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## **Categorizing terrorist entities listed by the European Union according to terrorist groups' underlying motives**

*Kurzfassung:* Es existiert eine Fülle an Auflistungen von Terroristengruppen, zusammengestellt von Staaten und Staatenverbänden. Die Liste der Europäischen Union enthält derzeit 44 solcher Gruppen. Die vorliegende Studie analysiert die Motive dieser Gruppen, um daraus Kommunikationsstrategien abzuleiten, wie diesen zu entgegenen sei. Dazu wird eine dreigliedrige Typologie nach Waldmann (2001) zugrunde gelegt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass ausschließlich religiös motivierter Terrorismus lediglich bei fünf der 44 analysierten Gruppen anzutreffen ist. Die meisten Gruppen (n=20) legen nationalistisch-separatistische Motive an den Tag; 19 Gruppen beziehen sich auf sozial-revolutionäre Motive. Es wird vorgeschlagen, je nach Motiv eine unterschiedliche rhetorische Gegenstrategie zu entwerfen, die spezifisch auf die jeweils identifizierten motivationalen und Identität generierenden Faktoren eingeht beziehungsweise diese widerlegt.

*Abstract:* States and international organizations have compiled lists of a great variety of terrorist groups. The current European Union list includes 44 entities. This study analyzes the underlying motives of the terrorist organizations named in this list. In order to understand the groups' motivations and consequently be able to advise on methods of countering them with communication strategies, we employ a three-item typology provided by Waldmann (2001). The results show that only five of the 44 groups were religiously motivated to commit terrorism. Most of the groups (n=20) had nationalist-separatist motives, and 19 groups displayed social-revolutionary motives. Based on the respective motives, differing counter-terrorism strategies are proposed, e.g., developing rhetorical counter-narratives that address and reduce the groups' motivational and identity-generating characteristics.

### **1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>**

In efforts to prevent terrorism, it is vital to understand the phenomenon and the communicative, symbolic character of terrorist acts. Through their actions, terrorists try to broadcast a certain message and communicate their guiding interests and priorities. In an audio-tape from January 2010, Al-Qaeda head Osama bin Laden announced: "If it was possible to carry our messages to you by words, we wouldn't have carried them to you by planes" (as reported by Walid, 2010). Corlett (2003) attributes terrorism to the demand for political, social, economic, or religious change. Independently of the primary goals, terrorism is also driven by several subordinate motives. In this article, we therefore try to answer the following research question:

*According to which motives can the terrorist entities listed by the European Union be categorized?*

A motive is the underlying cause of a given behavior, and the sum total of motives is called "motivation." Thus, in the theory of motivation and emotion, causal attributions play a key role (Weiner, 1985). Motivation consists of a) an aspiration for efficacy and b) organization for goal attainment (Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2010). These two characteristics are found in all human undertakings. Motive research distinguishes between implicit motives (such as internalized cultural aspects) and explicit motives, as expressed, e.g., in public statements. This study investigated motives made explicit in various ways, for instance in founding charters. Motive research is a multidisciplinary field, including *inter alia* psychology and criminology (Kehr, Thrash & Wright, 2011; Vecchi, Van Hasselt & Angleman, 2013). Unfortunately, too little attention has been focused on the conceptual classification and empirical investigation of terrorist groups' motives and ways to counter them using rhetorical communication strategies.

Terrorism takes many forms, and terrorists act for a variety of reasons. Terrorist entities pursue various different goals and have different backgrounds. To understand the terrorists' messages – with the aim of dissuading individuals from resorting to terrorism and deterring terrorist acts – we must understand the specific motives and interests of terrorist entities. This paper therefore not only provides insight into definitions and triggers of terrorism, but also discusses the backgrounds and objectives of the 44 entities currently listed as terrorist organizations by the European Union. By classifying the entities' motives according to the types of terrorism identified by Waldmann (2001), the paper reveals the common objectives and backgrounds of contemporary terrorism. This classification is relevant for efforts to frustrate terrorist recruiting strategies – which in most cases aim at arousing specific motivations – by means of rhetorical counter-strategies.

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This paper has six sections. The first describes the study's relevance. The second discusses various definitions of terrorism. We then compare these to the EU definition of terrorism, since this study focuses specifically on the EU terrorism list. Fourth, we explain the choice of the Waldmann typology to categorize the terrorist groups on the EU list. We then present the study's results in detail before concluding with a discussion and proposals for possible rhetorical counter-narratives.

## 2. Relevance of motivation-based counter-terrorism measures

Because governmental institutions like the European Union are interested in finding measures for countering terrorism, they try to identify active terrorist groups, but often neglect a comprehensive examination of the terrorist groups' different backgrounds and motives. However, as this study shows, terrorists' motives should be taken into consideration when developing counter-terrorism strategies. Hillebrand (2012), who investigates European counter-terrorism networks with a focus on policing, writes: "Yet many of the EU's CT [counter-terrorism; the authors] actions are of a rather administrative and regulative manner. Prominent examples concern the EU-US exchange of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data as well as the creation of terrorist lists and the subsequent freezing of financial assets of listed terrorist suspects or 'donors.'" (Hillebrand 2012, 6)

EU politicians are encouraged not to disseminate a discourse of fear, threat and administrative security measures in the media (cf. Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2008), but rather to offer matter-of-fact presentations and/or discussions of reasoning on the motives, causes and development of terrorism. The alternative discourse that politicians ought to bring to the media should not be based on "a culture of fear" (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2008: 6), but rather on motives of refuting terrorist messages. Furthermore, the Internet offers manifold possibilities for governments to directly communicate their counter-terrorism narratives. Narratives, in this context, are understood as the elements that constitute discourse. "Discourse is a category that belongs to and derives from the social domain, and text is a category that belongs to and derives from the linguistic domain. The relation between the two is one of realization: Discourse finds its expression in text." (Kress 1985: 27) Thus, a concept of narratives should underlie the counter-terrorism discourse that finds expression, e.g., in the statements of the EU or its respective member states.

