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Brothers in arms or peace? The media representation of Swedish and Norwegian defence- and military co-operation

Abstract: This article discusses the relevance of Johan Galtung's model for peace journalism and critical discourse analysis (CDA) in light of the media coverage of Swedish and Norwegian defence cooperation. By analysing the proposal for closer military cooperation between the Nato-member Norway and the non-aligned Sweden the article emphasises the paradox that the fact that both Sweden and Norway have forces fighting in Afghanistan was not mentioned when the heads of the Norwegian and Swedish Defence in a joint article justified the need for a closer cooperation between the two countries. Thus this analysis illustrates some limitations of the peace journalism perspective and the necessity to take a contextual approach in which also the possibility of "peace talk" being part of a war discourse is considered.

Introduction

Previous research shows that the national contexts have substantial framing impacts on mediated war discourses. After 9/11 and the Global War on Terror (GWOT), international politics have changed dramatically with new foreign and security policy alliances emerging. In the Scandinavian region the previous division between Nato members (Denmark and Norway) and non-aligned countries (Finland and Sweden) is gradually reduced in importance and new patterns of cooperation are taking over. The Nordic countries are presently involved in a formal defence cooperation through, NORDCAPS (Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Peace Support), NORDAC, (Nordic Armaments Cooperation) and NORDSUP (Nordic Supportive Defence Structures).2

In this paper we try to find out what this new situation means for security policy discourses in the media. By analysing the proposal for closer military cooperation between the Nato-member Norway and the non-aligned Sweden, jointly presented by the two countries’ commander-in-chiefs in August 2007, we will critically discuss how useful Johan Galtung’s peace journalism model is for analysis of such a debate. As a complementary approach we propose critical discourse analysis (CDA) because of its more sophisticated method for contextualising.

Earlier research

Our earlier studies of media coverage of the Gulf War 1990-91, the Kosovo War 1999, the Afghanistan War 2001 and the Iraq War 2003 have revealed the different framing of these conflicts in our respective countries’ media (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2001; Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2005; Nohrstedt, Höijer and Ottosen 2002). However, considering the close collaboration between Norway’s and Sweden’s troops in Afghanistan, and also with US and other Nato members’ military forces during the GWOT, it seems important to analyse how these changes are discursively constructed for public information and deliberations. A particularly interesting and relevant case here is the ongoing political elitist debate within the Nordic Defence Forces seeking a new role in the post-cold war area. The main question in this article is if and how these strategic security-policy matters are constructed and manufactured for consumption by the public opinion.

1. A earlier version of this article was presented to the International Peace Research Association in Leuven July 18 2008 and to the International Association for Media and Communication Research’s General Conference in Stockholm July 2008.
Methodological approach

The earlier research mentioned above concerning the Gulf War, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq were all based on extensive empirical material with comparative studies of the media coverage in several countries including of course Sweden and Norway. Several methods were used including quantitative content analyses based on issues like genres, use of sources and framing. Over all these studies represent a combination of quantitative and qualitative data, the latter often dealt with using critical discourse analyses (CDA). The character of the study presented here differs from the above mentioned since the topic, Nordic defence cooperation, was not a “hot” topic in the news. This is actually our first result, i.e. the lack of news journalism coverage of this important issue in main stream media. Instead of concentrating our analysis to news reporting as in previous studies, our take here is the ways in which editorials, debate and feature articles in main stream media relate discursively to the original debate item – or spin - written by the two commander-in-chiefs which brought the military collaboration plans to public attention. Furthermore, unlike our earlier studies cross national comparisons are not the aim in this article but rather comparative analysis of different types of media in an ambition to get maximum variation in our media material irrespective of whether it comes from Norwegian and Swedish media. Since the first quantitative result, i.e. the lack of substantial news material, is valid in both countries, the idea here is to look in more details of what comments – at all – followed from the initial debate article in a situation when the space for “legitimate controversy” (Hallin 1986; see also about “doxa” below) obviously was restricted to a minimum. Finally, the major purpose here is not so much the empirical results as such and as representations of the conditions of the public sphere in our two countries, but we would rather regard the argumentation as an explorative inquiry into the value of the peace journalism model for media studies of conflict communication and opinion building.

Given these considerations we selected both main stream newspapers as well as Nettavisen for our analysis. A special reason for choosing it, was the opportunity to include commentaries from the reader in blogs placed in the electronic field beneath the published article and hence providing us with responses “from below” on the spin initiated by the elite sources within the military and political sectors. Since we are using critical discourse analyses as a method, this response from the general public adds an extra dimension to the analyses.

A Nordic model?

The Nordic model is often referred to as a role model for other countries since the self image of the Nordic countries is often linked to the claim of putting humanitarian interests at the forefront (Leira et. al 2007). Issues like the quest for equality, international solidarity, the willingness to share some of its wealth with poor countries as development aid, are all included in this self image. Norway has even tried to brand itself as a “humanitarian great power” in its official foreign policy (ibid.). Analysts, like the Norwegian scholar Terje Tvedt, have criticized this rhetoric and image building claiming that also the Scandinavian countries should be judged by their actual policy rather than their self-image (Tvedt 2003). We support this criticism and will question whether Norwegian and Swedish participation as allied to US in the “War on terror” tend to play a negative rather than a positive role on the global scene. To be more precise, we will argue that this self-image might in itself become a riskfactor for the two small countries. Ignoring the actual danger in getting involved as an ally to the US in the GWOT by hiding this policy behind humanitarian rhetoric the two countries can easily be dragged into military adventures framed as peace-building and humanitarian intervention.

