicts, rather than more "normal" situations, provides limited potential for discovering paths to peace (Ben-Dak, 1970; Kent, 1971). Ben-Dak (1970), for example, concluded that much research on media and peace served primarily to establish the intractability and irreconcilability of parties engaged in conflict.

Carroll (1972) suggested that research focused on power relations at national and supranational levels served to increase the powerlessness, helplessness, impotence, and apathy of those whose mobilization would best serve peace efforts. She (1972; also see Hoffman, 1963) argued that too much research fails to "consider seriously the possibility that war is inherent not in human nature but in the power system of dominance in human relations" articulated through the nation-state.

In a recent study of political propaganda discourse and media content across four European nations, however, Nohrstedt et al (2000) found that media coverage of war is part of "propaganda flows and activities" that naturalize the fundamental paradox of "peace by bombs" and morality through immoral use of violence (p. 384). Hoijer, Nohrstedt & Ottosen (2002) suggested that three interconnected discourses constitute the global discursive order on war and peace: news discourse, propaganda, and a discourse of global compassion that embodies collective choices and effects change (Fairclough, 1995). They found post-Cold War politicians mobilized for war with the "designer language" of rights and compassion, not the discourse of dominance and power (Hoijer et al., 2002, p. 5; see also Terzis & Melone, 2001).

Nohrstedt et al's (2002) study of reporting on violence in Kosovo found that transnational media engaged in nationalized propaganda discourse that uncritically incorporated the government's concept of "military humanism" (p. 391) to the extent that military violence as a rational solution to the Kosovo conflict aligned with the domestic nation's international policy. The authors identified personalization of threats, exaggerated demonization of the enemy, acceptance of the "regrettable inevitability" of "accidental" casualties, and the consistent neglect of the existence or content of peace initiatives as components of media's war propaganda discourse that polarizes and suppresses shared or neutral positions. They also observed a continuum of media empathy with victims that paralleled national political policy.

Hackett (1991) argued that the need for public credibility, the journalistic ethos of public service, and the demands for professional integrity countervailed a singular, government-dictated discourse in the media. Decades earlier, Boulding (1972) contested focus on "the man' or capitalist imperialism as the source of oppression and violence, ... [arguing that it offers] simplistic, monocausal explanations of war" and that "powerful tools for understanding the dynamics of community formation are being left to one side in the peace research movement."

Peace Journalism

At the start of the 21st century, Galtung (1998, 2002), Kempf (1996, 2002), Shinar (2003) and others (see, e.g., Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2003; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005) advocated creative models and training programs to respond to this reality and to transform the role of media. Young and Jesser (1997) proposed that international media consolidate and concentrate their coverage to establish a single press consortium with the economic and tactical independence of governments to provide a truly autonomous alternative voice. Botes (1995) contended that media could

play a critical positive role in conflict prevention. Gorsevski (1999) suggested that the media could advance "propaganda of peacemaking" by re-humanizing individuals engaged in conflict through a non-violent rhetoric (Chilton, 1987). Rather than use media as a tool for pro-peace advocacy (see e.g., Bell, 1997; Galtung, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2002), however, Terzis and Melone (2001) asserted that media should pursue balance and neutrality, but they "cannot be neutral toward peace" (p. 19).

Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) similarly defined peace journalism as quality journalism that uses a creative set of tools to include routinely or habitually under-represented perspectives to provide deeper and broader coverage of news (pp. 5, 224). In place of advocacy journalism that envisions or portrays a conflict-free society, they argued for a peace journalism that helps produce a society "good at handling [] conflicts non-violently" (p. 48). Kempf (2002) also rejected attempts to understand peace journalism as a form of advocacy and favors peace journalism as "good journalism" that goes well beyond simplistic dualisms of good and bad. Kempf (2003) suggested a two-stage strategy to reduce the escalation orientation of mainstream conflict coverage: His first stage of "de-escalation oriented coverage" is characterized by neutrality and critical distance from all parties to the conflict and coincides broadly with what is generally considered quality journalism. It goes beyond the professional norms of journalism only to the extent that the journalists' competence in conflict theory produces coverage in which the conflict is kept open to a peaceful settlement. His second stage requires the abandonment of dualism and the reframing of conflict as a cooperative process through "solution-oriented coverage," which, he concluded, is likely to garner majority support only when an armistice or a peace treaty is already in place.

Possibly in response to critiques against peace journalism, Bauman and Siebert (2000) found nothing inherently unique or objectionable in its postulates and posited that media are inevitably engaged in conflict mediation. At the same time that media inherently educate, contextualize, provide an outlet for strong emotions, offer solutions, and build consensus, "journalists [also] mediate conflict whether they intend to or not" (Bauman & Siebert, 2000; see also Merrill, 1989, pp. 10-11). Astorino-Courtois (1996) suggested that media can play a pro-active role in marketing peace by identifying publicly salient attributes of peace and encouraging opposing groups to seek accord in areas of low-risk gain with little or no loss to their information role to society. Gilboa (2003) documented a positive, though ethically and professionally ambiguous, media role in helping peace negotiators build external support and test strategies and terms of agreement. Howard (2003) asserted that peace journalism does not require a departure from fundamental news values and professional practices but rather arises when the press attends carefully "to its own professional strictures ... [of] accuracy, impartiality, and independence" (p. 1). Lee and Maslog (2005) found that peace journalism relies less on overt advocacy than on "extensions of the objectivity credo... avoidance of good-bad labels, a non-partisan approach, a multiparty orientation, and an avoidance of demonizing language" (p. 324). Their empirical study of Asian newspaper coverage of conflicts found "little in terms of a solution-seeking approach [or] ... people orientation" (p. 324).

Clearly, however, peace journalism is not without its critics. Hammond (2002) has castigated the false morality of peace journalism as a form of "advocacy" journalism, evoking memories and fears of "yellow" journalism and abdication of social responsibility. Hammond argued that only a truly "dispassionate," neutral, objective press serves the needs of an open society and concluded that the agenda-driven coverage of the "journalism of attachment" increases, rather than reduces, the errors of distorted consensual reporting, moral certainty, lack of balance, selectivity, over simplification, dichotomization, polarization, dismissal of contrary or dissenting evidence, refusal to critically evaluate claims, and insufficiency of context. Hanitzsch (2004) complained of severe theoretical, ethical, and practical limits to the engagement of peace journalism and argued that some underlying assumptions of peace journalism are both naïve and simplistic. In what may be viewed as praise or condemnation, Winoto (2002) said, "The concept of peace journalism looks quite suitable, especially ...where the *purpose* of communication is to *generate social harmony and freedom*" (emphasis added). Fawcett (2002) suggested shortcomings of the narrative assumptions of peace journalism reporting. Howard (2003) argued "that the media may well be the most effective means of conflict resolution and preventing new wars" (p. 2), but competitive Westernized media will not quickly or easily abandon their "obsession with commercialized conflict" (p. 8).

Despite growing interest and controversy related to peace journalism, too little systematic empirical research has been conducted in the field. Wolfsfeld (2001c) and Howard (2003) decried the scarcity of academic analysis of the role of the media in peace building. Some three decades earlier, Ben-Dak (1970) encouraged the field to engage in systematic translation of the literature and to adopt "exact and reproducible methodologies" of consistent quantitative analyses from varied perspectives and experimental designs to counterbalance the dominance of "impressionistic" studies. Scholars including Fabris and Varis (1986), Hackett (1991), and Kempf (2003) have asserted that more systematic scientific analysis and empirical data on media coverage of war *and peace* are vital to understand the roles of the media and to mitigate social harms of media coverage. Daugherty and Warden (1979) argued that far-flung attacks on U.S. media coverage of the Middle East had been made "without substantial empirical data" about their content or their effects. Their analysis of 11 years of editorials in four elite newspapers found the press provided overwhelmingly more favorable coverage of Israel than Palestine but the skew in coverage was event driven, and press support for Israel was "neither monolithic nor invariable."

Political scientists repeatedly have reviewed and analyzed the literature in peace studies and conflict resolution (Arendt, 1969; Ben-Dak, 1970; Ben-Dak, 1972; Boulding, 1968; Boulding, 1972; Carroll, 1972; Converse, 1968; Kent, 1971; Parenti, 1970; Rapoport, 1970) in search of innovative directions and reasonable expectations for the field. These scholars simultaneously accused the field of experiencing a drought, lacking substance, being overly pragmatic and excessively "technical," preoccupied with institutionalized power rather than people, polemical, illusory, fashionable, narrow, amorphous, homogeneous, conflicted, reactive, ideological, ineffectual, biased, misdirected, speculative, trivial, marginal, reductionist, and meaningless. Anderson's (1963) overview of the status and weaknesses of peace research focused predominately on the United States and limited discussion of the role of the media (segregated under the effects of communication on attitude formation) to their function "as inventors of images and ideas" (p. 34)

Carroll (1972) suggested that peace was best advanced through the empowerment of small, self-focused, non-status-competitive, austere, isolated, independently competent, non-state actors. What was needed, Carroll (1972) asserted, was a reinvigoration of the sense of individual and autonomous competence and capability among the "underdogs." Peace studies, therefore, should refocus outside the nation-state, and away from the normative practices of superpowers and toward deviators and the potentialities of individual agents by defining "power as ability, energy and strength." Carroll (1972) barely acknowledged the pervasive influence of media and other social control institutions and claimed that the "integrative" power to build community and identity lies with the people.

