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## Patterns of criticizing Israel and their relationship to modern anti-Semitism<sup>2</sup>

*Kurzfassung:* Obwohl der Ausdruck antisemitischer Einstellungen diskreditiert ist, verschwand der Antisemitismus nicht gänzlich aus der deutschen Öffentlichkeit. Er transformierte sich in subtilere Gewänder und fand in der Kritik an der israelischen Palästina-Politik sogar eine scheinbar unverdächtige Ausdrucksform. Gleichwohl kann nicht davon ausgegangen werden, dass jegliche Israelkritik antisemitisch motiviert ist.

Der vorliegende Aufsatz bedient sich der Latent Class Analyse um typische Muster der Israelkritik zu identifizieren und setzt diese zu manifestem, sekundärem und latentem Antisemitismus in Beziehung.

Die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung legen nahe, dass es nicht so sehr die Israelkritik *per se* ist, die uns beunruhigen sollte, als vielmehr die Art und Weise, *wie* Israel von manchen seiner Kritiker kritisiert wird. Zugleich weisen sie darauf hin, dass sich auch hinter scheinbarer Neutralität, die jegliche Israelkritik vermeidet, antisemitische Tendenzen verbergen können.

*Abstract:* Even though the expression of anti-Semitic attitudes is no longer socially acceptable to the German public, it has not ceased entirely. It has been camouflaged in various ways and has even found politically correct expression in the criticism of Israeli Palestine policy. It cannot, however, be assumed that all criticism of Israel is motivated by anti-Semitic attitudes.

The present paper uses Latent Class Analysis to identify typical patterns of criticizing Israel and relates them to manifest, secondary and latent anti-Semitism.

The study suggests that it is not criticism of Israel *per se* which should alarm us, but rather the ways in which Israel is criticized. However, it also suggests that the sort of neutrality that avoids expressing any criticism may also conceal anti-Semitic tendencies.

### 1. Modern anti-Semitism

#### 1.1 Introduction

The rejection of and hostile attitudes toward Jews are broadly historically anchored in various societies and have been continually expressed ever since early Christianity split off from Judaism in the first century AD, assuming very different forms before culminating in the uniquely genocidal anti-Semitism of the National Socialist period (Bergmann, 2002). Although the open expression of anti-Semitic attitudes has steadily declined in Germany since 1945, above all current research has found evidence that many Germans still harbor latent anti-Semitic attitudes (Frindte, 2006). Open attacks on and the social exclusion of Jews are thus increasingly being replaced by inner rejection, denial of responsibility and the feeling of being unable to speak openly about Jews or contemporary policy toward Israel, etc.

Not only the conceptual comprehension of anti-Semitism, but also its operationalization in empirical anti-Semitism research is, however, not completely uniform. The spectrum of definitions of anti-Semitism extends from an understanding of anti-Semitism as (mere) rejection and discrimination against Jews, who are marginalized from the in-group through the imposition of negative stereotypes (Heyder, Iser & Schmidt, 2005), to its understanding as the denial *per se* of the rights of Jews as members of social communities, on up to its definition as the organized effort to destroy Jews as Jews (Frindte, 2006).

According to the working definition of the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC, 2005), anti-Semitism is a certain perception of Jews which may be expressed as hatred of Jews, which frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and which is often used to blame Jews for "why things go wrong." It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits to portray Jews.

Rhetorical and physical manifestations of anti-Semitism are directed toward Jews or even non-Jewish individuals (associated with Judaism in some way) and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities. In addition, such manifestations could also target the state of Israel, conceived of as a Jewish collectivity.

#### 1.2 Facets of anti-Semitism

In the newer literature, various facets of anti-Semitism are distinguished that gain their dynamics, among other things, from the societal and political ways of dealing with the crimes committed against Jews during the National Socialist regime, but also from societal and political approaches to the decades-long Middle East conflict.

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*Manifest or classical anti-Semitism* refers to defamation that is openly expressed and draws on traditional prejudices held against Jews as Jews by non-Jews (e.g., Heyder et al., 2005; Frindte et al., 2005a,b; Frindte, 2006, Zick & Küpper, 2007). This can go as far as the denial that Jewish citizens of Germany are really German. Some authors (e.g., Heyder et al., 2005; Zick & Küpper, 2007) regard this as a distinct facet of anti-Semitism, which they call *anti-Semitic separation*.

*Secondary anti-Semitism* (Schönbach, 1961) is a way in which some Germans deal with the Nazi past, the Holocaust and the question of guilt and responsibility (Frindte et al., 2005a,b; Frindte, 2006). It consists in the relativization, trivialization and denial of the Holocaust, along with the demand to end the discussion of coming to terms with the German past (Heyder et al., 2005), and can go as far as the insinuation that the Jews have only themselves to blame for their persecution (Zick & Küpper, 2007).

*Latent anti-Semitism* (Bergmann & Erb, 1991a,b) is expressed in attempts to *avoid* publicly speaking of intentionally committed discrimination against Jews as Jews (Frindte et al., 2005a,b; Frindte, 2006).

*Anti-Zionism* consists in rejecting the creation of the state of Israel in the Middle East as the homeland of the Jews, and moreover in even denying the Jewish state of Israel the right to exist. It can go as far as demanding that the Jews should leave the Middle East (Frindte et al. 2005a,b; Frindte, 2006).

*NS-comparative criticism of Israel* (Heyder et al., 2005) equates Israeli policy toward the Palestinians with National Socialist policies of persecuting the Jews and thereby involves not only the trivialization and relativization of the Holocaust (cf. secondary anti-Semitism), but also a reversal of the perpetrator-victim relationship. According to Holz (2001), this plays a central role in justifying anti-Semitic attitudes, and also includes the insinuation that Jews pursue advantages by instrumentalizing the Holocaust (Zick & Küpper, 2007).

To be distinguished from the above forms are *Israel-related anti-Semitism* (Zick & Küpper, 2007) which redirects anti-Semitic prejudices against the state of Israel and/or *anti-Semitic criticism of Israel* (Frindte et al., 2005a,b; Frindte, 2006), which uses criticism of Israeli policies as a means to express anti-Semitic contents in a socially acceptable manner on the one hand, and *attitudes critical of Israel* (Heyder et al., 2005) as a non-anti-Semitic form of criticism of Israeli Palestine policy, on the other.

According to the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC, 2005), contemporary examples of anti-Semitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could include, but are not limited to:

- Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.
- Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as a collectivity – including, especially but not exclusively, the myth of the Jewish world conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.
- Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.
- Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide committed against the Jewish people by National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).
- Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the extent of the Holocaust.
- Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own country.