We will also suggest that Pierre Bourdieus notion of doxa or the doxic room, (the non-political, non-discussable room) (Bourdieu 1998). Originally the notion of doxa was used by by the Greek rhetoricians as a tool for the formation of argument by referring to the common opinions, the doxa was often manipulated by sophist to persuade the people to follow the arguments of the leaders. In Bourdieus’s use of the notion of doxa he suggests that some issues are not introduced to the public discourse because the leaders simply try to avoid public discussions on certain topics. These issues are so to speak kept out of the agenda leaving behind the false impression of consensus (von der Lippe 1991). We argue that doxa thus can be a useful approach to understand why obviously relevant issues like common risk for Sweden and Norway through common participation in GWOT is left out of the public debate when defence co-operation between Norway and Sweden is discussed in the media. The reason for this is that opinion polls show strong opposition in both Sweden and Norway against having troops in Afghanistan. Since there seems to be great unity among politicians in both Sweden and Norway that the two countries should support US in the GWOT, they seemingly try to avoid public debate on the issue by treating it as a topic “beyond discussion”.

1. Only eighth articles were found mentioning the suggestion by the two Defence-ministeres in a search in Retriever, the electronic archive covering all major Norwegian newsoutlets, in the periode August 30- September 7. Most of the eighth articles found in a search in the electronic base were editorials, commentaries or small news bulletin pieces.
2. The eighth articles found were published in (Nettavisen 31.8, NTB 31.8, Aftenposten 1.9, Nationen 1.9, Bergens Tidende 1.9, Transer-Avisa 1.9, Nationen 1.9, Dagbladet 1.9, Klassekampen 4.9).
The peace journalism discourse

Peace journalism has been proposed as an alternative to traditional war journalism by several scholars and journalists after the original ideas formulated by Johan Galtung (Galtung 2002) and also criticized. BBC-reporter David Loyn is perhaps the best example of a well respected journalist in main stream media who openly has opposed the peace journalism approach. In a special issue of Conflict & Communication online the opponents and defenders of peace journalism are discussing its relevance and importance. Loyn prefer to use terms as “truthfulness” and “objectivity” as journalistic guidelines, even though he acknowledge the limitations of those terms: “On this analysis, if we accept that objectivity is at least a worthy aspiration, even though not a tool to achieve the ‘whole truth’, then peace journalism fails a key test by imposing other expectations onto journalists.” (Lyon 2007:5)

Loyn is disturbed by the Galtung’s original model for war- and peace journalism. According to him the categories in the model are too dualistic. He claims that journalism as it is practiced in every day news journalism seldom fits into “war journalism” or “peace journalism” categories. Loyn present his own experiences as a reporter in conflicts like Kosovo and Rwanda to suggest that if the peace journalism approach had been preferred the outcome would have been worse because it would have prevented interference to stop mass murders. In Northern Ireland he suggests that the peace journalism principle of transparency would have made the secret negotiation between the parties impossible. In the case of Kosovo Loyn comes very close to the journalism of attachment position1 by claiming that the Serb atrocities towards the Albanian was the most important issue, and should have been in the focus of reporting. By uncritically quoting former US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, when describing the political and military nature of US military intervention (it should be winnable, there should be no other option, and there should be an exit strategy), he proves his shortcomings in understanding the character of the US superpower. Least of all a superpower can in our mind be judged solely on its own rhetoric.

In the very end of his article Lyon concludes the discussion with some interesting reflections on the quest for objectivity in journalism. In our mind the discussion should begin where Loyn stops. The weakness in Lyon’s arguments is the lack of context. We agree with Jake Lynch’s criticism of Loyn that propaganda by the different parties in the conflict must be contextualized into the analyses. Loyn doesn’t mention propaganda and media strategies by the great powers through spin and PR and is thus unable to see what serious challenges journalism in the battlefield and warzones is confronted with. On this point another critic of peace journalism, the media researcher Thomas Hanitzch, criticise peace journalism from a totally different angel than Loyn. Hanitzch argues that the peace journalism advocates underestimate the material conditions for modern news reporting and overestimate the possibilities for journalist under hectic deadline pressure to contextualize their stories like Lynch et.al suggests. He thinks that a complex model like Galtung’s scheme is unfit for the highly standarized narrative schemes of modern news production. He thinks that promoting peace is no more noble than PR-campaigns and “journalism of attachment” which suggest military intervention to stop ethnic cleansing (like in Bosnia). Even though Hanitzch is sympathetic to many of he point suggested in peace journalism, he suggests that this might as well be labelled as “good journalism” (Hanitzch 2007:7).

Lynch in his answer to the critics, claims that they underestimate leaders in the Western world when it comes to willingness and abilities to manipulate the media. Especially in the phase of a conflict where there is a mobilisation to go to war based on rhetorics in favour of “humanitarian intervention” (like in Yugoslavia in 1999 and prior to the war in Iraq in 2003), Lynch argues that propaganda must be contextualized by the media and it’s vital that the media is not seduced by propaganda rhetoric and not adapts the vocabulary and arguments of spin doctors in favour of war. Lynch stresses that the basic aim of peace journalists is to “create opportunities for society at large to consider non-violent responses”. He criticizes Loyn for underestimating the effects of propaganda.

Quoting Entman Lynch argues that in order to give the audience the full picture journalist should make visible what the propaganda machinery leaves out, i.e. peace alternatives and realistic information on the consequences of war (Lynch 2007:2).