It is not enough to develop measures that only treat the symptoms (terrorist acts, violent groups), but instead, the goal should be to develop methods of communicating anti-terrorist motives. We need to treat the underlying causes of the "malady," not just relieve its symptoms. Therefore, it is important to categorize the listed groups according to their motivational drives. Relying on his list of varieties of counter-terrorism, Crelinsten (2014: 10-11) concludes:

Counterterrorism cannot be merely reactive or coercive, otherwise it risks creating a bunker mentality, triggering resentment and backlash that risks promoting terrorist recruitment as a result, and missing the next new development. It must therefore be proactive, looking ahead and trying to out-smart the terrorist, and plan ahead, thinking preventively. It must also be persuasive, convincing terrorists to abandon their destructive paths and supporters and sympathizers to seek other, non-violent ways to achieve their goals.

His concrete suggestions will be presented in the discussion section of this article.

## 3. The never-ending problem of defining terrorism

Although terrorism is not a new phenomenon, no comprehensive, universally accepted definition exists (Waldmann, 2001). Hirschmann (2003) concludes that almost no term is as diverse and controversial as "terrorism," and political positions often influence the choice of definition. The *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* includes a selection of more than 250 definitions that emphasize different attributes (Easson and Schmid, 2013).

This paper focuses on non-state terrorism. Therefore, "terrorism" is conceptualized here as an attack on political authorities or a state and its institutions. Waldmann (2001) characterizes terrorism as an act of violence against a political order. These acts are distinguished by arbitrariness and brutality, intended to arouse fear but also create sympathy and willingness to support the terrorists' goals. Furthermore, terrorists plan and organize their attacks clandestinely. As terrorist groups are usually not strong enough to occupy and control a territory or to openly challenge a regime, operating illegally and in secrecy seems to be their only realistic option (Waldmann, 2001). Provocation is another common tactic, in which a weak individual or group challenges a superior and more powerful foe by making sudden surprise attacks and violating social norms (Waldmann, 2001). The weaker party's aim is to provoke the stronger to resort to violence in self-defense, hoping thereby to convince the public that the state is brutal and unjust, and the attacker is the real victim of injustice. This paper, however, does not focus on military defense, but rather on communicative counter-strategies.

Corlett (2003) provides a definition of terrorism similar to Waldmann's (2001):

Terrorism is the attempt to achieve (or prevent) political, social, economic, or religious change by the actual or threatened use of violence against other persons or other persons' property; the violence (or threat thereof) employed therein is aimed partly at destabilizing (or maintaining) an existing political or social order, but mainly at publicizing the goals or causes espoused by the agents or by those on whose behalf the agents act; often though not always, terrorism is aimed at provoking extreme counter-measures which will win public support for the terrorists and their goals or causes. (Corlett, 2003: 19-20)

Taken together, the definitions of Corlett (2003) and Waldmann (2001) show that terrorist acts promote a message: Through the use of violence, terrorists seek publicity, aim to create awareness of a certain issue, and try to persuade a government to change its policies. Thus, terrorist acts have a symbolic character. Their purpose is not killing, kidnapping, or destruction for its own sake, but rather to gain attention (Waldmann, 2001; see also Hirschmann, 2003; Balagangadhara & De Roover, 2010). Schmid (2013b) therefore defines terrorism as a combination of violence and communication. Terrorists want to make their motives known to the public. Although the terrorist's message is generally addressed to a government (in the case of non-state terrorism), innocent civilians are often the ones directly affected by the terrorists' acts (Schmid, 2013b; Waldmann, 2001; Balagangadhara & De Roover, 2010).

#### 4. Terrorist groups listed by the European Union

In order to choose a relevant set of terrorist groups for categorizing according to the Waldmann typology of motivations, the European Union list of terrorist groups was used because of its currency, accessibility and European focus. We find a gap in current research, as scholars usually examine only US lists and counter-strategies (The Council of the European Union, 2013). For a critical perspective on the influence of terrorism lists, cf. Kaleck, 2011). The Council of the European Union (2001: 93) defines terrorist acts as:

intentional acts, which ... may seriously damage a country or an international organization ... with the aim of: (i) seriously intimidating a population, or (ii) unduly compelling a Government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or (iii) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.

In its definition, the EU emphasizes the terrorists' objective to force/constrain a government to take/refrain from certain actions, and the perspective is clearly oriented toward non-state terrorist groups (see also Baker-Beall, 2014). The definition also accentuates the terrorists' aim of political, social, economic or constitutional change and thus takes into account the variety of motivations of the different terrorist organizations. The European Union's list of terrorist groups includes only organizations that have already committed or threatened to commit terrorist acts, or which support such actions; for example by providing other terrorist entities with financial or technological resources (The Council of the European Union, 2001). Therefore, the list does not include groups that promulgate extremist ideologies or seek radical changes, but do not engage in terrorist activities.