Davison (1974) suggested a constructive media role and argued vaguely that the press could become an agent of "peace-keeping" because of its ability to direct public attention toward negotiations and enhance the exchange of information among parties. Boulding (1969) noted the "integrative power" and the ability of the media to define the central concepts of community and identity upon which peace could be founded. Beit Allahmi (1972), Ben-Dak (1972), Hofman, (1972), and Ibrahim (1972), who explicitly examined the significant role of improved communication and information flows in conflict resolution, tended to highlight the role of the media in the construction and reinforcement of simplistic and extremely negative images of the "other." Ben-Dak (1970), for example, observed that the media could serve either as a mechanism of "socialization for hostility or for coexistence." Much of this work implicitly centered on and presaged subsequent research on the role of media in identity formation rather than peace-building.

Arno (1984) argued that media can and do "operate as effective third parties" in conflict resolution (p. 233). Based primarily on case studies, O'Heffernan (1991) and Loshitsky (1991), and indeed Wolfsfeld (1997b), suggested media – especially television public affairs programs – function as public forums in which disputants engage and conflict is resolved. Spencer (2004) concluded that because the media attract public attention and generate public pressure to "facilitate diplomacy and force movement," they inherently play a role in peace by pressuring politicians to engage actively and effectively in peace negotiations (p. 604). Kelman (1996) argued that the media support conflict resolution by encouraging and facilitating positive commitment to negotiations and peace building, and Burton (1969) indicated that this media role is tied to its ability to control the pace and content of communication.

Botes (2003) and Becker et al. (1995) cautioned that the peace-making function of media is not automatic and hinges on the degree to which dialogues are respectful and reasoned exchanges rather than attacks and insults. Hopman and Druckman (1991) observed that media forums sometimes simply provided a highly visible opportunity for competitive posturing. Botes (2003) argued that media deal with disputants "relatively unconsciously and invariably without taking any responsibility for bringing the parties closer to any form of resolution" (p. 16). While reconciliation may arise through mediated exchanges, then, such an outcome is a largely unintentional effect of programming that is actually "a form of media voyeurism that does not take any responsibility for its social intervention" (p. 16). Indeed, journalists understand that parties in conflict use the media to advance their own self-interests. Yet Vayrynen (1991) noted significantly that the media can bring "out-parties" into the dialogue, thereby transforming the power dynamics and redefining the conflict. This function is most likely to occur, according to Botes (2003), when communication among the parties is limited, strained or otherwise "impoverished."

While one author flatly denied any independent media power and asserted that media in conflict zones are "the most manipulated and powerless players" (Three Kings, No Journalists, mediachannel.org, Dec. 20, 1999), more analytical attempts to grapple with the issue of the power of the media remain inconclusive, conflicted, or so complex as to evade rigorous empirical testing. Howard (2003), for example, distinguished among the "undeniably deadly side" of media as instruments of totalitarian regimes, the "partisan ... and destructive role" of completely free media in the most open democracies, and the challenging and problematic development of autonomous media in states moving from totalitarianism to democracy (p. 2; see also Bennett & Paletz, 1994; Strobel, 1997). Stone (1989) and Bruck (1989) argued that media discourse is highly contextual and far from determinative or closed. Thus, for example, Bruck (1989) said research into the role of media in peace must consider "historical and social embeddedness" as well as "ongoing [social] struggles" (p. 109).

Tehrani (2002) is an exemplar of those peace journalism scholars who assert that peace building requires "a media system that promotes peace rather than war, understanding rather than obfuscation, tolerance rather than hatred, celebration

of diversity rather than xenophobia" (p. 74) (Galtung, 2000, 2000b). He (2002) advocated greater structural pluralism to free independent media outlets to embrace discrete agendas and selected components of peace journalism. Tehranian argued that pluralistic ownership and governance of media are necessary but not sufficient for the praxis of peace journalism because media "objectives are ultimately hostage to the institutional, *national and international regimes* under which they are being pursued" (p. 71) (emphasis added).

Chomsky (1999) and Thussu (2000) have examined the ideological content of peace reporting by the U.S. media and assert that U.S. evocations of peace are strategically employed not to support peace but to cast a "saintly glow" over American aggression (Chomsky, 1999, p. 14). Thussu (2000) suggested that media representations of peace are defensive – presenting peace as the military protection of "our" borders against evil incursions (p. 358). Solomon (1992) similarly concluded that U.S. news media portray U.S. militarism as "establishing democracy and ... peace" (p. 57). Stone (1989) argued that Canadian newspapers use the language of "peace" as a surrogate for "our" values, beliefs and ideals in opposition to those of the "other" (pp. 57-8).

Illustrative Problems and Concerns: A case study

Foreign press coverage of Middle East peace initiatives offers insight into some of the key concerns of Tehranian, Lynch, a, and others, and reflects this author's interest in non-local, especially international media coverage of regional conflicts. While Shinar (2003) demonstrated the problematic role local media may play in building excessively high expectations for peace processes and conflict transformation, the global U.S. hegemon relies on long-distance wire reportage and U.S. summaries of the foreign press for much of its Middle East news. Here a purposive sample of European press summaries in *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* is used to highlight some problems and concerns with media coverage of distant conflicts that implicate U.S. interests or cultural values. While some would challenge the objectivity or selective coverage of this publication, *The Washington Report* presents itself as a magazine "that focuses on news and analysis from and about the Middle East and U.S. policy in that region, ... published by ... a non-profit foundation [created by] by retired U.S. foreign service officers to provide the American public with balanced and accurate information concerning U.S. relations with Middle Eastern states." The publication proclaims itself to be the most exhaustive and significant U.S. periodical covering these issues that reaches more than 100,000 of "the nation's most sophisticated populace," who are decision makers and opinion leaders in government, business, and the media. As such, *The Washington Report* is positioned to influence U.S. public policy, public opinion, and media content (McCombs & Shaw, 1972, 1993; Shah & Thornton, 2004).

A review of *The Washington Report* with particular attention to its summaries of press coverage of peace initiatives between Israel and the Palestinian territories suggests five trends in press orientations: 1. Peace initiatives are represented as political maneuvering and strategic posturing, 2. Peace initiatives are rhetorical games that hide fundamental and intractable differences and hatreds, 3. Peace initiatives are a game among players who have little commitment to or belief in their success, 4. Peace initiatives are fragile and will evaporate given any provocation, and 5. The language of peacemaking is doublespeak and distortion.

The following purposive sample from stories in *The Washington Report* illustrates these trends.

1. Peace: Politics by Another Name

The tendency to represent peace efforts as political games is pervasive and overt. General summaries of news coverage (Marshall, 1991) as well as references to specific newspaper stories (Jones, 2000, 2001, 2001c) suggest that peace initiatives are a farce and a "meaningless" "charade" played out by politicians who seek the spotlight rather than substantive agreements. Jones (2000) cited newspapers that represent peace negotiators as "playing for time" in a "game of exploiting the unrest." Marshall's (1991) summary suggested that the political game is fixed; he called U.S.-brokered peace initiatives "a contest [in] which the other side had drawn up the rules, could choose the players, and had determined the outcome in advance." In this game, newspapers in Frankfurt, Germany, and London represented weak political players as patsies or "stooges" in the talks (Jones, 2000). Intervention by U.S. President Bill Clinton in 2001 was justified because the "unfolding tragedy ... could have a decisive effect on America's other interests in the region" (Jones, 2001). However, the political involvement of the United States was portrayed as an "11th hour grasp" to "allow [... Clinton] to ride off in glory into the sunset as credits roll" rather than to advance or achieve lasting peace in the Middle East (Jones, 2001).

Such representations of peace negotiations as a political game render the violence invisible, consistently minimize the real costs of conflict, and marginalize human suffering. Both violent conflict and its cessation are seen as political maneuvers in which human lives are a reasonable cost. Jones highlighted this inhumane perspective by citing an *Economist* story on peace negotiations that concluded that "stopping the slaughter is worth doing for its own sake. The killing is leading to nothing good. It's a tragedy in itself" (Jones, 2001c).