We basically support Lynch’s position and would perhaps put even more emphasis on the impact of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and their impact of media reporting. In retrospect many of the misleading stories defending the intervention in Iraq hade their origin in disinformation caused by PSYOPS and propaganda (Eide and Ottosen 2008). One important PSYOPS operation was the US Army pulling down of the statue of Saddam Hussein and then portraying it as a spontaneous

1. The journalism of attachment was developed during the Bosnian War by the (at the time) BBC-reporter Martin Bell (1996). Bell argued that journalists have a responsibility for the development of the conflicts they are covering. Therefore, he proposes reporters assume an active position in favour of the victims of war, even if this means support for military interference by NATO. Bell argues that journalists should use their influence as journalists to try to improve the situation of those who cannot help themselves. Bells position caused a huge debate where his most important critic was Mick Hume who attacked Bell’s position in the essay “Whose War is it anyway? The Danger of the Journalism of Attachment” (Hume 1997). For a full overview of the discussion see Sjøvaag 2005.
reaction from the people in Baghdad. The importance of propaganda before the war is underlined in new literature like Michael Isikoff and David Corn’s book *Hubris* where the authors argue that the Bush administration mislead the opinion in their campaign for war to a level that has been underestimated by the media. Vice president Dick Cheney misused CIA and picked the information that suited argumentation for a war and put aside information that contradicted claims that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction

For example in a speech in front of Veterans of foreign wars 26 august 2002 Cheney misused facts from CIA and claimed: “There is now doubt he is amassing (WMD) to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us” (Isikoff and Corn 2006:28-29). Isikoff and Corn reveal a forceful will in the Bush administration to go to war whatever what. When Karl Rove once told the president about polls suggesting opposition in the public opinion against war the president exploded:: “Don't tell me about fucking polls. I don't care what the polls say.” (op. cit.: 29). The extent of systematic lies repeated again and again had impact and the public opinion changed to be more sympathetic to war as the solution to the "problem Saddam Hussein".

Center for public integrity has documented that the Bush-administration on 532 occasions produced a total amount of 935 false statements in the period from October 2002 to August 2003 (Reading-Smith 2008).

In our view David Loyns position in the debate has a naive point of departure. It presupposes that the media start their war reporting with "blank sheets". We think that the peace journalism model might serve as a useful checklist for both journalists and media researcher as a guideline in a propaganda-infected landscape. Media researcher Wilhelm Kempf has successfully used the peace journalism approach in his own research (Kempf 2006). He basically supports the framework of peace journalism even though he criticizes the book *Peace journalism* by Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick in their criticism of Loyns position on "objectivity":

"To radically turn away from the call for objectivity, as suggested by Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) or Hackett (2006), not only endagers the acceptans of peace journalism project in the journalistic community, however, but also twists peace journalism into a form of advocacy journalism, which lead directly to PR and propaganda and can squander the trust bonus its recipients grant to peace journalism". (Kempf 2007:7)

Critique of Peace Journalism from a CDA perspective

In the vibrant debate on peace journalism (PJ) critical discourse analysis (CDA) is underestimated as supplement. CDA has emerged as one of the influential approaches within media studies in general and could play a vital role in research on war and peace journalism as well. We believe that the debate on journalism research can gain a lot if drawing more on this linguistically inspired analysis. There are a number of consequences if this idea is pursued in war- and peace journalism.

If you define journalism as a discourse it implies that the final journalistic products are perceived to carry and contain meanings on several levels. All these levels can not be collapsed into a singular "manifest content" level. As with other fields of communication, meaning is based on multi-level interrelations. This also means that in CDA aspects of mediated conflict coverage that are rarely or at all noticed in debates about journalism, such as the importance of the context, the interdiscursive relations and the meaning of omissions, are addressed and integrated with the analysis. Considering that the discourse concept is defined by the institutional dimension, the structural conditions and the organisational setting are at the center of the attention. This is not entirely unique for the CDA but coherently treated in this approach as fundamental for any reasonable conclusions. Hence when analysing media content the layers of meanings related to and alluding to other discourses beyond journalism itself are of particular importance. These interrelated set of discourses are however not randomly configured according to our application of CDA, but rather regarded as constituting a "discursive order" with a term invented by Norman Fairclough (Fairclough 1995). We will soon exemplify the ways in which these theoretical points of departure are put in use in our analytical work, but first a few more comments to position ourself in the field of CDA research.

The label "critical" has its relevance as one common denominator for the CDA researchers as it indicates the normative character of their project(s). Meaning that communication is explored with an intention to point out other possible realities than the one under investigation. This normative orientation also comes with a theoretical focus on relations of power, dominance and hegemony. These are all challenged as obstacles to empowerment of non-elite people being caught in the discursive nets spun by ideologues, PR-strategists, politicians, etc. As indicated above one of the critical angles of CDA research is its insistence on hidden assumptions and latent, but nevertheless relevant, cognitive or emotive discursive elements.

The CDA field is inhabited by three different "schools": the socio-psychological Dutch variant with Teun van Dijk as the leading figure, the linguistic British school with Norman Fairclough as the most well-known scholar, and the discourse-historical approach developed by the Austrian school with Ruth Wodak as the leader (Wodak 1996, 2001). After Wodak’s
In the article it was an a link to the published text in Dagbladet. In this article the question of sovereignty of the two countries is mentioned:

Norway has traditionally been a NATO member while Sweden is a EU member. The framing and tone in the newspaper Dagens Nyheter can be seen as part of a broader historical past. Further, the two commanders underline that the proposed collaboration is "only" about purchase of submarines, tanks, etc. Mentioned is also coordination of "supply, education, training and doctrines".