Another advantage of relying on the EU list is its currency. The list of terrorist groups is reviewed and revised at least every six months. Groups that are no longer active can be deleted from the list and new organizations added. The last revision prior to this study was made in July 2013. At that time, the EU identified 26 organizations as terrorist entities according to articles 2, 3, and 4 of the EU Common Position (2001/931/CFSP) on the use of specific measures to combat terrorism. This means not only that these entities are designated as terrorist groups, but also that their financial assets, funds, and economic resources have been frozen and may not be made available to benefit any group designated by the EU as a terrorist organization (Council of the European Union, 2001).

Besides these 26 entities, the EU identified 18 terrorist organizations to which only article 4 of the EU Common Position 2001/931/CFSP applies. The article states:

Member States shall, through police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the framework of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, afford each other the widest possible assistance in preventing and combating terrorist acts. To that end they shall, with respect to enquiries and proceedings conducted by their authorities in respect of any of the persons, groups and entities listed in the Annex, fully exploit, upon request, their existing powers in accordance with acts of the European Union and other international agreements, arrangements and conventions which are binding upon Member States. (The Council of the European Union, 2001: 94)

As these 18 groups lack the characteristics named in articles 2 and 3 of the Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, the European Union has not taken measures regarding their organizations' financial assets, funds, and economic resources.

Although the European Union offers a definition of terrorism and lists terrorist organizations, it does not give detailed information on the respective groups. Categorizing the different forms of terrorism can help to order the data and make possible a practical application to the political and social realms, thus enabling governments to

develop counter-narratives. Categorizing the listed terrorist groups based on Waldmann's (2001) typology can help to identify similarities between their organizations, reveal the main motives of contemporary terrorism, and increase our knowledge about the motivations that lie behind terrorist attacks and recruitment strategies. This can provide helpful information for counter-terrorism programs, such as developing responses that weaken the respective motivations.

## 5. Waldmann's typology of motivation

Typologies of terrorism can contribute to greater conceptual clarity, help to order complex data and can be practically applied to both the political and social realms (Marsden and Schmid, 2013). There are a variety of typologies of terrorism, differentiating for example domestic and international terrorism (Hirschmann, 2003), the execution of terrorist actions (Marsden and Schmid, 2013), non-state and vigilante terrorism (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982), or terrorist group organizational characteristics and goal structures (Piazza, 2009). Rapoport (2004) examined aspects of the history of non-state terror and concluded that there were four "waves": the anarchist, anti-colonial, New Left and religious waves. Rapoport (2004: 47) states that, "a different energy drives each," although he does not use the term "motive."

For the objectives of motive research, however, the present paper uses a typology suggested by Waldmann (2001), and similarly by Straßner (2004). In Waldmann's (2001) typology, the term "terrorism" is interpreted according to the definition explained above and refers to attacks against political authorities or a state's system of governance. It focuses on the terrorists' motives and self-conceptions, takes note of nationalistic and social-revolutionary groups, and considers religiously motivated terrorism independent of political objectives. The typology is based on self-images and ideology as sources of terrorists' motivations, as well as on objectives arising from a specific socio-historical background that also influences terrorists' actions. Straßner (2004) deals exclusively with insurgent terrorism.

Waldmann's typology was introduced in parts in the late 1980s (e.g., Waldmann, 1989) and was fully developed by the late 1990s/early 2000. We take into account past and current criticism of the typology and suggestions for modified or new typologies made by other researchers in the field (e.g., Wilkinson, 1987; Farnen, 1990; Paletz & Vinson, 1992; Liebl, 2006). However, a discussion of the academic debate on the suitability of particular terrorism typologies would go beyond the scope of this paper.

Waldmann (2001) and Straßner (2004) delineate three categories of terrorism: social-revolutionary terrorism, ethno-nationalist terrorism, and religious terrorism. In the case of social-revolutionary terrorism, terrorists seek political and social revolution based on Marxist/Leninist/Maoist ideals (Waldmann, 2001). Social-revolutionary terrorists aspire to create a society in which every citizen is equal and has the same rights and opportunities; therefore, radical changes would have to be made in politics, as well as in the economy, administration, and culture (Waldmann, 2001)

*Social-revolutionary terrorist organizations* rely expressis verbis, as well as implicitly, on Karl Marx and subsequent ideologies. They strive for a radical reformation of political and societal reality, with which they associate armed struggle against capitalism, imperialism and global inequality and injustice. (Straßner, 2004: 360)

The second category, ethno-nationalist terrorism, describes terrorist groups that represent a minority or a population group held to be oppressed. The main objective of ethno-nationalist terrorists is an independent state or at least some degree of political autonomy (Waldmann, 2001). Often terrorists justify their goals with appeals to their historical background, claiming that their people had a better life before they were dominated by a hostile regime (Waldmann, 2001). They further emphasize their culture, which they view as threatened, e.g., by modernization, migration, or the increasing power of the centralized state (Waldmann, 2001). According to Straßner, the main characteristic of ethno-nationalistically motivated terrorist groups results from the fact that "the clientele of these terrorists consists of an oppressed, ethnically allegedly definable minority mostly located in a superordinate state system perceived as an adversary. The core concern of ethno-nationalistically motivated terrorists thus lies primarily in the creation of an own state entity for the minority that feels oppressed" (Straßner, 2004: 361).