2. Conflict: Evidence of Essentialist Hatreds

While the political game perspective suggests that the costs of violence are immaterial, the essentialist perspective suggests that violent conflict is natural, inherent, and inevitable. Jones (2000) documented this type of reporting in German, Italian, Polish, and Russian media that portrayed the collapse of peace talks as evidence of the fundamental insolubility of violence in the Middle East. Such reporting called the violent conflict evidence of "a holy war" and the embodiment of the "people's anger" and a "growing wave of hatred on both sides." Media adopting this view saw peace treaties as efforts to "paper over the irresolvable contradictions" between peoples convinced violence was the only path to pursue (Jones, 2000).

3. Peace Efforts: Charades, Futilities and Foolishness

A closely related media frame begins with a fundamental disbelief in the potential for true peace, perhaps due to an assumption of the inherent evil of human nature. Such media coverage of political actors' peace initiatives tended to suggest that the participants themselves lacked faith in the process (Jones, 2001c). Marshall (1991), for example, summarized stories in which both the possibility of conducting talks and their potential for effectiveness is seen as a sham. In this light, peace talks in fact do more harm than good; they produce "only empty promises" that "can only arouse a sense of betrayal and intensify existing grievances" (Marshall, 1991). British, German, French, Swedish, Italian, and Austrian media stories are cited to demonstrate coverage in which negotiations are presented as "worthless" and "likely to fail" from the start (Jones, 2000, 2001, 2001c, 2001d). For example, Jones (2000) noted a story in the French *Liberation* that said a summit was "better than military escalation" although no one should harbor "any illusions about the outcome." The *Berliner Zeitung*, according to Jones (2001), said the peace process would "lurch from crisis to crisis for many years," and the Italian *La Repubblica* paradoxically called the *peace plan* "a burial shroud."

Coverage of citizens protesting U.S. military action in Afghanistan was more than merely skeptical of its efficacy. Reporting challenged the "sincerity" of the protesters, and it overtly dismissed their rationale, their logic, and their understanding of international issues (Jones, 2001d).

4. Events: Portents of Doom

Coverage of potentially conflict-laden events and actions did not receive this same skeptical or dismissive treatment in the news media routinely reviewed by *The Washington Report*. Instead, media tended to accept the potency of events that challenged, rather than supported, peace talks. Examples from German, Dutch, and British newspapers represented Ariel Sharon's 2000 visit to the Temple Mount, for example, as a powerful, intentional, and unmitigated act of agitation that presaged future violence that might explode "into full-scale war" (Jones, 2000). Here even the 2001 Israeli elections are presented as a harbinger of a new "wave of violence" (Jones, 2001, 2001b). Here, the future potential for violence is made concrete and present, overshadowing the possibility of peace.

5. Officialspeak: Truth and Other Constructions

Press summaries also indicate that journalists sometimes exaggerate positions and polarize participants in peace negotiations, perhaps to overcome the inherent absence of drama in ongoing talks. Thus, for example, selected media labeled U.S. pressure on Palestinians to participate in talks an "ultimatum" (Marshall, 1991).

In its selection and representation of mainstream media coverage of peace initiatives in the Middle East, *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* highlights five mechanisms through which news media undermine and marginalize the credibility and effectiveness of peace processes while simultaneously underscoring the potency of actions that threaten peace. To the degree that *The Washington Report* contributes to the U.S. public and policy agenda in the Middle East, it portrays peace as uncertain, remote, and untenable. Through both news coverage and commentary, the selected newspapers recurrently dismiss the potential for peace and denigrate diplomatic solutions. Peace initiatives are alternately a political charade or a vital component of imperialist ambitions. Public protests against war are condescendingly represented as sincere but misguided. Violence is inherent, logical, and imbedded in the very nature of the peoples and the extremism of the region; it is an intractable cultural phenomenon among those "other" people, who often are represented as irrational, full of essentialist hatred, and increasingly committed to violence as a solution.

Media, Conflict, and Identity

Understanding of the complex intersections of media, conflict, and identity is foundational to the practice of peace journalism. Tomlinson (1991) observed that newspapers both naturalize and "promote identification within the nation as *the* dominant form of cultural identity" (p. 83) (emphasis added). While the media occasionally evoke "images and representations of explicit nationalism," they more frequently call upon and reinforce national identity "through the construction of an abstract nation at risk through constant evocation of the 'natural' boundaries of the national community" (Brookes, 1999, p.

261). Some scholars (see, e.g., Shinar, 2003) have argued that nationalist media have emphasized and magnified popular sensitivity to essentialist differences, fueling conflicts between cultures, and, in the words of Tehranian (2002), promoting "envy and hatred [that] ... outpaced mutual understanding, respect, and tolerance" (p. 59; also see Hackett, 1991). Challenging the naturalness of nationalism as the master identity requires a more complex vision in which identity is understood as an ongoing process of boundary construction, maintenance, and destruction (Brookes, 1999; Schlesinger, 1991, 1991b).

Majstorovic (1997) noted that each of the two prevailing interpretations of the nature of conflict is profoundly flawed. Portraits of two sides, divided by essentialist differences and primordial hatreds (Geertz, 1973; Shils, 1957, 1995; Smith, 1983, 1986, 1991, 1995; Hunter, 1991; Moscovici, 1981) misunderstand the malleable multiplicity of identity (Swidler, 1986), misrepresent history (Mermin, 1999), dichotomize complex problems, and ignore the interconnections among various groups (Majstorovic, 1997). In contrast, insights into the constructed nature of ethno-nationalism (Anderson, 1991; Hall, 1992; Ignatieff, 1993; Shils, 1957) colored by critical perspectives of power and of nation-state manipulation of the masses to their own ends (Haas, 1993; Hobsbawm, 1990) fail to recognize the contingent, fluid nature of identity; dismiss the varied constraints of myth, history, and tradition; and underestimate the agency of the people (Barthes, 1972; Brookes, 1999; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Majstorovic, 1997).

Majstorovic (1997) suggested that prevailing perspectives on national identity may result from the "shared perspectives" of scholars, the product of ideology, perhaps, rather than deep insight into the nature of intergroup dynamics. While vital questions remain unanswered, it seems evident that Huntington's (1998) thesis that global conflicts arise from irreconcilable fundamental cultural differences is profoundly flawed. To overlook the varied, distinct, or potentially overlapping ways in which parties to a conflict may self-identify, and to ignore the highly subjective and contextual nature of identities is to fall into the trap of reductionism. Neither the "peoples" nor the causes of conflict are fixed or unitary. Thus, reporting practices that essentialize and reify difference are not only simplistic, they are simply inaccurate. Moreover, analyses that focus on elite representations and portraits of reality (e.g., media content analyses) suffer from the same exclusivity of focus for which researchers castigate the media.

Contested Directions

While much current energy is directed toward practical training initiatives to address the perceived inadequacies of contemporary media practice, systematic research on media coverage of peace is insufficient to direct these efforts. One point of contention is the locus (or loci) of the problem. External events and shifting realities are a primary source of existing coverage patterns, according to Young and Jesser (1997), and Ross and Bantimaroudis (2005). Hess and Orphanides (2001) and Bloomberg and Hess (2002) suggest that strategic political economic gamesmanship drives world events that, in turn, drive media coverage (Mosco, 1996). More generally, Bruck (1989), Stone (1989), and others, point to the highly contextual nature of media coverage and assert that a significant impetus toward war reporting lies within the world itself and within the nature of catastrophic events. Such perspectives suggest limits to the transformative power of journalism training.

A stronger argument, effectively articulating the impotence of peace journalism initiatives, posits that the media are a propaganda mouthpiece for the government, and journalistic norms and standards are little more than a ruse (Chomsky, 1999; Herman & Chomsky, 1980). Several scholars explicitly reject this vision of journalists as patsy to government (Lang & Lang, 2004; Lee & Maslog, 2005; Wolfsfeld, 1997), but a large and well-established body of work emphasizes the significant influence of political propaganda upon reporting (Nohrstedt et al, 2002; Solomon, 1992; Stone, 1989; Thussu, 2000). Hallin (1986) and Avraham (2003), for example, hold that the political culture in which media operate holds enormous sway over coverage patterns.