## **2. Criticism of Israel**

### **2.1 Communicative latency**

The relationship between criticism of Israel and anti-Semitism is a political issue. In public discourse, the allegation of anti-Semitism can serve to silence critics and to disavow their arguments. Even Jews who are critical of Israeli policy and/or members of the Israeli peace movement run the risk of being stigmatized as anti-Semites (cf. "Jewish anti-Semitism"). However, the allegation that Jewish institutions would brand all criticism of Israel as anti-Semitism is also a form of argument which aims at discrediting these organizations. Not only Jewish institutions in Germany, but also Israeli representatives have again and again emphasized that criticizing Israeli policy does not automatically make a person an anti-Semite (cf. Klug, 2003; Bergmann & Wetzel, 2003).

Nonetheless, it should not be overlooked that anti-Semitic attitudes can be concealed behind criticism of Israel. Already Bergmann & Erb (1986) pointed out that a taboo against anti-Semitic utterances in public discourse can lead to the use of critical claims about Israel as an ersatz communication of anti-Semitic attitudes. It is taboo to express anti-Semitism in public discourse; anti-Semitic utterances are severely criticized and sanctioned in public (Bergmann & Erb, 1991b). This

repression of prejudices in the social system is found alongside expressions of anti-Semitic attitudes in private circles of friends and acquaintances. This coexistence of a public prohibition of anti-Semitism and private anti-Semitic expressions is referred to by Bergmann & Erb (1986) as communication latency and is understood as a functional latency that served to protect the structure of the social system of West Germany both inwardly and outwardly: On the one side, it constituted a fundamental precondition for the integration of post-war West Germany into the West, and, on the other side, it contributed to "the precarious construction of new structures of both an institutional and ideological sort" (Bergmann & Erb, 1986, 228), i.e., to the democratization of not only the West German state, but also its society and citizens.

According to Bergmann & Erb, a discrepancy between private attitudes and public statements is not just expressed by violations of the communication taboo. Because awareness drives people to communicate, ersatz communication occurs which articulates anti-Semitic attitudes not directly, but rather in roundabout ways – e.g., through criticism of Israel.

## 2.2 Empirical Findings

The connection between criticism of Israel and anti-Semitism was studied in a series of empirical surveys. Since, however, in such studies criticism of Israel is always measured as an attitude and not as willingness to communicate, these studies have only limited explanatory power for answering the question of whether criticism of Israel actually functions as ersatz communication. Whether this is the case would first have to be tested through the analysis of actual communication (cf. Bergmann, 2008, 504). As well the question of causality – whether anti-Semitism elicits anti-Israeli resentment or vice versa – cannot be conclusively judged on the basis of such data. Furthermore, the findings are not entirely uniform.

Kaplan & Small (2006) conclude on the basis of 2004 survey data from the Anti-Defamation League that anti-Semitic attitudes increase with the degree of agreement with anti-Israeli statements. For the authors, "it does become reasonable to ask whether such criticism is a mask for underlying anti-Semitism" (Kaplan & Scall, 2006, 560). Due to the scales and items they used, which do not do justice to the differences between criticism of Israel motivated by anti-Semitism and other attitudes critical of Israel, this study is only to a limited extent informative.

In contrast, a study by Heyder et al. (2005), which distinguishes between criticism of Israel and attitudes critical of Israel and operationalizes these constructs with respectively two items each, gives the impression that attitudes critical of Israel are not motivated by anti-Semitism. While about three-quarters of all Germans in all educational groups were found to have a critical attitude toward Israeli Palestine policy, anti-Semitic attitudes were inversely proportional to the educational level of the study participants.

Evidence for the existence of not just one type – criticism of Israel motivated by anti-Semitism – but also of a second type – criticism of Israel independent of anti-Semitic prejudices – is found in a study by Frindte et al. (2005a,b), who identified with the aid of a principal component analysis four dimensions of anti-Jewish attitudes: manifest/latent anti-Semitism, secondary anti-Semitism, anti-Israelism and anti-Zionism.

A follow-up cluster analysis produced four clusters of study participants, of which one (Cluster 4, 32.2%) displayed low values on all four attitudinal dimensions and therefore could be classified as largely free of prejudices. Another cluster (Cluster 1, 17.9%) had the highest values on all four dimensions and was characterized by Frindte et al. as consisting of "new" anti-Semites, who express hostility toward Jews in a more contemporary manner. A third cluster (Cluster 2, 21.7%) had high values on the dimension of secondary anti-Semitism, similar to Cluster 1, but was, however, clearly lower on the other dimensions. Since the majority of the members of this cluster lay to the right or right of center, they were called right-conservative advocates of ruling off the past without having marked anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist attitudes. The fourth cluster (Cluster 3, 27.6%) had, to be sure, significantly higher values on all four dimensions than Cluster 4, which was free of prejudices, especially on the two dimensions relevant to Israel, on which their values, however, were still clearly lower than those of the "new" anti-Semites (Cluster 1). Frindte et al. therefore see in this cluster, the majority of whose members are politically rather on the left, leftist critics of Israel who are free of anti-Jewish attitudes.

A Swiss study (GfS, 2007) which investigated the relationship between anti-Jewish attitudes, not only on the emotional, but also on the cognitive level, speaks for the view that criticism of Israel is not identical with anti-Semitic attitudes.

In terms of emotions, the picture of the Jews in Switzerland is on the whole positive (respect, admiration). To be sure, negative feelings like lack of understanding and disappointment are expressed by more than 20% of the subjects, but extremely negative feelings (rage, hate), however, are held by less than 10% of the subjects.

As well on the cognitive level the majority of the Swiss display a positive basic attitude toward Israel, which is viewed as a state like every other and as a part of the West, and its reactions to threats from the Islamic world are considered understandable by two-thirds. Nevertheless, half of the Swiss are of the opinion that Israel is carrying on a war of destruction against the Palestinians, over 40% think that Israel is partly responsible for world-wide terrorism, and 40% think that Israel has too much influence in the world.

On the basis of the results of a factor analysis, by means of which it was possible to differentiate between cognitive attitudes and situative emotions toward Israel, on the one side, and attitudes hostile to Jews, on the other side, the authors finally conclude that anti-Israeli attitudes are indeed widespread in Switzerland, "because their distribution in the population differs quantitatively and qualitatively from the distribution of anti-Jewish attitudes," however, this is "to be viewed as an independent phenomenon and evaluated independently of actual anti-Semitism" (GfS 2007, 48)

Even if one cannot automatically conclude from this that critique of Israel and anti-Semitism are independent of each other, there are some reasons to think that attitudes toward the Middle East conflict are strongly politically steered and not just a mere expression of sympathy or antipathy toward Jews and Palestinians (Bergmann, 2008, 493). Thus, among other things, a 1991 Emnid study shows that sympathy for the Palestinians correlates positively with sympathy for the Arab side, but has no influence on sympathy for the Jews in Israel. To the contrary: Anyone who lacks sympathy for the Jews in Israel has an above-average tendency to lack sympathy for the Palestinians, and anyone who sympathizes with the Israelis also tends to sympathize with the Palestinians.