Religious terrorism, the third category, is often related to religious fundamentalism. Although this type of fundamentalism can be found in the history of each of the three chief monotheistic world religions, the currently most violent form is that of Islamist terrorists (Waldmann, 2001). Religiously motivated terrorists often share a millenarian vision. They further criticize the global trend of modernization and secularization and therefore dream of founding a society on religious principles (Waldmann, 2001). In regard to religiously motivated terrorism, Straßner points to a "currently observable tendency of commingling religious motivation with social-revolutionary and ethno-nationalist contents (Palestine)" (Straßner, 2004: 361).

In the following section, we will apply the presented typology of three major motivations to the European Union lists. We will discuss the limitations of the study before presenting our results in a comparative overview, as well as in the respective motivation categories.

## 6. Results

To obtain sufficient information about the terrorist groups' motives, we made an extensive exploratory literature review. The qualitative approach included gathering information from document collections, the groups' own (founding) documents (e.g. the IRA green book or the Hamas founding charter) and websites (e.g. pkkonline.com), scholarly journals (e.g., Perspectives on Terrorism). As well we used as the reports of newspapers and broadcasters in Europe, North America and Asia (e.g. BBC, CNN, German quality newspapers such as the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* or *Die Zeit*). Important sources for our research on the motives, histories, and activities of the groups were the databases of research institutes. These included the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism of the University of Maryland, governmental institutions like the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), as well as non-governmental organizations like the US-based Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) or the Mackenzie Institute in Canada.

Already at this stage, we want to call attention to the limitations of the study:

- Most of the material that we accessed and gathered was in English. This certainly limits the range of documents and perhaps even prevents a deeper understanding of the terrorists' motives, which would be better traceable if researchers studied texts by terrorists in their native language.
- Moreover, changes in motives can occur over time. We have tried to follow these changes, but we have mainly found only minor changes, while the original underlying motive remained the same.
- Also, we found many cases of groups that could be classified in more than one category, for example the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In these cases, we assigned a group to the category it shared the most similarities with, and we will explain below why we placed them in the particular category. However, in order to indicate the multi-motive background of certain groups, Figure 1 illustrates intersections. Furthermore, Rapoport (2004), who tried to classify terrorist groups into four "waves" (see above), admits that most groups show a dominant, but not just one unique "feature" (Rapoport, 2004: 47). For example, he places the Tamil Tigers in the "religious wave" category, because they are largely Hindus. However, having examined the declaration of motivational factors on the LTTE website and their recruitment strategies, we cannot agree with this classification.
- Another problem arose with organizations that do not explicitly state their own objectives related to terrorism, but instead support other terrorist groups, for instance through funding. For example, the al-Aqsa Foundation and Stichting al Aqsa portray themselves as charitable organizations dedicated to achieving humanitarian goals, but in fact support Hamas terrorist activities. In such cases, the particular organization was assigned to the same category as the terrorist group it supports.




Figure 1: Motive intersections

Based on the information gathered about the terrorist organizations' motives, we categorized the groups as shown in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 presents the categorization of the 26 entities to which articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply, whereas Table 2 shows the 18 terrorist organizations to which only article 4 of the Common Position 2001/931/CFSP applies. The latter are entities based within the European Union.

Based on our definition of "motives" (see above), in the following sub-sections we will examine the various different terrorist groups and outline the decisions leading to the classifications made above.

Social-revolutionary terrorism	Ethno-nationalist terrorism	Religious terrorism
Communist Party of the Philippines, including New People's Army (NPA)	Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO)	Al-Takfir and Al-Hijra
Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan-PKK)	Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade	Gama'a al-Islamiyya
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, NLA)	Al-Aqsa e.V.	İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi (IBDA-C)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	Babbar Khalsa	Hizballah Military Wing and all units reporting to it, including the External Security Organization
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-General Command)	Hamas, including Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem	Hofstadgroep
Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-FARC)	Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)	
Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP/C)	Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development	
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path-SL)	International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)	
	Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF)	
	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	
	Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)	
	Stichting Al Aqsa	
	Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan (TAK)	

Table 1: Categorization of the terrorist groups designated by the European Union following articles 2, 3, and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP

Social-revolutionary terrorism	Ethno-nationalist terrorism
Cooperativa Artigiana Fuoco ed Affini-Occasionalmente Spettacolare (Artisans' Cooperative Fire and Similar-Occasionally Spectacular)	Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
Nuclei Armati per il Comunismo (Armed Units for Communism)	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna / Tierra Vasca y Libertad (Basque Fatherland and Liberty-E.T.A.)
Cellula Contro Capitale, Carcere i suoi Carcerieri e le sue Celle (Cell Against Capital, Prison, Prison Warders and Prison Cells-CCCCC)	Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)
Epanastatikos Agonas (Revolutionary Struggle)	Orange Volunteers (OV)
Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre (Antifascist Resistance Groups First of October-G.R.A.P.O.)	Real IRA
Solidarietà Internazionale (International Solidarity)	Red Hand Defenders (RHD)
Brigate Rosse per la Costruzione del Partito Comunista Combattente (Red Brigades for the Construction of the Fighting Communist Party)	Ulster Defence Association / Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF)
Epanastatiki Pirines (Revolutionary Nuclei)	
Dekati Evdomi Noemvri (Revolutionary Organization 17 November)	
Brigata XX Luglio (Twentieth of July Brigade)	
Federazione Anarchica Informale (Unofficial Anarchist Federation-F.A.I.)	