Rejecting portraits of relatively powerless media, many scholars assert that both internal industry norms and pressures and external ideology and politics drive the tendency for media to participate in rallies around government elites (Coles, 2002; Edwards & Swenson, 1997; Hutcheson, 2003; Lee, 1997; Lindsay, 2003; Mackuen, 1983; Mueller, 1994; Powlick & Katz, 1998). Gans (1979), Paletz and Entman (1981), and Shoemaker and Reese (1996) articulate a reciprocal influence between government elites and media in which a pivotal component is media dependency on government spokespeople. Bennett (2003), Body (1994), Lynch (2003), and Mueller (1971) point toward media reliance on government sources as the crux of the matter. Here, then, government exerts its power to set the media (dis)course indirectly by articulating coverage narratives and establishing salient binaries (Coe et al, 2004; Coles, 2002; Gitlin, 1979). Tuchman (1978), Schudson (1982), and Hallin and Mancini (1984) acknowledge the linguistic power of sources but suggest that the narrative conventions of journalism themselves are also at fault for media's proclivity to emphasize and exacerbate conflict. Professional norms and practices contribute to this formula (Hackett, 1991), making it particularly useful to consider new reporting and editing practices.

Wolfsfeld (1997b), Hackett (1991), Tehranian (2002), and Howard (2003) direct attention to the organizational structure, the increasing lack of pluralism, and the political economy of the media to argue that increased pluralism in ownership,

structures, and revenue streams is a key concern. In their view, a considerable portion of the problem lies within the power and prerogatives of media ownership and must be addressed at that level.

The complexity of the issues underlying peace journalism may elude scholarly consensus; a sufficient body of theory and evidence exists to support divergent positions. Thus, portents of gloom for the future of peace journalism see the field as flawed, certain to be ineffectual, or – worse – certain to be co-opted and manipulated to serve the “man” rather than the “people.” Others see opportunities for change and empowerment through retraining, restructuring, and re-envisioning the field. It is the reconciliation of these positions that is required.

Those who envision media as a public forum for open and productive debate (Arno, 1984; Loshitsky, 1991; O’Heffernan, 1991) must contend with abundant evidence that these industries are driven by the profit motive and the competitive lure of conflict (Howard, 2003) and often function as purveyors of fear and essentialist hatred at the behest of the powerful (e.g., Brookes, 1999). Those who advocate using the media to market salient, low-risk steps toward peace (Astorino-Courtois, 1983) or as a mechanism for advancing mutual respect and redefining community (Becker et al, 1995; Botes, 2003; Boulding, 1986) must address others who condemn the journalism of engagement as an abandonment of its vital role as an objective source of information (Fawcett, 2002; Hammond, 2002; Holquin, 1998). Those who suggest that citizens exert significant influence on media content because of their power to confer, or deny, media credibility (Tehrani, 2002) must recognize their diminished influence in the arena of international coverage. Those who believe in transcendent populist media standing outside existing power dynamics and transforming public dialogue to embrace new voices (Vayrynen, 1991) must grapple with the realities of competition in a lucrative global market and the expanding influence of media conglomerates and cross-national political initiatives (Burton, 1969; Kelman, 1996). And each of these must incorporate rich understanding of the variety of individuals and organizations that comprise the field of journalism as well as the dramatically different economic, cultural, and political environments in which they operate.

The Middle Road

Today both peace and war are caricatured in media coverage that seeks drama, political congruence, and clarity in 150 words or less. Such reporting obscures reality and confounds human initiatives toward global peace. Yet this practice is the result of a profound human tendency; journalists evoke oppositional dualities more readily during coverage of violent conflict, when their increased fear and mortality salience prompt heightened desire to cling to one’s own world view (Jonas & Greenberg, 2004). Inchoate fear also increases nationalism, defensiveness, and the willingness to censor the flow of information and to forego other fundamental liberties (Blanchard, 1992). Siebert (1952) and Blanchard (1992) are among a much broader group of scholars (see, e.g., Smith, 1999) who have argued that this “urge toward conformity,” in Blanchard’s (1992) terms, undermines the ability of the press to function as a check on government abuse of power during times of fear (pp. viii-ix).

Peace journalism, therefore, faces a daunting challenge to address deeply trained professional patterns, structural and financial pressures within the industry, and profound psychological responses that encourage reactive, and at times reactionary, nationalistic reporting. Calls to simply “do better” will, therefore, likely fall short if they fail to help journalists negotiate the terrors of war and transcend the human desire to distance and to blame. The challenge is not only for journalists to listen well and to hear “the other” better but to understand and incorporate that new understanding into an expanded revision of self that transcends national, religious, ethnic, and other profound aspects of identity and enmity. This shift demands abandonment of the moral certainty in one’s own beliefs to adopt a broader and more fundamental set of values grounded in clarity that peace is always better than violence, health is better than epidemic disease and starvation, and economic sufficiency is better than ravaging poverty.

To move toward media that serve global peace not war, we must avoid the alluring yet insubstantial path of reductionism. Allport (1954) and Tajfel (1969) observed that people employ categorizations to economize and simplify their assessments of others and to direct their intergroup behavior. The human urge to simplify complexity and divide continua into discrete categories upon which we base future choices and actions is a fundamental precept of contemporary understanding of social cognition and intergroup psychology (Miller & Hoffman, 1999). Kempf’s (2003) observations on human psychology are particularly useful here. He noted that humans tend to focus on their own intentions but on the actual effects of other’s actions. This tendency systematically underestimates the harm of personal actions as it overestimates the harm caused by others. The influence of such categorizations upon stereotyping, outcasting, and symbolic representations of culture is well documented (e.g., Hazlam et al., 1995, Hunter, 1991).

Yet the varied categories to which individuals belong do not coalesce into hostile opposing camps unless the groups are “*clearly defined in a public forum*.” That is, people are not likely to see themselves as belonging to a broad social category until some event, popular group, or charismatic leader defines the category” (Miller & Hoffman, 1999, emphasis added). Decades of agenda setting and framing research confirm the role of the media as this forum and support the conclusion

that people employ the categorizations with the greatest salience (Hogg & Turner, 1997; McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Thus, people aggregate around dominant categories, forming groups that will adopt increasingly extreme positions and exaggerate inter-group differences as the media portray conflict between the groups as rising (Brown & Williams, 1984).

An effective praxis of peace journalism must recognize first that journalists are human beings, citizens, social beings, and products of the same social, political, religious, ethnocentric, and nationalistic pressures and predilections as the people about whom they report. It is paradoxical, but nonetheless true, that many journalists attracted to the profession by a desire to "change the world" systematically engage in practices that entrench the status quo. Wilhoit and Weaver (Weaver, 1998; Weaver et al, 2002; Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996, 1991) repeatedly have documented the solid membership of U.S. journalists in the elite caste that benefits from the very conflicts peace journalism would ask them to work toward eliminating. Given human nature, peace journalism seems unlikely to take hold until proposals provide mechanisms to assist journalists in transcending their own individual and collective identities.

Journalists themselves, however, recurrently cite training as the greatest influence on their news values (Weaver et al, 2002). Modern journalism education in the United States is essentially an outgrowth of the U.S. government's extensive and effective use of communications media in World War II (Rogers, 1994). Here history suggests attention to retraining is well placed, at least in the United States and in countries where independent, autonomous media have not been the norm (Howard, 2003). James Carey (1978) and others (Edge, 2003) long have argued that the contemporary training of professional journalists stifles original and critical thinking. Improved practice, they say, requires journalists to be more self-reflexive and to better understand their role in society and in conflict (Edge, 2003).

Based in knowledge of the powerful role of war coverage to divert public attention away from enormous transfers of wealth, Galtung (1970, 2000, 2000b) and Tehranian (2002), like Kaldor (2003), nonetheless argues that strong, diverse, independent media are essential to civil society and "to counter the powers of the state and the market" to dominate and, hence, diminish civil discourse ((Tehranian, p. 79, 77). It is clear peace journalists and activists promoting peace must abandon the tactics of conflict and the reactive rhetoric of negativity, blame, and criticism (Coles, 2002; Gorsevski, 1999; Harvey, 1991; Ivie, 1987) to engage in a positive discourse of principled, compassionate humanism, and provide positive alternatives to the status quo. Proponents of peace must not engage in the game of shaming, demonizing, and othering mastered by the mongers of war (see, e.g., Lazar & Lazar, 2004) but should rally the people with invitations to act upon their essential "peace and justice sentiments" (Coles, 2002, p. 599) and conceptualize a transnational identity of universal humanity (Coles, 2002, p. 602).

What is needed is a journalism of symbolic rapprochement. My views adopt some of the principles of "conflict transformation" identified by Shinar (2003), who suggests that a transformation of "the images of the self and the other," rather than reconciliation, is necessary to end intractable, essentialist, cultural conflicts. I strongly support the focus on image transformation as vital to resolution of all conflicts regardless of whether essentialist or not. The key, as Shinar (2003) notes, is for "groups engaged in conflict [to] achieve a fairly accurate understanding of each other."