The article states that a proposal on defence cooperation turns the traditional way of thinking military affairs in the two countries upside down. Planned is adressed immediately, but with a peculiar rhetorical twist which does not invite to discussion. This crucial issue is only touched upon and then "dismissed": "We must put all old sovereignty reflexes upside down (på huvudet)."

In this article we will rely mainly on the historically oriented variant as developed by Wodak and her colleagues (Wodak and Benke 2001). The main reason being their successful applications of inter-discursive analysis diaconically, and the insights they offer to understand the operations of contextual conditions for creation of meaning in different settings, e.g. parliamentarian debates, public ceremonies, media, exhibitions, vox populi chat on the street corner, etc. Here we will, due to practical limitations, concentrate on journalism as a discourse related to defence policy discourses in the Scandinavian countries after the Second World War. Although this is a limited empirical basis for conclusions about the fruitfulness of applying CDA we nevertheless hope to be able to make some critical, although constructive, comments to the debate about P.J. It makes sense because a war must be analysed as a historical process starting long time before the first bullit is fired.

To understand potential wars and conflicts in the years to come we must look at the arguments in the security policy debate today. As indicated above we are positive to the intentions and the critique of main-stream war journalism coming from the peace journalism movement. But it seems to us that it could benefit from an integration of some of the theoretical ideas that CDA provides when it comes to understanding meaning-making as produced by discursive acts. If Norway and Sweden will be involved in future wars we might already in the contemporary debate find the reason for this not only in the arguments supporting a war oriented policy, but also in topics that are kept out of the debate. Here we think CDA has advantages that are not captured by the peace journalism model.

In sum, we contend that the CDA approach can offer: 1) a way to manage the demand on contextual reflexivity that has been raised in the debate about peace journalism; 2) integration of the propaganda discourses during peace time, which are mainly neglected in the Galtung model, but in reality might be the most important stage for media effects on conflict escalation; 3) a historical perspective – especially in the historical CDA approach as developed by Wodak and associates – in which discursive uses of historical analogies and examples are emphasised. In the examples we are discussing below in particular two points are important. Namely, firstly that even a discourse about peace building and security plans may in its historical consequences be steps toward conflict escalation, which should not be left out of the critical analysis. Secondly, contextually speaking we suggest that even a discourse qualified as "peace journalism" according to Galtung’s terminology could in the context of for example the GWOT be suspected to be the very opposite, i.e. "war journalism", in its consequences. These are the challenges for the critical media research field studying mediated conflict reporting today.

**Empirical example 1: Norwegian media**

In the autumn of 2007 the heads of Norwegian and Swedish Defence, Sverre Diesen and Håkan Syrén, published a joint article in Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet and Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter, proposing closer cooperation between the two countries on military affairs and defence issues. Among the proposals were joint military exercises, military education, joint development of new military doctrines and cooperation in buying military equipment such as warships and vehicles. In the background here is also the recent issue of Norway replacing her F-16 fighters with a new generation of fighters where the candidates were the Swedish plane JAS Gripen, produced by SAAB, the European Eurofighter and the US-produced Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) under construction by Lockheed Martin.

As mentioned in the methodological section of this article, through a case study we will analyse how a few selected media in each country covered this initiative as a news event. We will also see what potential important issues that are kept out of the news coverage. The Swedish example is the way Dagens Nyheter and Aftonbladet reported about the Diesen-Syrén proposal. The first newspaper is the leading quality paper and the latter the largest tabloid in Sweden. The Norwegian case is a news story in the electronic newspaper Nettavisen, owned by the commercial TV station TV2. This is the only major digital newspaper in Norway which is a pure electronic publication. The other major electronic papers are web-versions connected to, and owned by a print newspaper. Our reason for choosing this internet outlet, is that the readers can comment on the article in an electronic debate forum, published after the article itself. By using this in our analyses we are able to include some of the arguments in the public discourse following the article.

The article in question was published in Nettavisen on 31 August 2007 and had the title "Want a Norwegian-Swedish defence". The article states that a proposal on defence cooperation turns the traditional way of thinking military affairs in the two countries upside down. Norway has traditionally been a NATO member while Sweden is a EU member.

In the article it was an a link to the published text in Dagbladet. In this article the question of sovereignty of the two country is adressed immediately, but with a peculiar rhetorical twist which does not invite to discussion. This crucial issue is only touched upon and then "dismissed": "We must put all old sovereignty reflexes upside down (på huvudet)." The issue of whether Sweden wants to keep the non-alignment security policy could have raised an important debate, but are expelled to a historical past. Further, the two commanders underline that the proposed collaboration is "only" about purchase of submarines, tanks, etc. Mentioned is also coordination of "supply, education, training and doctrines". The framing and tone
is assuring and comforting. These new plans are only natural, uncontroversial and part of a necessary development: “The possibilities are great already to year 2012 and will grow further in the future.” The cooperation will not restrict the freedom of actions, on the contrary it will improve the relation: “A deeper Swedish-Norwegian collaboration provides opportunities to make our production of military forces more efficient. In this way we can strengthen our common influence within the entire European and Euro-Atlantic security cooperation.” This point is elaborated further: “A stronger cooperation between Sweden and Norway is therefore a complement to the present collaboration structures in Nato and EU. It facilitates the national operative capacity for both of us at the same time as it prepares the ground for increased freedom of political action in the future.”