Table 2: Categorization of the terrorist groups designated by the European Union following article 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP

## 6.1 Social-revolutionary terrorism

Within this motivation group, terrorist organizations often originate in communist parties (e.g. the NPA in the Communist Party of the Philippines, FARC in the Colombian Communist Party, G.R.A.P.O. as the armed wing of the Communist Party of Spain [Reconstituted], DHKP/C as an offshoot of the Devrimci Yol, a splinter group of the Turkish People's Liberation Party-Front). Often these groups can be traced back to student revolutionaries of the 1960s and 1970s (like PKK) or other left-wing intellectuals committed to the spread of Maoist ideology. Sendero Luminoso, for example, was founded by Abimael Guzmán, a philosophy professor and lecturer at the University in Ayacucho (Schmid 2013a). The NLA was founded by urban left-wing intellectuals and oil industry labor unionists, and was later joined by Catholic clergy committed to Liberation Theology. As well, the Nuclei Armati per il Comunismo had its roots in working classes that felt exploited and not fairly represented by the government. Therefore, Nuclei Armati per il Comunismo primarily attacked companies that employed illegal workers.

Social-revolutionary terrorist groups are far-left oriented and based on the ideologies of Marxism, Leninism and/or Maoism. The Columbian NLA, for example, adopts the Marxist ideologies that motivated Fidel Castro and Che Guevara in their 1959 overthrow of the Cuban government. These groups fight for revolutionary change of society, politics and economy, and can conceive of no means other than armed struggle and the overthrow of the nation state and its status quo politics in order to found a new state based on socialism and communism. Thus, many of these groups emphasize their wish for total equality among all citizens. For instance, the PKK claims to have strengthened the social role of women: "When before the women of Kurdistan were ignored and oppressed, today they are leading the way in all the social and political spheres of the struggle and daily life" (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, 2011). The PKK further stresses the role of the proletariat and demands that Kurdish society should be based on the principles of communism, so that it will become "an alternative to capitalist modernity" (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, 2011).

Social-revolutionary groups are opposed to imperialism, globalization, capitalism, and police violence. Thus, they attack political and military installations, diplomatic personnel and facilities, political leaders and institutions, national security and military officials, banks, government and office buildings. Or they extort concessions from foreign investors, businessmen and foreign-owned (often US-owned) companies within their country. They furthermore try to block "capitalist" construction projects and want to ban capitalist companies from their countries. Except for the PFLP, suicide bombings are not at all a common tactic of these groups. Usually, the terrorist groups are dissatisfied with the policies of their respective countries for labor relations and the economy, as well as foreign relations. FARC, for example, is strongly influenced by Marxist ideals and claims that it protects Colombian citizens against the rule of elites, neo-imperialism, and repressive violence by the Colombian government and paramilitary forces. FARC further criticizes the monopolization of resources by multinational corporations and the influence of the United States on Colombian affairs (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013h). Other groups, such as the DHKP/C, criticize modern Western societies and are strongly opposed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and even the EU, as well as to the US, because they believe that their governments are controlled by Western imperialists. Some groups, like CCCCC and Solidarietà Internazionale, express solidarity with incarcerated members of their networks, and proclaim as a goal the liberation of these members. The groups are also closely committed to anarchist and antifascist ideologies.

There have been reports of alliances between the groups, for example between the NLA and FARC. The Federazione Anarchica Informale (F.A.I.) maintains close relations with other Italian anarchist groups such as CCCCC, Brigata XX Luglio, and Solidarietà Internazionale. The F.A.I. links all these groups and functions as an umbrella organization. Many of the groups are based either in Europe (most of them in southern European countries like Italy, Spain or Greece) or Latin America (NLA, FARC, Sendero Luminoso), although the Latin American groups have a much larger membership.

For the religiously influenced social-revolutionary groups operating in the Middle East and fighting to take back Palestine for the Palestinians, categorizing these groups is more difficult (as in fact that they combine all three motives; cf. Figure 1). We have chosen to base our classification on the most important argument with which they try to characterize their struggle. For the PFLP, the second largest faction of the PLO, e.g., the liberation of Palestine is more of a subordinate goal. In fact, the PFLP seems to be influenced mainly by Marxism-Leninism: the organization wants to combine communist ideology with Arab left-wing nationalism in order to eliminate all Western influences from the Middle East (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2014). Left-wing Arabian nationalism is a movement that seeks to unite all Arab nations to form a single state, with the destruction of Israel perceived as necessary to unite the Arab nations and establish communism. The organization's members do not want to destroy Israel because they feel oppressed; instead they want to unite many countries and, based on the ideals of Marx and Lenin, create a nation in which every citizen is equal (<http://www.pflp-pal.org/strategy.html>).

## 6.2 Ethno-nationalist terrorism

We classify other groups operating in the Middle East in the category of ethno-nationalist terrorism. They feel oppressed by Israel and demand the creation of a liberal, autonomous Palestine. ANO, for example, seeks to destroy Israel as a nation and to liberate Palestine. The founder, Abu Nidal, was primarily driven by anger at the expulsion of his family from Palestine in 1948, during the Israeli War of Independence (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013a). The group has opposed any peace negotiations and believes that the total liberation of Palestine can only be achieved by armed struggle (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013a). Strong nationalism can be ascribed to all of the Middle Eastern groups. They seek to expel the Israelis from Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank to create a Palestinian nation-state. Therefore, the organizations' attacks are mainly targeted at Israeli settlers and security forces in the mentioned regions, but also at Palestinians who are perceived to support Israel (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013b). On the other hand, they provide assistance to Palestinian refugees.