The role of the media in such transformations is critical, yet extremely difficult. Journalism structures of conglomerated ownership politically aligned or interwoven with government actors exerting transnational or even global influence and peddling government rhetoric present significant sources of resistance particularly when legal structures limit their autonomy. Yet assertions that media have expanded their influence on and their intervention in international policy processes (Fowler, 1991; Gilboa, 1998; Hall, 1980; Larson, 1986; Tuchman, 1978) may be unduly pessimistic. It is likely media consistently have partnered, throughout time and to varying degrees, with governments in international affairs.

The challenge to create new constructions of reality is, at its base, a human challenge. Fisher (1989, 1989b) first suggested that narrative conventions have enormous societal impact because humans are story-telling animals, what he called *homo narrans*, who experience and understand life as a series of narratives with beginnings, middles, and ends (Niles, 1999). Humans naturally craft stories with dramatic coherence that transform individuals into archetypes and connect events into a logical series. Familiar story lines that place good and evil in dramatic combat, link hard work to resource acquisition, and create a world of finite resources and zero-sum contests resonate with the human psyche and drive the journalist who crafts the story as well as the reader.

Here restructuring and retraining that insulate independent journalism organizations and journalists themselves from the economic, socio-political, and nationalistic pressures exerted by corporate and government elites are critical. Independent organizations and individuals can provide coverage responsive to events (manipulated by these elites) but redefined by a new array of credible and authoritative sources who offer resources of the imagination from which citizens can craft alternatives to elite constructions. The challenge to create more open and varied news outlets that embrace a range of views rather than parrot dominant political ideologies is in large part one of capital. Internet-based independent media centers (IndyMedia) today are expanding news narratives and increasing the rhetorical space for open exchange of information while evading many of the obstacles of capital. Independently funded through multiple private supporters, "Indymedia is

a democratic media outlet for the creation of radical, accurate, and passionate tellings of truth" (<http://www.indymedia.org/en/index.shtml>). A non-hierarchical collective of independent media organizations and hundreds of journalists, Indymedia advances the objectives of peace journalism through grassroots, non-corporate coverage with access for alternate voices.

As voices rise and independent, self-critical media grow, training also can provide journalists with strategies to inoculate themselves against knee-jerk responses to evocations of fear and the realities of violence. As in most attempts at self-change, moving beyond denial is a critical first step. Thus it is encouraging that journalists are aware of government control and spin of war coverage and have become somewhat self-critical about press participation in propaganda efforts (Hoijer, Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2002, p. 7). The dominance of the discourse of compassion among audience members is a potential resource for those seeking to transform media coverage toward praxis of peace.

Peace praxis also requires the deconstruction of national identities and movement toward representation of humans as individual people not as exemplars of a national, religious, ethnic, or other group. This is a particularized practice. According to Juanita Leon, editor of *El Tiempo's* (Colombia) Peace Unit, what is needed is a journalism that "create[s] the idea that peace is possible in the collective imagination" (Pratt, n.d.). Journalism that displays the society's efforts toward peace is essential because "government and media attention [to] the peace process, and the specific benefits to be gained from a peace accord, would be directly associated with public attitudes concerning the *vitalness* of that process" (Astorino-Courtois, 1996, p. 1039, emphasis in original). Actions to disempower the primacy of national identity and coalesce new communities can be built through coverage that places transnational linkages, regional alliances, and global concerns at its center.

The goal of peace journalism should not be to achieve rational mutual understanding at all times for all peoples around the globe. Such a goal would ignore the importance of what Kaplan (2003) eloquently called "the beauty of intolerable truths:" irrational, destructive, cruel, and violent "explosions of passion ... are central to the human spirit." Numerous psychologists, similarly, have recognized the role of violence in fulfilling both individual and collective needs that include relief from boredom and stimulation of an increased sense of creativity, confidence, empowerment, and agency (Grundy & Weinstein, 1974).

A more realistic objective for peace journalism, and one that conforms to the norms of professional ethics and objectivity, is to include a rich array of "symbols of security" and peace as resources for the collective imagination, particularly in nations or regions where long-term violence has rendered peace an unknown and unimaginable concept (Ghazy, 2003; Kashua, 2004; Shinar, 2003). The primary task of peace journalism, then, is to render the unknown thinkable; the alien, recognizable; the different, compatible. For, "in the absence of positive depictions ..., it is extremely unlikely that [others'] interests will resonate" (Noakes & Wilkins, 2002, p. 649).

The War on War

Some will continue to argue that the practices outlined above as central to peace journalism praxis abandon the essential and central role of objective reporting. Poppycock! U.S. media long have embraced the government's "war on crime," its "war on drugs," its war on drinking and driving and an array of other public policy initiatives designed to alter the practices of residents. No one suggests the media should be an objective and neutral platform to exchange ideas on the pros and cons of rape or genocide. Why, then, is it more acceptable for media to promote anti-drug and anti-crime messages than to advocate for the end of violence? Clearly Lynch (1998) is correct: No substantial professional/ethical obstacle exists to the inclusion of pro-peace narratives by the media, and peace journalism does not involve any radical departure from contemporary journalism practice. Rather peace journalism requires numerous subtle and cumulative shifts in seeing, thinking, sourcing, narrating, and financing the news: shifts toward citizens and away from elite spokespeople, toward the value of peace rather than the adrenalin rush of conflict, toward mutual benefits rather than unilateral victory.

Caution is advised in pursuing a "peace frame" that encourages continued reliance on elites, media events, etc (Dayan & Katz, 1992) or a practice reliant upon overly concentrated media power (Young & Jesser, 1997). History demonstrates how quickly power corrupts and the agility with which governments co-opt external elites and effectively silence expression of truly original visions. Symbolic representations of equality, humanity, and harmony grow best in the rich soil of diverse experience and freedom (Shinar, 2004).

References

- Ackerman, S. (1999). Redefining diplomacy. *Extra!* Available at www.fair.org/extra/9907/kosovo-diplomacy.html.
- Adam, Barry D. (1991). Nicaragua, the Peace Process, and Television News: A Study of U.S. and Canadian Coverage in Three Languages. *Canadian Journal of Communication*, 16:1, available at www.cjc-online.ca.

- Allport, G. W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Altheide, David L. (1987). Format and Symbols in TV Coverage of Terrorism in the United States and Great Britain, *International Studies Quarterly*, 31:2, 161-176.
- Anderson, Benedict. (revised, 1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso: New Left Books.
- Angus, I. and P.G. Cook. (1984). *The media, Cold War and the disarmament movement: Reflections on the Canadian Situation* (Working paper 84-3) Waterloo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares. Cited in: Hackett, R. A. (1991). News and Dissent, The Press and the Politics of Peace in Canada. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Arendt, H. (1969). Reflections on violence. *Journal of International Affairs*, 1, 23.
- Arno, A. (1984). The news media as third parties in national and international conflict: Duobus litigantibus tertius gaudet. In: Arno, A. & Dissanayake, W. (eds.), *The News Media in National and International Conflict*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Astorino-Courtois, A. (Nov. 1996). Transforming international agreements into national realities: Marketing Arab-Israeli peace in Jordan. *The Journal of Politics*, 54:4, 1035-1054.
- Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ed.) (2003). *Constructive Conflict Coverage. A Social Psychological Approach*. Berlin: Regener.
- Avraham, E. (2003). Press, politics, and the coverage of minorities in divided societies: The case of Arab citizens in Israel. *The Harvard Journal of Press/Politics*, 8:4, 7-26.
- Barthes, Roland. (1972). *Mythologies* (Annette Lavers, Trans.). New York: Hill & Wang.
- Bauman, M. & Siebert, H. (2000). Journalists as Mediators, in: Reyhler, L. and Paffenholz, T. (eds.) *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Becker, C., Chasin, L., Chasin, R. et al. (1995). From Stuck Debate to New Conversation on Controversial Issues: A Report from the Public Conversations Project. *Journal of Feminist Therapy*, 7:1, 143-163.
- Beit, Hallahmi, Benjamin. (1972). Some psychosocial and cultural factors in the Arab-Israeli conflict: A review of the literature. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 6:2, 269-80.
- Bell, M. (1997). TV news: How far should we go?, *British Journalism Review*, 8:1, 7-16.
- Ben-Dak, Joseph D. (1972). Some directions for research toward peaceful Arab-Israeli relations: Analysis of past events and gaming simulation of the future. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 16:2, 281-294.
- Ben-Dak, Joseph D. (1970). Time for reorientation: A review of recent research on the Arab-Israeli conflict. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 14:1, 101-112.
- Bennett, W.L. (2003). Operation Perfect Storm: The Press and the Iraq War, *Political Communication Report*, 13:3.
- Bennett, W.L. & Paletz, D. (eds.) (1994). *Taken by Storm: The Media Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*. University of Chicago Press.
- Blanchard, Margaret A. (1992). *Revolutionary Sparks, Freedom of Expression in Modern America*. Oxford University Press.
- Bloomberg, S.B. and Hess, G.D. The temporal links between conflict and economic activity. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46:1 (2002) 74-90.
- Botes, Johannes. (1995). Journalism and Conflict Resolution, in: Rubenstein, R.E., Botes, J., Dukes, F. & Stephens, J.B. (eds.) *ICAR Report #2, Frameworks for Interpreting Conflict: A Handbook for Journalists*. George Mason University: Institute for Conflict Analysis & Resolution.
- Botes, Johannes. (2003). Public Affairs Television and Third Party Roles: The *Nightline* Debates in South Africa (1985) and Israel (1988). *Peace & Conflict Studies*, 10:2, 1-19.
- Boulding, Elise. (1972). Peace Research: Dialectics and development. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 16:4, 469-475.
- Boulding, Kenneth. (1968). Accomplishments and prospects of the peace research movement. *Arms Control and Disarmament*, 1.
- Bratic, V. (2006). Media effects during violent conflict: Evaluating media contributions to peace building, *conflict & communication online*, 5:1.
- Brody, Richard A. (1994). Crisis, war, and public opinion: The media and public support for the president. In: W. Lance Bennet and David L. Paletz, eds., *Taken by storm: The media, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 210-227.
- Brody, Richard A. & Shapiro, Catherine R.. (1989). Policy failure and public support: The Iran-Contra affair and public assessment of President Reagan, *Political Behavior* 11, 353-369.