In terms of macro-theme the debate article tells that military cooperation makes it possible to finance necessary production and purchase of defence equipment. By the disposition and the selection of words and expressions the cooperation is described as economically necessary and politically wanted. It is furthermore presented as entirely natural and uncontroversial: it is “of course nothing new”, “both sides /.../ will certainly keep their full national right to make decisions about the uses of the forces”, it has “strong political support in both our countries”. However, a certain urgency is indicated because a choice of direction has to be decided: “We now wish to get a clear and broad political mandate to proceed from idea to action. The time is short. In both our countries the defence forces face challenges the next coming years that make decisions about the direction urgent.”

In an attached interview with Sverre Diesen, he states that he foresee no big practical problems with the proposal and that he regards it a challenge to the politicians in the two countries. He further states that he has sent a written proposal to the Norwegian defence minister (at the time) Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen claiming that it’s now up to the politicians to decide how close the future defence cooperation between the two countries will be. He stresses that the proposal does not include the controversy on Norway’s choice of a new generation fighter planes.

Nettavisen asked Diesen if he suspects problem in NATO because of the proposal. Diesen responds that it is unproblematic for a NATO member like Norway and a EU member like Sweden to work closely together. He also mentions that Sweden already is a member of NATO’s partner organisation “Partnership for Peace” (PfP). He further stresses that Sweden is already in a process of adapting to NATO standards in a number of areas. There will be few practical problems because of this, and each country will also in the future have full control over it’s own defence.

Nettavisen then asks Diesen to be more exact on the issue of “common military doctrines”.

He then answers (our interpretation): “Norway has not decided a hierarchy of doctrines, but there are several documents offering guidelines on a national level. When we work together in an international context, in UN, NATO, EU or in PfP it is vital that one has a common doctrine which is decisive for the policy. Thus it’s logical and practical that Sweden and Norway jointly contribute to development of this doctrine”.

Interestingly enough he does not comment on the fact that Norway and Sweden both contribute to the NATO-lead ISAF-force in Afghanistan. Neither the journalists nor Diesen touch upon the historical fact that before Norway joined NATO there was a Swedish suggestion to establish a Nordic defence alliance as a possible alternative solution for Norway and Denmark. This suggestion played a major role in the public debate prior to Norway’s decision to join NATO (Furre 1991). Many people on the left saw this as preferred solution for Norway. Bjørgulv Braanen, the editor of the left wing newspaper Klassekampen, also made a point of this in his commentary on September 4 stating it as “tragedy that the plans for a joint Nordic defence cooperation was smashed after the war” (Second World War, authors remark) by US-loyal top-politicians who preferred membership in NATO. Klassekampen with this position is a dissenting voice in the Norwegian media landscape.

The response from the readers

Twelve different contributions published on the Nettavisen’s website covered a number of issues. Interestingly enough several of the comments touched upon historical facts in the relationship between Sweden and Norway.

The first one was written by Leif Rognan under the title “Illusion about security”. This op-piece falls within what we can call a traditional pro-NATO discourse. He rejects the idea that even a totally integrated Swedish-Norwegian defence will offer Norway the security the country needs with Russia as an increasingly self-conscious neighbour. He suspects that this proposal will be used by the Norwegian left to weaken NATO and USA. He fears that this in practical terms will weaken “our” defence capability and bring “us” in a situation similar to the appeasement policy prior to Second World War. He ends with a wish that Norwegian politicians despite this new Nordic hype will not be tempted to undermine “our” ability to have “our” freedom and independent policy. His last sentence is: “If our foreign- and security policy shall be based on US-hatred we will face an insecure future”.

The next comment is written within the tradition of what we could call a traditional historical Norwegian-Swedish quarrel. It’s written by the pseudonym ”Tittentei” and has the humorous title “Svorsk (Co-writing of Swedish and Norwegian in one
word) defence cooperation”.

Its ironic undertone strikes already by the introductory statement: “First vi can get back Jamtland and Herjedalen (sic) (areas in the boarder region that once belonged to Norway).” Then Tittentei reminds us that Sweden saw to it that Norway had to pay more to EU in fees to sign the agreement of European Econmical area (EØS) than was originally proposed. She also suggest that Sweden probably will “help us” with increasing the defence expenses as well.

“Tiger” replies to this, picking up on the half joking tone, and suggest that if we must have a new generation fighter planes we should choose the Swedish fighter JAS-Gripen. But he suggests that the money instead could be used on health care and the elderly people. He also suggests that we stop the “madness” and refuse to buy the more expensive American Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

“Ola Smart” replies to this: “Bullshit! JSF is decades ahead and much more advanced than Eurofighter and Gripen. We need the best plane and JSF is the best.

”JKT” replies to this: “Of course we must cooperate with Sweden. We need much closer ties than today”.

Without saying so explicitly, this is relaunching of the old idea of a joint Nordic defence alternative, proposed by Sweden before Norway joined NATO.

The signature “Sceptical” answers ironically: “Great idea, bring in Finland and Denmark also.”

“Tordenskiold” skips the ironi and suggest that the whole Nordic region (including Iceland) should have a joint defence, both economically and practically.

“Balle Balle” answers: “This doesn’t work . The Swedes do this just to help Russia and USA to split our country in two.” He complains that the only unsolved issue is the boarder of the indigionous Sami area. The Norwegian – Swedish issue was according to him solved when Norway left the union with Sweden in 1905. Will Swedish membership in NATO be a new beginning for a closer relationship, he wonders.