Also placed in this category are groups that disguise themselves as "international charity associations" to raise funds for Hamas, and thus agree with Hamas' ethno-nationalist motivation: e.g., the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, the Al-Aqsa Foundation and Stichting Al Aqsa. They have collected donations in mosques, Islamic centers, and during demonstrations on the Arab-Israeli conflict (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2002). They are also active in recruitment and providing logistical support (US Department of the Treasury, 2007).

Here, again, the problem arises of categorizing Middle Eastern groups due to their multiple motives. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, for example, features a mosque and Islamic script in their logo, but the creation of an Islamic state is not an explicit goal of the group (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013b). Similarly, in its slogan and charter, Hamas refers to Allah and accentuates Jihad – i.e., war or struggle against those who do not believe in Allah. Although the group draws on Islamic themes, its main objective is the liberation of Palestine from Israel, which characterizes Hamas more as an ethno-nationalist terrorist group than a religious one. Piazza (2009: 66) states that Hamas "is functionally a national-liberation movement." And although Hizbul Mujahideen seeks to spread Islam in Jammu and Kashmir, its ethnically-motivated activities primarily concentrate on winning the political independence of Jammu and Kashmir from India, seeking to integrate them with Pakistan. As one can legitimately question why we have not assigned more "Islamist" groups to the religious motive category, we further justify our choice with a last example: the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Even though the PIJ perceives the Arab-Israeli conflict as of a religious nature and promotes Jihad (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013g), the organization does not display the usual characteristics of religious terrorism: The PIJ's objectives are neither the spread of religion nor a society based on religious principles. In an interview with a delegation from the World Federation of Scientists in 2009 (Atran and Axelrod, 2010), PIJ leader Ramadan Abdullah Shallah emphasized that the organization's motives are not of a religious nature: "*We don't want a state based on religious identity*" (Atran and Axelrod, 2010: 4). Unlike religious terrorists, the PIJ does not demand a state based on Islam:

*I have no problem living with the Jewish people. We have lived together in peace for centuries. And if Netanyahu were to ask if we can live together in one state, I would say to him: 'If we have exactly the same rights as Jews to come to all of Palestine ... then we can have a new language, and dialogue is possible.'* (Atran and Axelrod, 2010: 8)

Instead of religious goals, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad focuses on achieving political independence by overthrowing the state of Israel (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013g). As the members of the PIJ perceive the Palestinians as oppressed by Israel and therefore fight for autonomy, the organization, in our eyes, practices a form of ethno-nationalist rather than religious terrorism.

Other demands for independent states and political autonomy are voiced by organizations of Sikhs: "Babbar Khalsa", the Khalistan Zindabad Force and the ISYF fighting against India in order to establish a state called "Khalistan." The LTTE feels oppressed by the Sinhalese, thus they are struggling against the government of Sri Lanka to gain independence and establish their own Tamil nation. TAK aspires to create a Kurdish state, the ETA a Basque one, and violent Irish Republican nationalist terrorist groups fought against British Army and Northern Ireland Security Forces, seeking to unite Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. Of course, most of the groups' members belong to the respective ethnic group (Basque, Kashmiri, etc.). To justify their violent nationalist struggle, the groups often appeal to their own history and culture, which differ from the dominant national ones. Members killed in the struggle are revered as saints and martyrs who were oppressed and treated unjustly by the national state.

An exception to the groups listed above – whose objective is their own nation-state – are loyalist terrorist groups that want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom and oppose a united Ireland (Kushner, 2003). Although they do not want to establish their own state, but rather maintain the status quo as part of the UK and were originally differentiated on the basis of religion – Irish nationalist groups are Catholic, UK loyalist groups are

Protestant –, these groups can still be seen as ethno-nationalist organizations. The UDA, Orange Volunteers, and LVF want to maintain the current status quo for Northern Ireland and remain part of the UK. They condemn Republican nationalist terrorist groups and the Republic of Ireland for interfering in Northern Ireland's internal affairs, and for the attempted "gallicization" of Northern Ireland, which they perceive as a threat to the country's British culture. Therefore, they have tried to destabilize the peace process and block a political settlement.

Also in this category, we can see the origin of some organizations as splinter groups of political parties, albeit less so than in the social-revolutionary terrorism category: The Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, for example, was established as a military arm of Al Fatah (Anti-Defamation League, 2013). Hizbul Mujahideen was founded in 1989 as the militant wing of the Islamic Pakistani party "Jamaat-e-Islami" (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013e). And Palestinian Islamic Jihad emerged as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. There is often co-operation among the groups, e.g., between Khalistan Zindabad Force and Hizbul Mujahideen. Additionally, many of the ethno-nationalist groups have influential diasporas – as well in Western countries including Canada, the USA, and European states – that are active in funding and recruitment (e.g. the Tamils and Sikhs). The ISYF was even founded in the United Kingdom as an international branch of the All India Sikh Students' Federation (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2001a).

Regarding the date of foundation, there is no specific time-frame for the emergence of the groups in this category. Most sprang to life after an outrage committed against their respective ethnic group by those in national power. Regarding targets, ethno-nationalist terrorist groups are typically of two types: Some operate only within their respective national borders; others have been active in terrorist operations in many countries. The ANU, for example, is allegedly responsible for attacks in 20 different countries, including the US, UK, Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey. The Middle Eastern groups that fight for an autonomous Palestinian state independent of Israel aspire to destroy Israel and thus target all institutions, states, officials, politicians, or religious buildings linked to it. ANO, for example, hijacked a Pan American World Airways flight and was responsible for a shooting spree at a synagogue. Further, accessible public spaces like bus-stops, restaurants, and shopping malls are frequent targets of terrorist attacks – often suicide attacks.