### 2.3 Societal beliefs and perceptual distortions

Although there is no doubt that criticism of Israel's policy represents a medium in which anti-Semitic contents could be articulated in a socially and politically correct manner, from a conflict-theoretical perspective we must, however, assume that criticism of Israel could also derive from a variety of other sources.

Thus the psychic infrastructure which enables the members of a society to endure long-term (intractable) conflicts contains, according to Bar-Tal (1998), societal beliefs which include, among others, the justness of one's cause, one's victim role, the delegitimation of the enemy and the defense of personal and national security through a policy of strength. The suspicion of anti-Semitism underlying criticism of Israeli Palestine policy can thus be justified, or could also be only an aspect of the perceptual distortions (Deutsch, 1973; Kempf, 2002a) that result from these societal beliefs and contribute to the delegitimation of not only the enemy, but also of neutral third parties and/or of minorities within one's society who do not share the basic societal consensus.

Such perceptual distortions are found on both sides: both sides seek supporters and try to build up coalitions (Glasl, 1992), and both sides take the risk that third parties might solidarize with the opponent.

Even solidarizing with Palestine does not necessarily prove anti-Semitism, however. At least in some cases it involves 'only' taking sides against Israel (with the appropriate enemy image). That this is not just a theoretical possibility is shown by the results of a Swedish survey (Bachner & Ring, 2005), according to which the majority (86%) of those who take the Palestinian side in the Middle East conflict do not have anti-Semitic attitudes (cf. Bergmann, 2008, 491).

In order to work toward a peaceful solution – whether as individuals or as a society as a whole – , we must overcome these perceptual distortions and replace the above-named societal beliefs (War Frame) with a different interpretative frame (Peace Frame) that acknowledges the justification (of at least some) of the interests of the other side, recognizes the mutual victim roles, ends the delegitimation of the opponent and strives to achieve personal and national security through a peaceful solution. This of necessity implies criticism of both sides, and thus also criticism of Israel.

In addition, highly escalated conflicts tend to have a polarizing effect: "Those who are not for us are against us." Therefore, even criticism of Israel resulting from a Peace Frame runs the risk of being interpreted as anti-Semitic, or at least may appear to show a lack of solidarity.

### 2.4 Positioning toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

In the concrete case the situation is, however, more complicated (cf. Kempf, 2008): Israel has not only been in a continuous state of war for several decades, but rather – despite all setbacks – over the past sixteen years it has also participated in a peace process. This has led to a weakening of the above-named societal beliefs in Israel. Both frames co-exist today in Israel (War and Peace Frames), sometimes even within a single person vacillating back and forth between these frames, whereby both frames not only represent cognitive interpretative patterns, but also involve emotional ties, indeed in an ambivalent manner, for both frames promise security and simultaneously create insecurity (cf. Table 1).

- The War Frame offers security, because tried-and-true action patterns can be continued, but it also creates insecurity, because it poses the threat of continued violence.
- The Peace Frame also offers security, because it promises an end to violence, but at the same time it creates insecurity, because new behavioral patterns must be tried out whose effectiveness is still uncertain.

Criticism of Israel resulting from a Peace Frame thus does not necessarily mean a lack of solidarity with Israel or even anti-Semitism, but can, to the contrary, instead arise from acting in the existential interest of Israel.

	<b>Offers security</b>	<b>Creates insecurity</b>
<b>War Frame</b>	Because tried-and-true action patterns can be continued	Because it poses the threat of continued violence
<b>Peace Frame</b>	Because it promises an end to violence	Because new behavioral patterns must be tried out whose effectiveness is still uncertain

Table 1: The emotional ambivalence of the War and the Peace Frames

No less ambivalent is how people in Germany position themselves toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The World War II lesson of "never again fascism, never again war" implies a tendency toward the Peace Frame (never again war). However, it is ambivalent in regard to the human rights question (never again fascism), which can be interpreted in two ways:

1. Support for the victims of National Socialism, which implies a tendency toward unconditional solidarity with Israeli policy and a weakening of the Peace Frame.  
This can go as far as turning into a War Frame: (never again fascism, *therefore* war), as was the case (in part) in the Gulf War discourse 1990/91 (Kempf, 1994).
2. Support for human rights worldwide, which implies a tendency to refrain from supporting at least some aspects of Israeli policy, and includes expressing solidarity with the Israeli peace movement and at least a certain degree of empathy with the Palestinian side.  
Although this means, first, a strengthening of the Peace Frame, second, the danger is also created of turning into a War Frame and taking sides with the Palestinians.

With regard to positioning toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we can thus identify various positioning patterns that result from the two dimensions of War Frame vs. Peace Frame and from taking sides with either of the two parties (cf. Table 2).

	<b>Pro-Israel</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Pro-Palestine</b>
<b>War Frame</b>	Uncritical support of Israeli policy, delegitimation of the Palestinians and justification of Israeli violence		Criticism of Israeli policy, delegitimation of the Israelis and justification of Palestinian violence
<b>Peace Frame</b>	Criticism of both sides' policies, accentuation of the vital needs of the Israelis and condemnation of violence on both sides	Criticism of both sides' policies, accentuation of the vital needs of both societies and condemnation of violence on both sides	Criticism of both sides' policies, accentuation of the vital needs of the Palestinians and condemnation of violence on both sides

Table 2: Patterns of positioning toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

While only one of these patterns (pro-Israeli War Frame) is uncritical of Israeli policy, none of the critical patterns can be regarded as anti-Semitic *per se*. Even patterns (pro-Palestinian War Frame and pro-Palestinian Peace Frame) that are biased toward solidarity with the Palestinians do not necessarily imply any anti-Semitic prejudices or motivations.

## 2.5 Legitimate vs. anti-Semitic criticism of Israel

According to the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC, 2005), examples of the ways in which anti-Semitism manifests itself with regard to the State of Israel could include:

- Denying the Jewish people the right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of the state of Israel is racist.
- Applying double standards by demanding actions from Israel that are not expected or demanded of any other democratic country.
- Using symbols and images associated with classical anti-Semitism (e.g., claims that the Jews murdered Jesus or the blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.
- Drawing comparisons between contemporary Israeli policies and those of Nazi Germany.
- Holding the Jews collectively responsible for the actions of the State of Israel.

However, criticism of Israel similar to criticism that is not regarded as prejudiced when leveled against other countries cannot be regarded as anti-Semitism *per se*.