The signature “PEM” picks up on this and claims: “I never understood why the union was resolved . (…) I see no advantages with a border and customs”. He mentions similarities i language and other reasons to want the union back and regret that the plans to merge the national telecompanies Telia and Telenor failed a few years ago. He calls for a formalized cooperation in more areas. Closer ties with Sweden is much better for Norway than to traumatize the nation with a new battle over EU-membership,

The signature “Ola Smart” is provoked by this and asks "What kind of bullshit is this”. He returns to the traditional historical Norwegian-Swedish quarrel discourse and reminds that the Swedes emptied our silver mines and the Danes, during the periode when they were in union with Norway, brought us into several wars. “You are ignorant and should read more history,” he claims.

The signature “affe” agrees with the last speaker and claims that the Danes took our language away, overtaxed us and suppressed us. Ask the people on Farou Icelands if the enjoy Danish ruling, he asks polemically.

“Lars” thinks it is fine to shop in Sweden since prices are lower there. “But we are closer to Danes in mentality and way of life”, he claims. In a PS he states that even our present F-16 is more advanced than Gripen. “Sorry that’s the way it is.” But adds that the Swedes “are better than us in negotiations and agreements- there we can learn something”.

And then the debate is over. Nobody mentions the fact that Norway and Sweden are fighting together in Afghanistan as allied to US in the ISAF forces under NATO leadership in the “War on terror”. This important fact so vital for the future events in GWOT is not mentioned by Nettavisen, Diesen or any of the discussants.

Empirical example 2: Swedish media

When the commander-in-chiefs of Norway and Sweden in public present the plans for increased military collaboration, the format is a debate article to the leading quality newspaper Dagens Nyheter under the headline: “New defence cooperation between Sweden and Norway” (DN 31 August 2007). As mentioned above the article urges in general and vague language that old sovereignty ideas must be forgotten, and the text is obviously intended to help the readers forget all about them.

Two themes are totally absent in the article – themes that would be entirely relevant with respect to the historical-political substance of the matter:

a. the Swedish proposal after WWII of a Nordic Defence Alliance, which had substantial support in the general opinion in the Nordic countries as an alternative to Nato, and
the fact that both countries are partners to USA in the EU/Nato operations in Afghanistan as part of “the global war on terror” (GWOT).

The semantic manoeuvres that the two commanders use, clearly with an intention to avoid the later issue, is fascinating as an attempt not to raise concerns about possible conflict risks at the tangent of the farreaching cooperation plans. Consequently through out the article they use abstract and imprecise expressions when touching upon what kind of military joint venture that may come in the future: “Euro-Atlantic security cooperation”, “the international community (UN/EU/Nato)”, “interational peace operations”, etc.

Since the proposed military cooperation is said to include eighteen areas, whereof only five are specified in the article, it is reasonable to expect that the collaboration will increase not only between the two Scandinavian countries but also be extended to other Nato members. But this is not a theme in the article. On the contrary it is quite remarkable how one-sided and energetic it is when emphasising that freedom of action will grow because of the cooperation.

In the subsequent media coverage silence or consensus are predominant. The debate is mentioned in the news, but without mention of any crucial questions or critical comments by the news media themselves or from the public. The leading tabloid Aftonbladet reports briefly about the main content of the proposal, with some quotations from the article – no further comments or commentators are referred. But the implication of closer cooperation with Nato as a military alliance is remarkably absent in this Social-Democratic newspaper. In contrast three Norwegian newspapers had editorials commenting the proposal, but did not bring the story as news. Two of them were positive (Trønderavisen and Bergens Tidende), while Nationen is more neutral (all of them published on 1 September.2007).

However, the foreign editor of the Dagens Nyheter contributes with a comment. On the editorial pages the newspaper has since a number of years proposed that Sweden should apply for membership in the Nato. The plans for a joint Swedish-Norwegian military cooperation obviously give the foreign editor an occasion to once again criticise the alleged stubbornness and reluctance at the side of the politicians to spell out in public what changes have actually taken place in Swedish defence policy. The editorial’s headline, “Open door to Nato”, indicates that the defence collaboration should naturally be followed up with a Swedish Nato membership application. Nevertheless, this is not something the editor expects to happen. Primarily because left-wing politicians will continue its opposition and also because “there are only political losses to be made in a situation where the overwhelming majority of the Swedes are opponents to an application”. This “remarkable” policy will continue, according to the editor: “It is a policy where everything that is done points in the direction of an application being the natural consequence, at the same time as the official rhetoric pretends not to know what is actually going on.” He ends up with the argument that it would be more honest to be outspoken, but without expressing much hope about that. His final line of the editorial goes: “What is happening is going to happen anyway.”

In an analytical comments to the proposal of defence cooperation in Dagens Nyheter the same day (31 August 2007) Ewa Sternberg claims that three holy cows in Swedish defence policy is on their way to the slaughter house. One of them is the non-alignment policy which is getting closer to the butcher due to this plan, when “we are starting knitting us together with the Nato country Norway”. She also mentions the polls showing that the Swedish people is against membership in Nato. “But an alliance with Nordic neighbour-countries does not need to be perceived so negatively. Even if the cooperation with Oslo will bring us closer to Washington. (...) In the future there may be a Finnish army, a Swedish airforce and a Norwegian navy in Scandinavia.”

As an additional remark to the article on defence cooperation on 31 August 2007, the web-edition of Dagens Nyheter in a news bulletin reports a couple of weeks later (070924) that the Norwegian broadcasting cooperation, NRK, had revealed that a classified report from the commander-in-chief, Sverre Diesen, expressed his view that Norway cannot count on Nato in case of a serious conflict with Russia. The reason being that Nato is so occupied with the GWOT. An invasion of Norway is not a realistic scenario, according to the report, but the fish, oil and gas resources in the North could become challenges for Norway in her relation with the military big power in the East.