Babbar Khalsa detonated two bombs in movie theaters in Delhi; the Hizbul Mujahideen attack Indian politicians and security forces in the Kashmir region; the ISYF and the Khalistan Zindabad Force target Indian Hindus, symbolic figures like the Deputy Superintendent of Police (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2001b), and also Sikhs perceived as adversaries. The LTTE has attacked politicians, airplanes, banks and Buddhist religious sites, mostly on Sri Lankan territory. TAK contends that the Turkish government finances the oppression of the Kurds, mainly with income from tourism; thus, the organization's terrorist operations concentrate on disrupting tourism in Turkey by attacking Turkish and foreign civilians in popular tourist areas. In sum, we can say that the groups target their "ethnic" enemies, i.e. the groups they think oppress or threaten them. In this way, they vent their motivational feeling of ethnic oppression.

### 6.3 Religious Terrorism

Even though the main share of media coverage, political debates, and even research deals with religious terrorism, surprisingly few groups are assigned to this category. Those listed are all Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups. They operate on an international level: examples include the train bombings in Madrid, the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands, and bombings at US or French military or government facilities like consulates, embassies or military bases. These attacks are of a symbolic nature, intended to draw attention to and condemn the nation represented by the targets. Except for the Hofstadgroep – whose name was coined by the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service and later adopted by the media (Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, 2008) – all the groups allude to Islam or Allah in their names, e.g., "Islamic Group" (Gama'a's al-Islamiyya) or "Islamic Great Eastern Raiders' Front" (IBDA-C).

The groups' motives stem from a rejection of and opposition to Western globalization, along with modern norms and values that the groups' members consider incompatible with Islamic law. Al-Takfir and Al-Hijra, for example, see Islamic society as mired in a phase of weakness. Therefore, the group began to migrate (to mountain caves or special rented rooms) and isolate itself in an effort to avoid influences it perceived as negative. In unpopulated areas, they strove to create an Islamic community that would realize their understanding of an ideal Islamic society. Gama'a al-Islamiyya, on the other hand, wants to transform Egypt into an Islamic state and fights the Egyptian government by attacking security forces, government officials, Coptic Christians, tourists, and Egyptians who it perceives to oppose Islam (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013c). The IBDA-C seeks the foundation of a Sunni Islamic federated state in the Middle East in which everyone obeys Islamic commandments and laws. Members claim that secularism in Turkey is illegal and call for reestablishing the Caliphate. Judaism, Christianity, and Western societies are perceived as evil (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013f). Likewise, the dominant goal of the Hezbollah Military Wing is to establish a Shi'ite theocracy in Lebanon. The Hezbollah Military Wing wants to destroy Israel and fights against influences from Western societies or other religions (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013d).

These organizations espouse a very strict interpretation of Islam, emphasize the importance of Jihad, and some strive for total withdrawal from modern society. They want to exclude non-Muslims from the public sphere in these countries. Their objectives are based only on Islam, and the groups do not pursue political goals, e.g. political liberation. Some are reportedly financed by Middle Eastern states. In this category there are also examples of terrorist motives that stem not from the poor working classes, but instead adopt the ideas of radical intellectuals: Al-Takfir and Al-Hijra were founded by an agricultural engineer (Gleis, 2005), and Gama'a Al-Islamiyya started as an Egyptian student organization.

## 7. Discussion and Outlook: Rhetorical counter-narratives

The European Union – like many other institutions – is concerned about terrorism and has taken measures to counter it. For instance, European Union agencies have been commissioned to identify active terrorist groups based on the terrorism definition provided by the Council of the European Union. This definition is similar to many researchers' understanding of terrorism. However, the European Union provides no information on the motives and goals of the different terrorist organizations. But, as presented above, the terrorists' actions are heavily influenced by their motivational ideology, objectives, and socio-historical background. Thus, to understand the terrorists' activities, these aspects must also be considered.

Consequently, the purpose of this paper was to give insights into the motives and ideologies of the 44 organizations listed in July 2013 as terrorist entities by the Council of the European Union. Thereby we wanted to contribute to reducing the "lack [of] a systematic comparison of the aims sought by organizations" (Rapoport, 2004: 73). As the organization of goal attainment is a crucial factor of motivational drives (Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2010), we could deduce the motives from a thorough review of primary and secondary literature, such as terrorist groups' websites and databases. For more clarity regarding the groups' objectives and to reveal trends, the organizations were categorized using terms from Waldmann's and Straßner's typology, which is based on terrorists' motives and differentiates three forms of terrorism: ethno-nationalist, social-revolutionary, and religious terrorism. Categorizing the entities identified by the European Union reveals that the majority of the terrorist organizations are of an ethno-nationalistic nature: 20 groups, i.e., almost half of the listed entities, display characteristics of this type of terrorist motivation. Almost as many (19 entities) display social-revolutionary motives. In contrast, only five organizations are actually motivated by religious goals. This is consistent with Rapoport's observation that "nationalism or separatism is the most frequently espoused cause" (Rapoport, 2004: 65).