A similar position is taken by Moshe Zimmermann (2002), who has formulated a number of guidelines for identifying anti-Semitic criticism of Israel in political discourse. According to his view, any sincere criticism which is based on knowledge, which refrains from anti-Semitic stereotypes and blanket condemnation and which does not aim at provoking anti-Semitic sentiments is not, and cannot be, anti-Semitic and is therefore legitimate. And this is the case not only when the criticism is expressed in Israel, but also when expressed in Europe, even in Germany.

Anti-Semitic criticism of Israel can be identified on the basis of the associations the critic suggests, the targets he chooses and, last but not least, his purpose.

"Language is indeed the mother of all associations: If Shylock, Judas or *Der Stürmer* is mentioned in connection with the topic of Israel, if anyone speaks of Germans vs. Jews, if anyone presumes that the Israelis control the German Jews, if anyone speaks of the "eye for an eye" mentality, if the stereotypical "rich Jews," the "cosmopolitan" or "world Jewry" are brought into a discussion, if the caricature of the "Jewish" nose or references to ritual murder are brought up – one already finds oneself in the space of anti-Semitism, because this goes beyond legitimate criticism of Sharon or of Israel.

Second, it is a matter of the group against which criticism is expressed: If it is not a matter of specific politicians (Israeli or also German) or of specific organization (even if it is a matter of the "Jewish World Congress"), but rather of the alleged representatives of "Jewry" or the "Jews," if one is not thinking of Israeli, but rather of Jewish characteristics, one has already come to anti-Semitism.

And third, and perhaps even more important: It is a matter of the intention. One and the same statement or expression can express different intentions. Even comparisons with National Socialism thereby receive a very different meaning: A comparison can aim at differences, it can serve as a warning, it can, however, also intend a trivialization or relativization of National Socialism or the delegitimation of Jewry. Whether a critic of Israel has anti-Semitic intentions can usually only be indirectly determined if one knows the critic's way of thinking or the addressees of these comparisons and the historical allusions" (Zimmermann, 2002, 2).

### 3. Measurement of anti-Semitic criticism of Israel

#### 3.1 Multivalency of responses to questionnaire items

Building upon Zimmermann's arguments, it becomes evident that the identification of anti-Semitic criticism of Israel – necessarily – involves a hermeneutic process. While we may assume that we could directly operationalize the above-named facets of anti-Semitism using questionnaire items, this is, as a consequence, not the case with anti-Semitic criticism of Israel (Frindte et al., 2005a,b; Frindte, 2006) and its demarcation from other ways of criticizing Israel.

The questionnaire items usually employed to identify anti-Semitic criticism of Israel are inappropriate for this purpose for a number of reasons, which we may illustrate with some examples from studies by Frindte et al. (1999) and Petzold (2004) (cf. Table 3).

No.	Statement
1	The Israelis are interested in a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict
2	The Israelis are occupiers and have no right to stay in the Palestinian territories
3	Israel is a state who sticks at nothing
4	Israel wages a just war against the Palestinians
5	Israel is exclusively responsible for the emergence and perpetuation of the Middle East Conflict.
6	The Palestinian suicide attacks are an appropriate means to combat Israel
7	What the Israelis do to the Palestinians resembles what the Nazis did to the Jews
8	It would be preferable if the Jews would leave the Middle East

Table 3: Questionnaire items from studies by Frindte et al. (1999) and Petzold (2004).

*First:* Blanket questions provoke blanket answers. This is even more the case when the participants in a questionnaire study cannot formulate their own answers, but can only agree or disagree with ready-made statements, as is usually the case in questionnaire research. Accordingly, even the acceptance of statements that would be legitimate if they were formulated in a more differentiated way, gives the impression of anti-Semitic prejudices. But since study participants do not have the opportunity to reformulate the statements, we cannot know whether they agree with their blanket phrasing or only with some "rational kernel" which they associate with them.

Statements like the one in example No. 1 ("The Israelis are interested in a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict") ignore the diversity of Israeli society, and – taken literally – its rejection can therefore be assumed to verbalize some anti-Semitic prejudice.

If a participant associates this statement with well-founded doubts about whether a given Israeli government at a given

point in time endorses the peace process, however, he may reject the statement even from the perspective of a pro-Israeli Peace Frame.

The same holds for the statement in example No. 2 ("The Israelis are occupiers and have no right to stay in the Palestinian territories"), which has its rational kernel in a multitude of UN resolutions, and/or for the statement in example No. 3 ("Israel is a state who sticks at nothing"), which may be associated with problematic aspects of Israeli military actions like the targeted killing of Palestinian leaders and/or the deaths of hundreds of Palestinian civilians during the Gaza War. While of course acceptance of statements like these does not express unconditional support for Israeli policy (cf. pro-Israeli War Frame), it is *not necessarily* an expression of anti-Semitism and might be agreed with by members of the Israeli peace movement as well.

*Second:* As we have already seen with examples No. 2 and 3, critical statements about Israel or Israeli policy could have various motivations and, therefore, the mere acceptance or rejection of the statements has no specific meaning.

Rejecting a statement like the one in example No. 4 ("Israel wages a just war against the Palestinians") *may* be motivated by anti-Semitic prejudice. But a participant's rejection of this statement only indicates that he does not accept a pro-Israeli War Frame. Whether he rejects the statement because of anti-Semitic prejudice, a pro-Palestinian War Frame, or a Peace Frame remains unclear: Since – from a pacifist point of view – every war is evil, there is no such thing as a "just" war, and consequently statement No. 4 could be rejected even from a pro-Israeli Peace frame.

Similarly, the acceptance of a statement like the one in example No. 5 ("Israel is exclusively responsible for the emergence and perpetuation of the Middle East Conflict") *may* be motivated by anti-Semitic prejudice. But a participant's acceptance of the statement might also result from a pro-Palestinian War Frame.

The same holds even for the statement in example No. 6 ("The Palestinian suicide attacks are an appropriate means to combat Israel"), which takes sides with the Palestinians and involves military logic, but as long as it is not associated with the denial of Israel's right to exist, its acceptance does *not necessarily* imply any anti-Semitic content.

*Third:* As Zimmermann (2002, 2) has pointed out, even NS-comparative criticism of Israel can acquire different meanings depending on the underlying intentions.

A statement like No. 7 ("What the Israelis do to the Palestinians resembles what the Nazis did to the Jews") may result from a Peace Frame and aim at warning Israel not to abandon the high moral standards of Jewish culture, or it may result from a pro-Palestinian War Frame and aim at delegitimizing Israel, or it may result from secondary anti-Semitism and aim at trivializing the Holocaust.

*Fourth:* As well, responses to statements that contain overtly anti-Semitic content and/or provoke anti-Semitic sentiments are often not unambiguous.