- Brookes, Rod. (1999). Newspapers and national identity: The BSE/CJD crisis and the British press. *Media, Culture & Society*, 21:2, 247-263.
- Brown, Rupert, and Williams, Jennifer. (1984). Group Identification: The Same Thing to All People? *Human Relations* 37, 547-64.
- Bruck, P. (1989). Strategies for Peace, Strategies for News Research. *Journal of Communication*, 39:1, 108-29.
- Burton, J.W. (1969). *Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations*. London: Macmillan.
- Carroll, Berenice A. (1972). Peace research: The cult of power. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 16:4, 585-616.
- Carruthers, S.L. (2000). *The media at war: Communication and conflict in the twentieth century*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Chilton, P. (1987). Metaphor, euphemism and the militarization of language. *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, 10, 7-19.
- Coe, Kevin; Domke, David; Graham, Erica S.; John, Sue Lockett & Pickard, Victor W. (2004). No Shades of Gray: The Binary Discourse of George W. Bush and an Echoing Press. *Journal of Communication* 54:2, 234-252.
- Coles, Roberta L. (2002). War and the contest over national identity. *The Sociological Review* 50: 4, 586-609.
- Connell, I. (1982). Peace in our times. In: C. Aubrey (ed.), *Nukespeak: The media and the Bomb* (pp. 17-32). London: Comedia.
- Converse, Elizabeth. (1968). The war of all against all: A review of the Journal of Conflict Resolution. 1957-1968. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 12:4.
- Daminikowski, T. (2004). In: Hanitzsch, T., Löffelholz, M. & Mustamu, R. (eds). *Agents of Peace, Public communication and conflict resolution in an Asian setting*. Jakarta: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Universitas Kristen, Petra, Technische Universität Ilmenau, & Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst.
- Daugherty, David & Warden, Michael. (Win. 1979). Prestige press editorial treatment of the Mideast during eleven crisis years. *Journalism Quarterly*, 56:4, 776-82.
- Davison, W.P. (1974). *Mass Communication and Conflict Resolution: The Role of the Information Media in the Advancement of International Understanding*. New York: Praeger.
- Donsbach, Wolfgang. (2004). Psychology of news decisions: Factors behind journalists' professional behavior, *Journalism*, 5:2, 131-157
- Edwards, G.C. III, & Swenson, T. (1997). Who rallies? The anatomy of rally event. *Journal of Politics*, 59:1, 200-212.
- Edge, Marc. (2003). Professionalism versus pragmatism, *Media, Fall/Winter*, 10-12.
- Entman, R.M. (2004). *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, & U.S. Foreign Policy*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
- Fabris, H. and T. Varis. (1986). *Peace and Communication*. San Jose: Editorial Universidad para la Paz.
- Fairclough, N. (1995). *Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Longman.
- Fawcett, Liz. (2002). Why Peace Journalism Isn't News, *Journalism Studies* 3:2, 213-223.
- Fisher, W. R. (1989b). Clarifying the narrative paradigm, *Communication Monographs*, 56, 55-58.
- Fisher, W. R. (1989). *Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action*. University of South Carolina Press.
- Fowler, R. (1991). *Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press*. London: Routledge.
- Galtung, Johan. (circa 1970). *Some basic assumptions of peace thinking*. International Peace Research Institute. Oslo.
- Galtung, Johan. (2000a). The Task of Peace Journalism, *Ethical Perspectives*, 7.
- Galtung, Johan. (2000b). *Theories of peace*. International Peace Research Institute.
- Galtung, Johan. (2002). Peace Journalism – A Challenge. In: Kempf, Wilhelm & Heikki Loustarinen (eds.) *Journalism and the New World Order, Vol.2. Studying the War and the Media*. Gothenburg: Nordicom.
- Gamson, W.A., Croteau, D., Hoynes, W., & Sasson, T. (1992). Media Images and the Social Construction of Reality. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 18, 373-393.
- Gans, H. J. (1979). *Deciding what's news: A study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time*. New York: Random House.
- Geertz, Clifford. (1973). *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.
- Ghazy, Randa. (2003). *Dreaming of Palestine*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Inc. .
- Gilboa, E. (1998). Media Diplomacy: Conceptual divergence and applications. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 3:3.
- Gilboa, E. (2003). Media diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In: Gilboa, E. (ed.) *Media and Conflict, Framing issues, making policy, shap-*

- ing opinions*, 193-213. Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers.
- Gitlin, T. (1979). News as ideology and contested area: Toward a theory of hegemony, crisis and opposition. *Socialist Review*, 9, 11-54.
- Goldfarb, M. (2001). All journalism is local: Reporting on the Middle East, How the U.S. and European media cover the same events differently. *Press/Politics* 6:3, 110-115.
- Gorsevski, E.W. (1999). *The Geopolitics of Peaceful Persuasion: Toward a Theory of Nonviolent Rhetoric*. Pennsylvania State University: PhD Dissertation.
- Grundy, K.W. & Weinstein, M.A. (1974). *The Ideologies of Violence*. Columbus, OH: C.E. Merrill Publ. Co.
- Haas, Ernst B. (1993). Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 22, 505-45.
- Hackett, Robert A. (1991). *News and Dissent, The Press and the Politics of Peace in Canada*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Hackett, R. and Zhao, Y. (eds.) (with Johan Galtung). (2005). *Democratizing Global Media: One World Many Struggles*, Boulder CO: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Hall, S. (1980). *Culture, Media, Language*. London: Hutchinson.
- Hall, S. (1992). The Question of Cultural Identity. In: S. Hall, D. Held and T. McGrew (eds.). *Modernity and Its Futures*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Hallin, D. (1986). *The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hallin, Daniel and Mancini, P. (1984) Speaking of the President: Political Structure and Representational Form in U.S. and Italian Television News, *Theory and Society*, 13: 6, 829-850.
- Hammond, Philip. (2002). Moral Combat: Advocacy Journalists and the New Humanitarianism. Available at myweb.lsvu.ac.uk/~hammon-pb/2002.html.
- Hanitzsch, T. (2004). Journalists as peacekeeping force? Peace journalism and mass communication theory, *Journalism Studies*, 5:4, 483-495.
- Hanitzsch, T., Löffelholz, M. & Mustamu, R. (eds.) (2004). *Agents of Peace, Public communication and conflict resolution in an Asian setting*. Jakarta: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Universitas Kristen, Petra, Technische Universität Ilmenau, & Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst.
- Harris, I.M., L. J. Fisk and C. Rank. (January 1998). A Portrait of University Peace Studies in North America and Western Europe at the End of the Millennium, *The International Journal of Peace Studies*, 3:1.
- Harvey, M. (July/August, 1991). Why did the anti-war movement flop? *Utne Reader*, 17-18.
- Hazlam, Alexander S., Oakes, P., Turner, J.C. and McGarty, C. (1995). Social Categorization and Group Homogeneity: Changes in the Perceived Applicability of Stereotype Content as a Function of Comparative Context and Trait Favourableness. *British Journal of Social Psychology* 34, 139-60.
- Herman, E.S. and Noam Chomsky. (1988). *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon.
- Hess, G.D. and A. Orphanides. (2001). Economic conditions, elections and the magnitude of foreign conflicts. *Journal of Public Economics*, 80, 121-40.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1990). *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. (eds.). (1983). *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hoffman, Stanley. (1963). Rousseau on war and peace. *American Political Science Review*, 2, 57 et seq.
- Hofman, John E. (1972). Readiness for social relations between Arabs and Jews in Israel. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 6:2, 241-251.
- Hogg, Michael A., & Turner, John C.. (1987). Intergroup Behaviour, Self-Stereotyping and the Salience of Social Categories. *British Journal of Social Psychology* 26, 325-40.
- Hoijer, B., Nohrstedt, S. A. & Ottosen, R. (2002). The Kosovo War in the Media- Analysis of a global discursive order, *conflict & communication online*, 1:2 at www.cco.regener-online.de.
- Holquin, L.M. (1998). The media in modern peacekeeping. *Peace Review*, 10:4, 639-645.
- <http://www.ethics.be/ethics/viewpic.php?LAN=E&TABLE=EP&ID=141>
- Howard, Ross. (2003). The Media's role in War and Peacebuilding, presented at the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Conference on The Role of the Media in Public Scrutiny and Democratic Oversight of the Security Factor, Budapest, Feb. 6-9, 2003. Available online at www.impacs.org.
- Hunter, James Davison. (1991). *Culture Wars. The Struggle to Redefine America*. Basic Books. Free Press.