In conclusion the Swedish media discourse on the defence cooperation is constructed as a non-controversial and un-politicised issue, although one commentator mentions that it will knit Sweden closer to Nato. Otherwise the rhetorics of the article signed by the two commanders seems to have been uncritically accepted – the proposed plans are simply the natural next steps on a road already chosen and economic gains and operational improvements are the only objectives involved. The only critical point raised is when DN once again repeats its complaints that it would be clarifying if in particular the Social-Democrats acknowledged in public what they had since long agreed to, namely increased collaboration with Nato. That there could be any conflict-risks involved in this development, e.g. becoming militarily engaged in the GWOT in Afghanistan or elsewhere, is remarkably absent in the Swedish discourse.
The debate on a joint defence revisited

In the summer of 2008 the heads of defence in Sweden and Norway picked up the debate again and now they had included the head of defence in Finland. In a joint article Sverre Diesen, Håkan Syrén and Juhani Kaskela suggested a joint Nordic defence system (Et nytt nordisk forsvar Aftenposten 18 June 2008).

They referred to the article by Diesen and Syrén in August 2007 and stated that many of the suggestions have been discussed further and they mention a joint report presented to the ministers of defence in Norway, Sweden and Finland, where 140 suggestions for mutual defence cooperation had been identified. Out of these they suggest that 40 can be implemented immediately. Among those 40 are: “maritime surveillance, surveillance of the airspace, mutual landforces, common areas for practice, mutual Nordic bases for sea, air, and land – support, medical support and military education”.

The main argument is the budget cuts experienced by the permanent forces in the three countries. The alternatives are mutual cooperation or capacity reductions. The reason for these cut backs are presented in a subtle manner. The doxa linked to Nordic participation in GWOT is as obvious here as in the the article from August 2007. The issue is only indirectly dealt with in the beginning of the article: "Most countries in the Euroatlantic area have gone through huge reorganisation to prepare their defence to deal with increasingly complex tasks nationally and internationally".

When reading the whole report the aim to coordinate joint efforts on GWOT is more clearly expressed. In point 42.2 in the document the following statement is quite clear:

“This could mean to share burden of a task in international operations by contributing assets from all three nations, simultaneously or in sequence, into one assignment” (Nordic Supportive Defence Structure 2008:B:5).

Another way to put this, which is not pointed out in the media, is that the military capacity in all the Nordic countries have been reduced because resources have been drained due to their role as allied to the USA in the GWOT war theaters in Afghanistan and Iraq. The question is of course whether the public opinion the Nordic countries would have agreed to this trade-off and the use of military and economic resources if the choice had been presented to them in a frank and open manner. In addition, at least in Swedish defence debate the huge and often badly calculated costs for the international military engagements have been hot potatoes for the government. After that large parts of the Swedish defence industry have been bought up by US capital during the recent decades, the international collaboration in the GWOT seems to be the reason for continued spending of large amounts of the tax payers´money on the defence sector at the same time as it is the lever that will eventually dispose of the traditional non-alignment policy of both Finland and Sweden.

The controversy over Joint Strike Fighther

On 20 November 2008 the Norwegian Parliament after a short debate made the principle decision to buy the US Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighther (JSF) as the Norwegian future fighter plane. The decision happened after a long process where also the Swedish Saab Gripen was a candidate. This debate was highly relevant for the debate on closer Nordic defence cooperation. The Swedish government was involved in the marketing efforts to try to convince the Norwegian politicians to choose the Swedish plane. Including in the proposed contract was a comprehensive plan for industrial, economical and military cooperation. A Norwegian decision to buy the Swedish plane would obviously have been an important step to strengthen the Nordic cooperation. It would also mean more independent role for Norway within the US-Norwegian relationship and NATO. This issue was also controversial within the coalition government since the SV (the socialist left party) were in favour of the Swedish/Nordic solution while the AP (the social democrats) supported US –JSF solution.

When the decision was made it was met with disbelief from the Swedish government and the Swedish media. The Swedish media and politicians had problems understanding the Norwegian decision since the Swedish Gripen plane according to their estimates would have been cheaper and one important step towards a stronger Nordic defence cooperation. In Norway the public debate and the media coverage was a confusing exercise with figures since the government spokespersons insisted that the JSF-solution was both cheaper and was more suited to fullfill Norway’s military commitments in international operation.

This could have given Norwegian media reason to go into a critical coverage of the whole process. But once again we saw that with the exception of Aftenposten the main stream media closed ranks with the government in security policy issues. The independent Norwegian defence analyst John Berg in his work has concluded that even the official US figures concludes that the Swedish Gripen solution is the cheapest (Berg 2009). The Norwegian Ministry of Defence based it’s report to Parliament on 27 points and succeded to frame the debate in Parliament around those 27 points despite the fact that international experts had concluded otherwise (ibid.). In the debate on 20 November in Parliament the government claimed that 48 JSF planes could be purchased for 18 billion NOK and thus less than the Swedish Gripen. In the government report to Parliament (Stortingsmelding) one month after the decision was made it was concluded that 56 JSF planes would cost 42 billion NOK and be more expensive than the Gripen package. Again the main stream media avoided to confront the
government with the issues of prices and other facts, such as the estimated life expectancy of both Gripen and JSF (Berg 2009).

One important aspect of this debate is that the US government has clearly stated that JSF fits into the US global military strategy. The supporters for Gripen have claimed that Gripen was better fitted for the defence of the Norwegian costal line, and claimed that Norway’s role as close allied to US in the GWOT was dependent on the choice to buy JSF.