Although the acceptance of the statement in example No. 8 ("It would be preferable if the Jews would leave the Middle East") implies the delegitimation of the Jews and the denial of Israel's right to exist, even a hard-core anti-Semite might reject it, because he fears that "the Jews" might return to Germany.

*Fifth:* Even in cases where the response is more or less unambiguous, statements that contain overtly anti-Semitic content and/or encourage anti-Semitic sentiments are not suitable to identify attempts at using criticism of Israel as a medium to express anti-Semitic contents in a socially accepted manner.

### 3.2 Score distribution and Principal Components Analysis

The following results are based on data from the study by Petzold (2004) and analyze the items in Table 3. The age of the N = 411 participants ranged from 18 to 83 years (M = 40.28, SD = 16.55). 57.7% of the participants were female, 42.1% male, 25.1% students, 15.3% academics, 13.1% retired, 12.2% service personnel, 8% civil servants, 8% social work professionals, 5.8% unemployed, 5.6% craftsmen, and 6.9% other.

The "positive" items (No. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8) were scored on a five-point Likert scale from 1 = completely disagree to 5 = agree completely. The "negative" items (No. 1 and 4) were scored the other way around. Accordingly, the higher the item score, the more a participant agrees with the anti-Israeli pole. Missing data were scored as 3 (neither agree nor disagree).

Using the sum of the item scores as a measurement of anti-Israeli attitudes results in a scale with moderate internal consistency (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.778). The possible scale values (questionnaire scores) range from x = 0 (complete disagreement with the anti-Israeli propositions) to x = 40 (complete agreement with the anti-Israeli propositions), with x = 24 indicating neither agreement nor disagreement.

The empirical distribution of the questionnaire scores is displayed in Figure 1. The mean score ( $M = 22,32$ ;  $SD = 5.214$ ) indicates a significant tendency towards the rejection of anti-Israeli propositions ( $t = -6.532$ ,  $df = 410$ ;  $p < 0.0001$ ). On the other hand, however, at least 43 of the 411 participants (10.46%) have scores as high as or higher than the critical score of  $x = 29$ , which indicates a significant ( $p = 0.05$ ) agreement with the anti-Israeli propositions.<sup>1</sup>




Figure 1: Distribution of the questionnaire scores

Principal Components Analysis of the items identified two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 (cf. Figure 2). The factors were VARIMAX rotated according to the Kaiser criterion and account for a total of 55.986% of the total variance.




Figure 2: Screeplot of the eigenvalues

The matrix of factor loadings is displayed in Table 4. Loadings larger than 0.447 that account for at least 20% of the variance of an item are printed in boldface.

1. Since Cronbach's Alpha is only a lower boundary of reliability, and since the items are obviously not homogeneous, the critical score of  $x = 29$  is over-estimated.

Item		Factor	
No.	Statement	1	2
2	The Israelis are occupiers and have no right to stay in the Palestinian territories	<b>0.728</b>	-0.078
1	The Israelis are (not) interested in a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict	<b>0.702</b>	0.114
3	Israel is a state who sticks at nothing	<b>0.701</b>	0.137
7	What the Israelis do to the Palestinians resembles what the Nazis did to the Jews	<b>0.683</b>	0.224
5	Israel is exclusively responsible for the emergence and perpetuation of the Middle East Conflict	<b>0.681</b>	0.377
4	Israel (does not) wage[s] a just war against the Palestinians	<b>0.521</b>	<b>-0.687</b>
8	It would be preferable if the Jews would leave the Middle East	<b>0.451</b>	<b>0.511</b>
6	The Palestinian suicide attacks are appropriate means to combat Israel	0.282	<b>0.719</b>

Table 4: VARIMAX rotated factor loadings.

The first factor accounts for 37.491 % of the total variance and displays an *attitude critical of Israel*. It emphasizes the opinions: that the Israelis are occupiers who have no right to stay in the Palestinian territories (2), that the Israelis are not interested in a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict (1), that Israel is a state that sticks at nothing (3), that what the Israelis do to the Palestinians resembles what the Nazis did to the Jews (7), that Israel is exclusively responsible for the emergence and perpetuation of the Middle East Conflict (5), that Israel does not wage a just war against the Palestinians (4), and that it would be preferable if the Jews would leave the Middle East.

The second factor accounts for 18.495% of the total variance and indicates *support for violence and displacement*. It *disparages* the opinion that Israel is *not* waging a just war against the Palestinians (4) and *supports* the opinion that the Palestinian suicide attacks are an appropriate means to combat Israel (6) and that it would be preferable if the Jews would leave the Middle East (8).

### 3.3 Typical response patterns

Summarizing the results so far, the data give the impression that agreement vs. disagreement with anti-Israeli propositions is due to two factors: one that displays an attitude critical of Israel and one that indicates support for violence. On the average, the study participants tend to reject anti-Israeli propositions, but a relevant minority supports them to a significant degree.

However, none of these results tell whether there is a specific anti-Semitic motivation behind the participants' item responses and/or questionnaire scores. Moreover, due to the multivalency of the responses, the questionnaire scores also lack a specific meaning. As Kracauer already elaborated in the context of content analysis as early as 1952, the mere frequency of textual elements (or the sum of item scores) does not have a specific interpretation. What counts are the *patterns* in which the responses are combined.

Number of classes	Log-Likelihood	Number of parameters	Degrees of freedom	Likelihood-Ratio	p	AIC
1	-4676,57	40	1679575	4501,00	> 0,9999	9433,14
2	-4370,69	81	1679534	3889,23	> 0,9999	8903,37
3	-4200,12	122	1679493	3548,09	> 0,9999	8644,24
4	-4022,92	163	1679452	3193,69	> 0,9999	8371,83
5	-3959,22	204	1679411	3066,29	> 0,9999	8326,44
6	-3904,31	245	1679234	2956,47	> 0,9999	8298,61
7	-3856,01	286	1679329	2859,88	> 0,9999	8284,02
8	-3834,38	327	1679288	2816,62	> 0,9999	8322,76
9	-3794,41	368	1679247	2736,68	> 0,9999	8324,83

Table 5: Goodness of fit statistics of the Latent Class Analysis

Using the AIC criterion (cf. Table 5), the application of Latent Class Analysis to the present data<sup>1</sup> identified seven classes which display typical response patterns, some of which are critical of Israel (classes No. 1, 3, 5 and 6), some of which refrain from criticizing Israel (classes No. 4 and 7) and one of which is supportive of Israel (class No. 2). Although none of these classes displays unconditional solidarity with Israel (none of them agrees that Israel wages a just war against the Palestinians), the majority of the response patterns are obviously free of anti-Semitic tendencies.

The response pattern supportive of Israel is typical for 18.12% of the participants.