- Huntington, Samuel P. (1998). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. New York: Touchstone Books.
- Hutcheson, John S. (2003). Affirming a Nation: The Construction of U.S. National Identity during the Persian Gulf War and the War on Terrorism. Master's Thesis, Department of Communication, University of Washington.
- Hutcheson, J., Domke, D., Billeaudeau, A., & Garland, P. (2004). U.S. national identity, political elites, and a patriotic press following Sept. 11, *Political Communication* 21:1, 27-50.
- Ibrahim, Saad E. M. (1972). Arab Images of the United States and the Soviet Union before and after the June War of 1967. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 6:2, 227-40.
- Ignatieff, M. (1993). *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the new Nationalism*. New York: Viking.
- Ivie, R.L. (June, 1987). Metaphor and the rhetorical invention of cold war idealists. *Communication Monographs*, 54, 165-181.
- Jonas, E. and Greenberg, J. Terror management and political attitudes: The Influence of Mortality Salience on Germans' Defence of the German Reunification, *European Journal of Psychology*, 34, 1-9. Available online at www.interscience.wiley.com.
- Jones, Lucy. (April 2001b). European press reacts with dismay to election of Ariel Sharon, *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, XX: 3, 43.
- Jones, Lucy. (Sept. 30, 2001c). The European press views the Middle East: European press; Mitchell Report offers little hope, *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, XX: 6, 29.
- Jones, Lucy. (Dec. 31, 2001d). The European press views the Middle East: Support for U.S. bombing of Afghanistan wanes as campaign continues, injuries mount, *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, XX: 9, 47.
- Jones, Lucy. (March 2001). The European press views the Middle East: Clinton's last push for peace, *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, XX:2, 33.
- Jones, Lucy. (Dec. 2000). The European press views the Middle East: Sharon's Temple Mount visit "unprecedented act of provocation" says Germany's Sueddeutsche Zeitung, *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, XIX: 9, 47.
- Kaldor, Mary. (2003). *Global Civil Society, An Answer to War*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
- Kaplan, Robert. (May 2003). Society: Euphorias of Hatred. *The Atlantic Monthly*, 44-45.
- Karnik, N.S. (1998). Rwanda and the Media: Imagery, War & Refuge. *Review of African Political Economy*, 78, 611-623.
- Kashua, Sayed. (2004). *Dancing Arabs*. Berkeley, CA: Grove Press.
- Kempf, Wilhelm (1994). German Newspaper Coverage of Allied Prisoners of War During the Gulf Crisis (1990/91). Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz Nr. 26, at www.ub.uni-konstanz.de/serials/kempf.htm.
- Kempf, Wilhelm (2002). Conflict Coverage and Conflict Escalation. In: Kempf, Wilhelm & Heikki Loustarinen (eds.) *Journalism and the New World Order, Vol.2. Studying the War and the Media*. Gothenburg: Nordicom.
- Kempf, W. (2003). Constructive conflict coverage, *conflict & communication online*, 2:2, at www.cco.regener-online.de.
- Kent, George. (1971). The application of peace studies, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 15:1, 47-53.
- Knightley, P. (1975). *The first casualty*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch.
- Kondopoulou, M. (2002). The Greek media and the Kosovo crisis, *conflict & communication online*, 1:2, 1-11.
- Lake, David A. & Rothchild, D. (1996). Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict, *International Security*, 21:2, 41-75.
- Lang, K. & Lang, G. E. (2004). Noam Chomsky and the Manufacture of Consent for American Foreign Policy, A Reply, *Political Communication*, 21:1, 93.
- Larson, J.F. (1986). Television and U.S. foreign policy: The case of the Iran hostage crisis. *Journal of Communication*, 36.
- Lazar, Annita & Lazar, Michelle M. (2004). The Discourse of the New World Order: 'Out-Casting' the Double Face of Threat, *Discourse & Society*, 15: 2/3, 223-242.
- Lee, J. (1997). Rallying around the flag: Foreign policy events and presidential popularity. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 7:3, 252-256.
- Lee, S.T. and Maslog, C.C. (2005). War or Peace Journalism? Asian Newspaper Coverage of Conflicts. *Journal of Communication*, 55:2, 311-329.
- Liebes, Tamar. (1992). Our war/their war: Comparing the "Intifadeh" and the Gulf War on U.S. and Israeli television. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, 9:1, 44-55.
- Lindsay, James M. (March 25, 2003). Poll: Fear of terrorism still high, *Brookings Daily War Report*.

- Loshitzky, Y. (1991). The Intifada as a Meta-Televisual Dialogue. *Media, Culture, and Society*, 13:4, 557-571.
- Lynch, Jake. (2003). *Iraq: Broadening the agenda*. Available at www.basicint.org/iraqconflict/Pubs/Discussion%20Papers/DS080903.htm
- Lynch, Jake & Annabel McGoldrick. (2005). *Peace Journalism*. London: Hawthorn Press.
- Mackuen, M. (1983). Political drama, economic conditions, and the dynamics of presidential popularity. *American Journal of Political Science*, 27:2, 165-192.
- Marshall, Rachelle. (Oct. 1991). Nothing without U.S. pressure on Israel. *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, X:4, 14.
- McCombs, M., & Shaw, D. L. (1972). The agenda-setting function of mass media. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 36, 176-187.
- McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1993). The evolution of agenda setting research: Twenty-five years in the marketplace of ideas. *Journal of Communication*, 43, 58-67.
- McLeod, D.M. & Hertog, J.K. (1998). Social control and the mass media's role in the regulation of protest groups: The communicative acts perspective. In: Demers, D. & Viswanath, K. (eds.), *Mass media, social control and social change* (pp. 305-330). Ames: Iowa State University Press.
- Mermin, Jonathan. (1999). *Debating War and Peace*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Merrill, J.C. (1989). *The Dialectic in Journalism: Toward a Responsible Use of Press Freedom*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press.
- Metzl, J. (1997a). Information intervention: When switching channels isn't enough, *Foreign Affairs*, 76:6, 15-30.
- Metzl, J. (1997b). Rwandan genocide and the international law of jamming, *American Journal of International Law*, 91:4, 628-651.
- Miller, Alan S. & John O Hoffman. (1999). The growing divisiveness: Culture wars or a war of words? *Social Forces*, 8:2, 721-746.
- Mosco, Vincent. (1996). *The Political Economy of Communication*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Moscovici, Serge. (1981). On Social Representations. In: *Social Cognition: Perspectives on Everyday Understanding* (J.P. Forgas, ed.) Academic Press 181-209.
- Mueller, John E. (1971). Trends in popular support for the wars in Korea and Vietnam, *American Political Science Review*, 65, 358-375
- Mueller, John E. (1994). *Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Naveh, Chanan. (2005). The role of the media in establishing international security regimes, *conflict & communication online*, 4:1, 1-18.
- Niles, John D. (1999). *Homo Narrans: The Poetics and Anthropology of Oral Literature*. University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Noakes, John A. & Wilkins, Karin Gwinn. (2002). Shifting frames of the Palestinian movement in US news, *Media, Culture and Society*, 24:5, 649-671.
- Nohrstedt, Stig; Kaitazi-Whitlock, Sophia; Ottosen, Rune, et al. (2000). From the Persian Gulf to Kosovo - War Journalism and Propaganda, *European Journal of Communication*, 15:3, 383-404.
- O'Heffernan, P. (1991). *Mass Media and American Foreign Policy: Insider Perspectives on Global Journalism and the Foreign Policy Press*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing.
- Ottosen, R. (1995). Enemy images and the journalistic process. *Journal of Peace Research* 1, 1-16.
- Paletz, D. & Entman, R. M. (1981). *Media, power, politics*. New York: Free Press.
- Pan, Z. & Kosicki, G.M. (1994). Voters' Reasoning Processes and Media Influences during the Persian Gulf War, *Political Behavior*, 16:1, 117-156.
- Parenti, M. (1970). Power and pluralism: A view from the bottom. *The Journal of Politics*, 32.
- Powlick, P.J. & Katz, A.Z. (1998). Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus, *Mershon International Studies Review*, 42:1, 29-61.
- Pratt, Timothy. *Colombia: Journalism Under Fire*, accessed at mediachannel.org, April 2005.
- Price, M.E. & Thompson, M. (eds.) (2002). *Forging peace: Intervention, human rights and the management of media space*. Edinburgh: Univ. of Edinburgh Press.
- Rapoport, A. (1970). Can peace research be applied? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 14:2, 277-860.
- Reese, Stephen D., & Buckalew, Bob. (1995). The militarization of local television: The routine framing of the Persian Gulf war. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, 12:1, 41-56.
- Reimann, Michael. (2002). Communication Disorders in Conflict Coverage. In: Kempf, W., Luostarinen, H. (eds.). *Journalism and the New*