Some groups displayed characteristics of two categories. For instance, several groups appealed to Islam or Sikhism, but in most cases, religion was primarily an attribute the members of the group had in common rather than a driver of their terrorist attacks. Often these groups pursued a nation independent of a state currently perceived as an oppressor. In general, this objective was not based on religious motivation, but on pure nationalism and historical or cultural aspects. This finding supports an observation already made by Hirschmann (2003), who stated that many terrorist entities use religion mainly to justify their actions, whereas their goals and motives are mainly of a political nature. This result can be explained by the role of religion in societies: Religion establishes a social framework and is able to create a stronger bond between people than could a political ideology (Hirschmann 2003). Therefore, appealing to religious faith increases the legitimacy of the terrorists' actions and helps to recruit new members and supporters. Another finding of this study is that many of the presented terrorist entities are active in Israel and focus on the liberation of Palestine. This underlines the critical situation of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the need for continuing political dialogue and actions.

In sum, it can be said that although a large number of terrorist organizations appeal to religion, the main driving forces behind terrorism are still ethno-nationalism and the demand for a social revolution. When countering terrorism, these aspects should be considered as the specific motives influencing not only why, but also how a group operates – in which realm and with which targets – and thus help to achieve a better understanding of terrorism. Knowing the specific motives of a terrorist group can only be a starting point for a more complex analysis of terrorists' communication and – taking into consideration their rhetoric, target audiences, communication channels and communication contents – the development of a strategic communication concept for countering terrorism. This again can help to improve political measures like precautions, prevention, or dialogues with terrorists, which governments have so often neglected (Baker-Beall, 2014). Of course, it remains to be seen whether this analysis gives any justification to argue for the effectiveness of any specific rhetorical counter-narratives. Yet, it certainly is a start to take into account the various motives of terrorism in anti-terrorist communication and to address not only the "symptoms," but also the "malady" and causes underlying the founding of violent groups.

As we have already discussed the limitations of this study (see above), we now want to emphasize the implications of our categorization for anti-terrorism policymaking. Until now, EU anti-terrorism discourse does not focus on motive-based counter-strategies (Baker-Beall, 2014). Crelinsten (2014) identified five different approaches to counter-terrorism: coercive, proactive, persuasive, defensive, and long-term. We suggest that our findings can contribute to persuasive counter-terrorism, which "involves understanding and dealing with the ideas

that underpin the use of terrorism in social and political life. This has ideological, political, social, cultural and religious aspects" (Crelinsten, 2014: 6). Whereas other models such as the coercive approach rely "on the state's monopoly of the use on violence, i.e., the exercise of hard power" (Crelinsten, 2014: 2), the persuasive approach explicitly includes a communication model as one of the most important tools in counter-terrorism measures. Crelinsten's "persuasive communication model" of terrorism response speaks of the distribution of information to different target audiences. The communication narratives have to be "expressive and symbolic as well as instrumental" (Crelinsten, 2014: 6), and in our case have to be designed according to the three different motives identified in our study. That means, for example, that even though Hamas and the PFLP pursue quite similar goals (i.e., the liberation of Palestine), persuasive counter-terrorism efforts should be structured differently. For Hamas, national security and government experts could employ an inter-ethnic understanding counter-narrative, whereas to fight the PFLP an anti-socialist counter-narrative would be more suitable. These counter-narratives could be promulgated via comments on websites that are frequently used by the respective terrorist group's followers. Our research showed that the goals of terrorist groups can be the same (e.g., the liberation of Palestine, the creation of a Kurdish state), even though their motivation may be different (PFLP vs. Hamas; PKK vs. TAK). Consequently, the response to and communication with them must also be different. Whereas the PKK is primarily driven by the desire to establish communism and thus claims to aspire to achieve equality for all citizens, TAK does not emphasize such social-revolutionary goals. Therefore, to deter potentially interested individuals from joining these groups, the EU should write their posts (e.g. on Social Media websites of PKK) not in an explicitly anti-communist frame but should instead emphasize the achievements and benefits of democracy. These differences in motives have sometimes even been the reason for the breakup of groups and the creation of splinter groups, as, for example, is the case with Republican groups (e.g., the IRA) in Northern Ireland.

In order to describe the EU's strategic communication in more detail, we will now focus on the differences between reflective and non-reflective rhetoric. This is important, as terrorists or individuals interested in terrorist groups' ideology often do not feel up to discussing certain assumptions. As Lederman states, "Specifically, the respondent will need to decide to what degree the opposition's rhetoric should be reflected, and which features of it should be mirrored. Those decisions may together constitute a strategy which may, broadly, be termed reflective or non-reflective" (Lederman, 1991: 42). Therefore, to directly and openly contradict ideological assumptions is not viewed as the best and most effective persuasion technique. It is rather "an outmoded and inappropriate model of communication that is poorly adapted to the task of persuading audiences already hostile to the messenger and disenchanted with the message" (Corman et al., 2008: 5). More suitable would instead be non-reflective rhetoric that tries to focus on motives that in fact counter the ones inherent to the terrorist group but does not try to "discredit" them. In the case of Hezbollah, for example, the EU should not attack and denigrate Islam as such, but rather focus on the benefits of secular state systems and religious pluralism. This, as Palmerton says, will have an effect on the actions of terrorist groups, because "the rhetoric of terrorism is created in large part by those responding to terrorist acts" (Palmerton, 1988: 106).

Finally, it must be noted that the above findings are based only on information about the terrorist entities listed by the European Union in July 2013. As the Council of the European Union reviews its list at least every six months, new groups may be added in the future and thus their motives should also be analyzed and categorized. Besides, as discussed above, the motives, objectives and ideology of a terrorist organization may change over time. Therefore, a regular review of the different groups' classification is suggested, preferably including reference to documentary evidence in various different languages. With this in mind, we hope that the general categorization provided by this study can guide future research on terrorist motives.

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