A few weeks after the Norwegian decision to buy JSF, Norway’s former foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg again in a public speech tried to re-launch the idea of a Nordic defence cooperation, without getting much response in Swedish media (Berg 2009b). The Nordic defence concept is still alive in rhetoric from the Norwegian Commander in chief, Serre Diesen. In an article in Aftenposten 12 January 2009 under the title “Why Nordic defense cooperation? He argues once again strongly for the use of common military equipment: “Thus, Norway, Sweden and Finland in the future will be able to operate the same types of tanks, infantry and field artillery”. Strangely enough Diesen does not even mention fighter planes in this argument. Not with one word is the Norwegian decision to buy the US JSF planes two months earlier referred to.

Obviously Norway has made its choice to keep up its position as loyal ally in the GWOT as the number one priority. Sweden’s dilemma to both play a role in the GWOT and to be an independent player on the industrial military market for a while led to a friction with the Norwegian government. Once again the doxa of the mainstream media makes it almost impossible to confront the political and military elite on major issues the debate in Swedish and Norwegian media was reduced to nationalistic quarrel between two neighbours. Both in Sweden and Norway the unifying strategic interest seems to be the intention to continue as brothers in arms on the battlefields in Afghanistan, which therefore is not an issue in this debate.

Conclusions

The Peace journalism model as suggested by Johan Galtung is a useful tool as a checklist both for journalists and peace researchers. Since Galtung’s approach is somewhat rigid it has its obvious limitations and should thus be supplemented with other methods and theories. We suggest that Bourdieu’s notion on doxa and the CDA approach could be such a supplement. Even though the question of audiences as active contributors to the public discourse on war and peace have been addressed in some recent research, the general impression is that a more sophisticated meaning-theoretical point of view would help bringing the debate to a more reflexive understanding of the achievements and limits of the “PJ program” (Kempf 2007:4). The CDA approach to media studies incorporates levels of meanings and the relations between different actors in the discourse analysis as part of the context. The public debates in society have influences on media texts as do the discourses among politicians, PR-firms and spin doctors. And vice versa. In particular, the CDA perspective helps to explore in what ways mediated discourses are interrelated with for example national and transnational security-policy discourses. In the empirical examples touched upon above the silence around certain critical aspects of the plans for closer military cooperation between Finland, Norway and Sweden, and the hidden assumptions concerning the wider context of the US-lead GWOT are some such important – though discursively absent – interdiscursive relations.

Our point is that this silence (or doxa) about potential conflict-risks and possible involvement in future wars are not reflected in Galtung’s model for war and peace journalism. On the contrary, by ignoring the potential conflict risks that may be contingent of deeper involvement in the GWOT the journalistic examples above would in some respects be categorised as “peace journalism” and in some as “war journalism”. For example, although a common Nordic peaceful we-identity is appealed to there is no opposite them-identity or enemy image mentioned. It further put the emphasis on preventing future wars – although by military means. On the other hand – which would place the spin in the war journalism category – the proposal of increased Nordic cooperation in the defence sector is making potential conflict risks “opaque and secret”, it is “elite oriented” and it definitely does not “uncover all cover-ups” (Galtung 2002). In addition we claim that the great varieties of positions and point of views in the public as shown in our empirical examples does not fit in neither the war-column nor the peace column in Galtung’s model. The elite positions in Galtung’s war model are represented by the military and the politicians, but the systematic avoidance of conflict-risks, which may facilitate a process toward military conflict escalation, is not considered by the model. The reason for this is mainly the general limitation of the Galtung-model to the stage of open war, whereas we would like to draw attention to the need of expanding the analysis to the previous stages in conflict escalation processes.

The discourse among ordinary people, though, might pick up historical links like the suggestion after the Second World War of a Nordic solution as an alternative to NATO for the Scandinavian countries, but also to mention other possible scenarios than the one promoted by the elites. New digital media offers an opportunity for the public to forward such positions in opposition to the main stream media. However, these more popular comments in our empirical cases are more ironic jokes than part of a serious discussion about the possible negative consequences of increased military collaboration. In any case, we suggest that the multi-media landscape with its different discursive spaces also should have a place in the future
debate on peace journalism.

Models such as Galtung’s are probably not relevant in all conflict situations and stages. Used as a tool for assessing the journalistic contributions to conflict resolutions they are not without problems because they are generalised, although not properly contextualised. At the same time it must be admitted that there are plenty of empirical evidences that much of the war reporting in main stream media is constructed along the lines Galtung suggests. By using CDA as a supplement we suggest a more comprehensive analysis that includes both the systematic silencing of certain crucial aspects as well as the voices of ordinary people in the public discourse on war and peace issues with the objective of finding out the complex discursive constructions and structures that contribute to conflict escalations and wars.

We suggest the following:

1. Galtung’s polarised two models have heuristic value for reflexive evaluation of journalistic practices – both internally within the trade and by interested people outside the profession, e.g. media researchers and audience. But they do not contain any recepy in any other ways.
2. As a “philosophy” peace journalism is far too narrowly defined and the notion PJ could preferrably be replaced by some more appropriate term, for example “consequence-ethical reflexivity”, which in our view better catches the sound kernel of the PJ “program”.
3. The PJ model may gain from being combined with CDA or other context oriented methods for analyses of and discussions about what discursive constructions are best at satisfying the requirements of a responsible and consequentially reflexive journalism.
4. This should extend the application field and imply that also the role of journalism in the advent of conflicts, i.e. the discursive handeling of conflict risks, are exposed to critical examination.

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