World Order. Vol. II. Studying War and the Media. Göteborg: Nordicom.

- Rogers, Everett M. (1994). *History of Communication Study*. New York: Free Press.
- Ross, Susan D. (2003). Framing of the Palestinian/Israeli Conflict in Thirteen Months of *New York Times* Editorials Surrounding the Attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. *conflict & communication online*, 2:2 www.cco.regener-online.de.
- Ross, Susan D. and Bantimaroudis, Philemon. (2005). Frame shifts and catastrophic events: The attacks of September 11, 2001, and *New York Times*'s portrayals of Arafat and Sharon. *Mass Communication & Society*.
- Schudson, Michael. (1982). The Politics of Narrative Form: The Emergence of News Conventions in Print and Television, *Daedalus*, 11:4.
- Schlesinger, P. (1991). Media, the political order and national identity. *Media, Culture & Society*, 13:3, 297-308.
- Schlesinger, P. (1991b) *Media, state and nation: Political violence and collective identities*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Schlesinger, P. (1978). *Putting 'Reality' Together: BBC News*. London: Constable.
- Shah, H. & Thornton, M.C. (2004). *Newspaper coverage of interethnic conflict: Competing visions of America*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Shils, Edward . (1995). Nation, Nationality, Nationalism and Civil Society. *Nations and Nationalism I*, 93-118.
- Shils, Edward . (1957). Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties. *British Journal of Sociology*, 7, 113-45.
- Shinar, Dov. (2004). Media Peace Discourse: Constraints, concepts and building blocks. *conflict & communication online*, 3:1/2 at www.cco.regener-online.de.
- Shinar, Dov. (2003). The peace process in cultural conflict: The role of the media. *conflict & communication online*, 2:1 at www.cco.regener-online.de.
- Shinar, Dov. (2003a). Cultural conflict in the Middle East: The media as peacemakers. In: Gilboa, E. (ed.) *Media and Conflict, Framing issues, making policy, shaping opinions*, 281-95. Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers.
- Shoemaker, P. & Reese, S. (1996). *Mediating the message: theories of influences on mass media content* (2d ed.). New York: Longman.
- Siebert, Frederick S. (1952). *Freedom of the Press in England 1476-1776: The Rise and Decline of Government Control*. University of Illinois: Ilini Books.
- Sigal, L.V. (1973). *Reporters and officials*. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.
- Smith, Anthony. (March 1995). Gastronomy or Geology? The Role of Nationalism in the Reconstruction of Nations. *Nations and Nationalism I*, 3-23.
- Smith, Anthony. (1986). *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Smith, Anthony. (1983). *Theories of Nationalism*. New York: Holes & Meier Publishers.
- Smith, Anthony. (1991). The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed? *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 20, 353-68.
- Smith, J.A. (1999). *War and Press Freedom, The problem of prerogative power*. Oxford University Press.
- Solomon, W.S. (1992). New Frames and Media Packages: Covering El Salvador. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, 9, 56-74.
- Spencer, G. (2004). The impact of television news on the Northern Ireland Peace Negotiations. *Media, Culture, and Society*, 26:5, 603-623.
- Steuter, E. (1990). Understanding the media/terrorism relationship: An analysis of ideology and the news, in: *Time magazine. Political Communication and Persuasion*, 7, 257-278.
- Stone, S.D. (1989). The Peace Movement and Toronto Newspapers. *The Canadian Journal of Communication*, 14:1, 57-69.
- Strobel, W.P. (1997). *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations*. Washington, D.C.: USIP Press.
- Swidler, Ann. (1986). Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. *American Sociological Review* 51, 273-86.
- Tajfel, H. (1969). Cognitive aspects of prejudice. *Journal of Social Issues*, 25, 79-97.
- Taleb, B.A. (2004). *The Bewildered Herd, Media Coverage of International Conflicts & Public Opinion*. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse.
- Tehrani, M. (2002). Peace Journalism, Negotiating global media ethics. *Harvard Journal of Press/Politics*, 7:2, 58-83.
- Terzis, George & Melone, S. (2001). Using the Media for Conflict Transformation, in: Austin, A. (ed.), *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.
- Thompson, M. (1999). *Forging war: The media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Luton: Univ. of Luton Press.
- Tichenor, P.J., Donohue, G.A., & Olien, C.N. (1980). *Community Conflict & the Press*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Tomlinson, J. (1991). *Cultural Imperialism*. London: Pinter.

- Tuchman, Gaye (1978). *Making News. A Study in the Construction of Reality*. New York: The Free Press.
- Vayrynen, R. (1991). To settle or transform? Perspectives on the resolution of national and international conflicts. In: Vayrynen, R. (ed.), *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation*. London: Sage.
- Vincent, R. C. (2000). A narrative analysis of U.S. press coverage of Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbs in Kosovo. *European Journal of Communication*, 15:3, 321-344.
- The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs available online Feb. 2006 at <http://www.wrmea.com/aboutwrmea/index.htm>.
- Weaver, David H. (1998). *The Global Journalist : News People Around The World*. Cresskill, N.J. : Hampton Press.
- Weaver, D., Beam, R., Brownlee, B., Voakes, P.S., Wilhoit, G.C. (2002). *The Face and Mind of the American Journalist*, accessed Feb. 1, 2006, at http://www.poynter.org/content/content_view.asp?id=28235
- Weaver, David H. and Wilhoit, G. Cleveland. (1996). *The American Journalist In The 1990s: U.S. News People At The End Of An Era*. Mahwah, N.J. : L. Erlbaum.
- Weaver, David H. and Wilhoit, G. Cleveland. (1991). *The American Journalist: A Portrait Of U.S. News People And Their Work*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Weiss, Meira. (2002). The Body of the Nation: Terrorism and the Embodiment of Nationalism in Contemporary Israel. *Anthropological Quarterly* 75:1, 37-62.
- Winoto, S. (Oct. 12, 2002). Peace journalism, A model for reporting on conflicts, *The Jakarta Post*.
- Wolfsfeld, Gadi. (1997). Fair Weather Friends: The Varying Role of the News Media in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. *Political Communication*, 14:1, 29-48.
- Wolfsfeld, Gadi. (2004). *Media and the Path to Peace*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wolfsfeld, Gadi. (1997b). *Media and political conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wolfsfeld, Gadi. (2001b). The news media and peace processes, the Middle East and Northern Ireland. *Peaceworks*, 37.2.
- Wolfsfeld, Gadi. (2001). Political waves and democratic discourse: terrorism waves during the Oslo peace process, in: W. Lance Bennett & Robert M. Entman, eds., *Mediated politics: communication in the future of democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wolfsfeld, Gadi. (2001c). The Varying Role of the News Media. Paper presented at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco.
- Young, Peter and Jesser, Peter. (1997). *The Media and the Military. From the Crimea to Desert Strike*. New York: St. Martin's.

On the author: Susan Dente Ross is an associate dean at Washington State University, a Fulbright Senior Scholar, and a former journalist and newspaper owner. Her research focuses on the roles of legal and media institutions in creating, perpetuating, or resolving social divisions and conflict. An expert in media and legal practices that undermine full political participation and foment conflict, she has focused on how these institutions support intercultural conflict and the circumstances under which they encourage peace and democratic participation. Her work contributes to several multi-national projects to reform media practices and develop a university peace journalism curriculum.

Address: College of Liberal Arts, 309E Thompson Hall, PO Box 642630, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164 USA
eMail: suross@wsu.edu