- Class 2 (18.12%,  $M^2 = 15.089$ ) results from a Peace Frame that rejects both the claim that Israel wages a just war against the Palestinians (item No. 4) and (even more so) the positive evaluation of Palestinian suicide attacks (item No. 6). With respect to all the other issues (items No. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 8), it takes a clear position in favor of Israel (cf. Figure 3).




Figure 3: Response frequencies and 99% confidence limits of the mean item scores in class 2

The two response patterns that refrain from criticizing Israel are typical for 18.97 % of the participants.

- Class 4 (16.77%,  $M = 22.047$ ) also results from a Peace Frame (cf. items No. 4 and 6), but has no opinion about whether the Israelis are interested in peaceful conflict resolution (item No. 1), whether they are occupiers (item No. 2) and whether Israel is a state who sticks at nothing (item No. 3). The accusation that Israel is exclusively responsible for the conflict (item No. 5), the insinuation that the Israelis treat the Palestinians the same way the Nazis treated the Jews (item No. 7), and the claim that it would be preferable if the Jews would leave the Middle East (item No. 8) are rejected, however (cf. Figure 4).
- Class 7 (2.2%,  $M = 21.250$ ) is a very small class of participants who obviously have little knowledge of Israeli-Palestinian affairs. Their response pattern is mainly made up of missing data (response category 0) and neither-nor responses (response category 3). It only shows a weak ambivalence with respect to NS-comparisons (item No. 7), some tendency to disapprove of Palestinian suicide attacks (item No. 6), and a somewhat greater tendency to reject the claim that it would be preferable if the Jews would leave the Middle East (item No. 8) (cf. Figure 5).

1. For Latent Class Analysis, missing data were scored as a response category of their own.  
2. Mean scores were computed from response categories 1 – 5 only, without category 0 (= no response).




Figure 4: Response frequencies and 99% confidence limits of the mean item scores in class 4




Figure 5: Response frequencies and 99% confidence limits of the mean item scores in class 7

Two of the response patterns criticize Israel without taking sides with the Palestinians. These patterns are typical for 38.23% of the participants.

- Class 1 (28.53%, M = 21.081) criticizes Israel on the basis of a Peace Frame (cf. items No. 4 and 6) that is obviously free of any anti-Semitic tendencies. Although the participants in this class are ambiguous about the question of whether Israel is a state who sticks at nothing (item No. 3), and although they agree that the Israelis are occupiers who have no right to stay in the Palestinian territories (item No. 2), they clearly reject the claim that it would be preferable if the Jews would leave the Middle East (item No. 8), and they also refuse to make Israel exclusively responsible for the conflict (item No. 5), to accuse the Israelis of treating the Palestinians the same way the Nazis treated the Jews (item No. 7), and/or to deny their interest in peaceful conflict resolution (item No. 1) (cf. Figure 6).
- Class 5 (9.70%, M = 23.788) has no clear-cut Peace Frame and – although this response pattern does not reveal any obviously anti-Semitic tendencies – the motivation behind it remains unclear. The participants in this class reject both the war against the Palestinians (item No. 4) and Palestinian suicide attacks (item No. 6) to a much lower extent than the classes discussed above. Participants in this class tend to see the Israelis as occupiers who have no right to stay in the Palestinian territories

(item No. 2) and to regard Israel as a state who sticks at nothing (item No. 3). However, they have no opinion about whether the Israelis are interested in peaceful conflict resolution (item No. 1), no opinion about whether Israel is exclusively responsible for the emergence and perpetuation of the conflict (item No. 5) and no opinion about whether the way the Israelis treat the Palestinians is comparable to the way the Nazis treated the Jews (item No. 7). Nonetheless, they tend not to agree that it would be preferable if the Jews would leave the Middle East (item No. 8) (cf. Figure 7).




Figure 6: Response frequencies and 99% confidence limits of the mean item scores in class 1




Figure 7: Response frequencies and 99% confidence limits of the mean item scores in class 5

The remaining two response patterns are critical of Israel and take a position in favor of the Palestinians; in all they are typical for 24.98% of the participants.

At first glance, these response patterns (cf. Figures 8 and 9) look like a Peace Frame, but may also result if a pro-Palestinian War Frame is disguised as a Peace Frame: They condemn Israel's war against the Palestinians (item No. 4) much more than the other classes (despite class 1), and they reject Palestinian suicide attacks (item No. 6) much less than the other classes (despite class 5).

In contrast to the other classes, these two are also the only response patterns that support equating the Israelis with the

Nazis (item No. 7) and thus do not refrain from encouraging anti-Semitic sentiments.

- Although the participants in class 3 (17.953%, M = 26.929) have no opinion about whether Israel is exclusively responsible for the emergence and perpetuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (item No. 5), they regard Israel as a state who sticks at nothing (item No. 3), the Israelis as occupiers who have no right to stay in the Palestinian territories (item No. 2) and who are not interested in peaceful conflict resolution (item No. 1) (cf. Figure 8).
- Class 6 (7.03%, M = 32.528) shows much the same response pattern as class 2, but in a more radicalized way. Condemnation of Israel and the Israelis (items No. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7) is much greater, and the rejection of Palestinian suicide attacks is even weaker than in class 3. In contrast to class 3, the participants in this class also make Israel exclusively responsible for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (item No. 5) (cf. Figure 9).

Whether these two response patterns are motivated by anti-Semitic attitudes or whether they are motivated by taking sides with the Palestinians and this "only" deteriorates into the use of anti-Semitic clichés (cf. item No. 7) cannot be easily decided.




Figure 8: Response frequencies and 99% confidence limits of the mean item scores in class 3




Figure 9: Response frequencies and 99% confidence limits of the mean item scores in class 6

### 3.4 The limited applicability of questionnaire scores

Summarizing these results, we have identified seven response patterns, none of which is marked by the sort of unconditional solidarity with Israel that is characteristic of the German 'raison d'état' (Staatsraison), which assumes that Israel wages a just war against the Palestinians.

Three of these patterns (class 1, 2 and 4; 63.41%) display a Peace Frame and are either supportive of Israel (class 2; 18.12%) or refrain from criticizing Israel (class 4; 16.77%), or they are critical of Israel (class 1; 28.525%), but display no anti-Semitic tendencies.

Two of the response patterns (class 5 and 7; 11.9%) give no evidence of a Peace Frame. These response patterns are either marked by non-responding and refraining from criticizing Israel (class 7; 2.2%), or they criticize Israel in a rather moderate way and without taking sides with the Palestinians (class 5; 9.7%). Although these classes do not display any overt anti-Semitic tendencies, the motivation behind them remains unclear, and it cannot be completely ruled out that latent anti-Semitism (such as the attempt to avoid speaking publicly about Jews) plays at least some role in their emergence. More probably, however, the members of these classes simply have little knowledge and few opinions about Israel.

The remaining two response patterns (class 3 and 6; 24.98%) position themselves in favor of the Palestinians, and their criticism of Israel does not refrain from encouraging anti-Semitic sentiments. Whether they "only" take sides with the Palestinians and this deteriorates into the use of anti-Semitic clichés, or whether they result from genuinely anti-Semitic motivation cannot be easily decided. While the first of these patterns (class 3; 17.95%) criticizes Israel in a somewhat more moderate way, class 6 (7.03%) takes a quite radical anti-Israeli position.

Although the various classes are characterized by significantly different response patterns that have different meanings and give rise to different hypotheses about the underlying motivations, they cannot be sufficiently differentiated if we only look at the participants' overall questionnaire scores (cf. Figure 10).




Figure 10: Mean scores within the various classes

While the questionnaire scores differentiate between participants who strongly support Israel (class 2,  $M = 15.089$ ) and those that take sides with the Palestinians (class 3,  $M = 26.929$ ; and class 6,  $M = 32.528$ ), the entire range in between them (class 4,  $M = 22.047$ ; class 7,  $M = 21.250$ ; class 1,  $M = 21.081$ , and class 5,  $M = 23.788$ ) remains vague. Particularly classes 1, 4 and 7, which display dramatically different response patterns, have nearly the same over-all mean score: While class 1 displays a non-anti-Semitic form of criticizing Israel, class 4 refrains from criticizing Israel, and class 7 is made up of missing data and neither-nor responses.

### 3.4 Validity of the interpretations

In order to obtain a more detailed account of a possible anti-Semitic motivation behind the identified response patterns, two mini-scales for manifest anti-Semitism (MA1: Dislike of Jews; MA2: Jewish conspiracy), another one for secondary anti-

Semitism (SA: Ruling off the past), and one for latent anti-Semitism (LA: Refusal to speak about Jews) were constructed using three items each from the questionnaire by Petzold (2004) (cf. Table 6).<sup>1</sup>

<b>MA1: Dislike of Jews (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.837)</b>	
1	One shouldn't do business with Jews
2	I belong to those who dislike the Jews
3	It is preferable to have nothing to do with Jews
<b>MA2: Jewish conspiracy (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.820)</b>	
1	There exists a secret Jewish network which has a crucial influence on the political and economic processes in this world
2	A fundamental goal of Judaism is to safeguard supremacy in this world
3	The Jews have too much influence on this world
<b>SA: Ruling off the past (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.777)</b>	
1	Decades after the end of the war, we shouldn't talk so much about the persecution of the Jews and eventually rule off the past
2	One should ultimately put an end to the chitchat about our guilt vis-à-vis the Jews
3	The German people has a particular responsibility vis-à-vis the Jews
<b>LA: Refusal to speak about Jews (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.469)</b>	
1	I believe that many people do not dare to tell their real opinion of the Jews
2	The whole topic "Jews" is somehow unpleasant for me
3	I don't tell everybody what I think about the Jews

Table 6: The mini-scales for manifest, secondary and latent anti-Semitism

Analysis of Variance ( $F_{3,1640} = 129.469$ ;  $p < 0.001$ ) revealed a significant difference between the mean scores on the four scales, which are lower throughout than the neutral score of 9 (cf. the graph to the left of Figure 11).




Figure 11: Mean scores of agreement with manifest, secondary and latent anti-Semitic statements in the overall data (left) and within classes of response patterns (right)

The more obvious the anti-Semitic content of the questionnaire items, the less the participants agreed with them, and particularly the scale for Dislike of Jews (MA1) has the lowest mean score. Although this may indicate a response tendency toward presenting socially acceptable views, the scales have a significant regression on the response patterns (cf. Table 7).

1. As Cronbach's Alpha indicates, particularly the LA-scale is far from optimal, but scale construction was limited by the available data.

Scale	F	df	p
MA1: Dislike of Jews	11,228	6, 404	< 0.001
MA2: Jewish conspiracy	24,280	6, 404	< 0.001
SA: Ruling off the past	11,587	6, 404	< 0.001
LA: Refusal to speak about Jews	10,195	6, 404	< 0.001

Table 7: Main effects of the response patterns on the anti-Semitism scales

In accordance with our interpretation of the response patterns, the participants belonging to class 2 (support for Israel with a clear-cut Peace Frame) and class 1 (criticism of Israel with a clear-cut Peace Frame) had the lowest, and the participants belonging to class 3 and class 6 (taking sides with the Palestinians) were among those with the highest mean scores on each of the four scales. The participants belonging to class 5 (unclear motivation; no clear-cut Peace Frame) were also in these high scoring classes (cf. the graph to the right of Figure 11).

### 3.5 Identifying anti-Semitic ways of criticizing Israel

In order to differentiate between anti-Semitic and other forms of criticizing Israel, however, these bivariate relations between the response patterns and the anti-Semitism scales are only of limited usefulness. Instead, it would be preferable to reconstruct the meta-patterns according to which the patterns of criticizing Israel are combined with the various facets of anti-Semitism.

These meta-patterns can be identified by employing both the response patterns and the anti-Semitism scales as variables in a second order Latent Class Analysis. For this purpose, the responses to the four scales were classified in five categories from "reject" to "support" of anti-Semitic statements (cf. Table 8, Figure 12).

Score	Category	
	No.	Label
3 - 5	1	reject
6 - 7	2	rather reject
8-10	3	neither – nor
11 - 12	4	rather support
13 - 15	5	support

Table 8: Categorization of the scores




Figure 12: Mean categories within the classes of response patterns

According to the AIC criterion (cf. Table 9), second order Latent Class Analysis identified four meta-patterns, two of which (classes No. 1 and 2) reject all sorts of anti-Semitic statements, while the other two (classes No. 3 and 4) reject only the "Dislike of Jews" statements (MA1), but to a considerable degree support the "Jewish conspiracy" statements (MA2), the "Ruling off the past" statements (SA) and the "Refusal to speak about Jews" statements (LA).

Class 1 (37.87%) most clearly rejects the anti-Semitic statements (cf. Figure 13) and contains mainly participants who criticize Israel on the basis of a Peace Frame (response pattern 1) or who support Israel (response pattern 2) (cf. Figure 14).

Class 2 (31.43%) rejects the anti-Semitic statements to a lesser degree (cf. Figure 13). It contains a mixture of participants who are uncritical of Israel (response pattern 4), who criticize Israel on the basis of a Peace Frame (response pattern 1) or who take sides with the Palestinians in a moderate way (response pattern 3). (cf. Figure 14).

Number of classes	Log-Likelihood	Number of parameters	Degrees of freedom	Likelihood-Ratio	p	AIC
1	-2732.22	18	1773	1186,18	p > .999	5500,44
2	-2511.37	37	1754	744,48	p > .999	5096,74
3	-2461.15	56	1735	644,04	p > .999	5034,30
4	-2430.08	75	1716	581,90	p > .999	5010,16
5	-2414.33	94	1697	550,40	p > .999	5016,66
6	-2398.70	113	1678	519,14	p > .999	5023,40

Table 9: Goodness of fit statistics of the second order Latent Class Analysis

Class 3 (22.02%) tends to some extent to agree with latent (LA: Refusal to speak about Jews) and secondary (SA: Ruling off the past) anti-Semitic statements (cf. Figure 13) and contains mainly participants who take sides with the Palestinians in a moderate way (response pattern 3), who are critical of Israel without a clear-cut Peace Frame (response pattern 5) or who are uncritical of Israel (response pattern 4) (cf. Figure 14).

Class 4 (8.68%) also shows a tendency towards latent (LA) and secondary anti-Semitism (SA). This tendency is stronger than in class 3, however, and this class is the only one that also tends to agree with the claim of a Jewish world conspiracy (MA2) (cf. Figure 13). Participants in this class are mainly those who also take sides with the Palestinians in a most decisive way (response pattern 6) (cf. Figure 14).




Figure 13: Mean anti-Semitism categories within the meta-classes




Figure 14: Distribution of the response patterns within the meta-classes

91.6% of the participants who support Israel (response pattern 2), and 92.4% of the participants who criticize Israel on the basis of a Peace Frame (response pattern 1) belong to one of the classes that are opposed to anti-Semitic statements (classes 1 and 2) (cf. Figure 15).

On the other hand, however, 69.6% of the participants who criticize Israel without following a clear-cut Peace Frame (response pattern 5) belong either to class 3 (60.0%) or to class 4 (9.6%). Accordingly, this response pattern (whose motivation so far appeared unclear) correlates with an even stronger tendency toward anti-Semitic attitudes than the moderately pro-Palestinian response pattern (response pattern 3), where only 50.0% show a tendency toward anti-Semitic attitudes (class 3: 46.3%; class 4: 3.7%) (cf. Figure 15).

Also, participants who refrain from criticizing Israel (response pattern 4) do not reject anti-Semitic statements throughout. 33.8% of the participants with response pattern 4 (class 3: 28.8%; class 4: 5.0%) belong to one of the classes that rather tend to support them (cf. Figure 15).

Finally, 71.5% of the participants who show a more radical pro-Palestinian response pattern (response pattern 6) belong to class 4 and thus display a strong anti-Semitic attitude (cf. Figure 15).

Since none of these participants (0.0%) belongs to class 3, which displays anti-Semitic prejudices in a more moderate way, it can be assumed that the remaining 27.9% of the participants who do not openly express anti-Semitic prejudices do so because of social desirability: Participants who criticize Israel in a radically pro-Palestinian way either express their anti-Semitic tendencies or try to disguise them.




Figure 15: Distribution of the meta-classes within the response patterns

#### 4. Discussion

It was argued that criticism of Israel can occur for a variety of different reasons. Anti-Semitic criticism of Israel, therefore, cannot be directly operationalized by means of questionnaire scores. Instead, one has to look at the response patterns of positioning toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In order to do so, we suggested a methodological approach which identifies these response patterns by means of Latent Class Analysis and will result in the identification of some positioning patterns that are critical of Israel, some of which refrain from criticizing Israel and others that are favorable to Israel.

The anti-Semitic elements contained therein can then be identified by means of a second order Latent Class Analysis which juxtaposes the positioning patterns with the facets of anti-Semitism, emotional closeness to one of the conflict parties, pacifistic vs. bellicose attitudes and the human rights orientation of the participants.

The data that we used to demonstrate the power of this methodological approach were far from optimal, however. The criticism of Israel questions covered only part of the issues that are relevant for the identification of a pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian positioning according to a War or a Peace Frame (cf. Table 2). The internal consistency of the scales for measuring the facets of anti-Semitism was in part low (cf. Table 5), and there were no data available for measuring emotional closeness, pacifism and/or human rights orientation.

Nonetheless, we managed to identify a number of positioning patterns, which ranged from pro-Israeli to neutral to pro-Palestinian response patterns.

While the pattern in favor of Israel (response pattern 2: 18.1%) could be shown to oppose anti-Semitic attitudes, the patterns that are critical of Israel ranged from a pattern which rejects anti-Semitic attitudes and criticizes Israel on the basis of a Peace Frame (response pattern 1: 28.5%) to a pattern which displays anti-Semitic attitudes and takes sides with the Palestinians (response pattern 6: 7.0%).

While the latter pattern can be assumed to result from anti-Semitism, the anti-Semitic tendency of the pattern that takes sides with the Palestinians in a more moderate way (response pattern 3: 18.0%) is much weaker. This pattern is possibly not genuinely anti-Semitic, but is rather due to positioning oneself according to a pro-Palestinian War Frame motivated by the desire to defend the rights of the Palestinian population, and this partly degenerates into anti-Semitic attitudes. Whether this hypothesis is true cannot be tested with the available data, however.

In any case, the anti-Semitic tendency of this moderately pro-Palestinian pattern is noticeably weaker than that of the pattern that criticizes Israel without any evidence of being motivated by solidarity with the Palestinians and/or by interpreting

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict according to a Peace Frame (response pattern 5: 9.7%). Accordingly, an anti-Semitic motivation of the latter pattern cannot be ruled out, but again, the available data is not sufficient to confirm this hypothesis.

The pattern which criticizes Israel on the basis of a clear-cut Peace Frame (response pattern 1: 28.5%), on the other hand, rejects anti-Semitic attitudes to nearly the same degree as the patterns which favor Israel. An anti-Semitic motivation for this pattern can, therefore, be definitively ruled out.

While these results seem to suggest that most of the criticism of Israel is not (response pattern 1), or at least not genuinely (response pattern 3), motivated by anti-Semitism, the seemingly neutral pattern which does not take sides with the Israelis but only refrains from criticizing Israel (response pattern 4: 16.5%) displays a considerable amount of anti-Semitic prejudice.

Accordingly, it is *not* criticism of Israel *per se* which should alarm us, but rather the way Israel is criticized (by a minority of the participants). The sort of lukewarm neutrality that doesn't criticize Israel might conceal anti-Semitic tendencies as well.

Due to the shortcomings of the available data, these results are, of course, only preliminary. Nonetheless, they demonstrate the power of our methodological approach and have encouraged us to apply it in a forthcoming panel study, in which we will complement Petzold's questionnaire with additional items which cover the participants' positioning towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a more systematic way, with indicators of their emotional closeness to the conflict parties, and with scales for measuring their pacifist attitudes and human rights engagement, etc.

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